On 5/25/23 12:54 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
The rest of BPF subsystem follows the rule that if process managed to
get BPF object FD, then it has an ownership of this object, and thus can
query any information about it, or update it. Doing something special in
GET_INFO_BY_FD operation based on bpf_capable() goes against that
philosophy, so drop the check and unify the approach with the rest of
bpf() syscall.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 11 -----------
1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 1d74c0a8d903..b07453ce10e7 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -4022,17 +4022,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file,
info.verified_insns = prog->aux->verified_insns;
- if (!bpf_capable()) {
- info.jited_prog_len = 0;
- info.xlated_prog_len = 0;
- info.nr_jited_ksyms = 0;
- info.nr_jited_func_lens = 0;
- info.nr_func_info = 0;
- info.nr_line_info = 0;
- info.nr_jited_line_info = 0;
- goto done;
- }
Isn't this leaking raw kernel pointers from JIT image this way for unpriv? I think that
is the main reason why we guarded this (originally behind !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) back
then..
ulen = info.xlated_prog_len;
info.xlated_prog_len = bpf_prog_insn_size(prog);
if (info.xlated_prog_len && ulen) {
