Re: [PATCH bpf-next 06/10] bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations

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On Thu, May 4, 2023 at 1:13 PM Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Tue, May 02, 2023 at 04:06:15PM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > Move out flags validation and license checks out of the permission
> > checks. They were intermingled, which makes subsequent changes harder.
> > Clean this up: perform straightforward flag validation upfront, and
> > fetch and check license later, right where we use it. Also consolidate
> > capabilities check in one block, right after basic attribute sanity
> > checks.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
> >  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> > index 2e5ca52c45c4..d960eb476754 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> > @@ -2573,18 +2573,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
> >       struct btf *attach_btf = NULL;
> >       int err;
> >       char license[128];
> > -     bool is_gpl;
> > -
> > -     /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
> > -      * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
> > -      * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
> > -      * object creation success.  Capabilities are later verified for
> > -      * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
> > -      * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
> > -      * and other operations.
> > -      */
> > -     if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
> > -             return -EPERM;
> >
> >       if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_PROG_LOAD))
> >               return -EINVAL;
> > @@ -2598,21 +2586,22 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
> >                                BPF_F_XDP_DEV_BOUND_ONLY))
> >               return -EINVAL;
> >
> > +     /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
> > +      * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
> > +      * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
> > +      * object creation success.  Capabilities are later verified for
> > +      * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
> > +      * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
> > +      * and other operations.
> > +      */
> > +     if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
> > +             return -EPERM;
> > +
>
> Since that part was done in patch 1. Move it into right spot in patch 1 right away?

fair enough, will do it right away in patch 1

>
> >       if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&
> >           (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) &&
> >           !bpf_capable())
> >               return -EPERM;
> >
> > -     /* copy eBPF program license from user space */
> > -     if (strncpy_from_bpfptr(license,
> > -                             make_bpfptr(attr->license, uattr.is_kernel),
> > -                             sizeof(license) - 1) < 0)
> > -             return -EFAULT;
> > -     license[sizeof(license) - 1] = 0;
> > -
> > -     /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
> > -     is_gpl = license_is_gpl_compatible(license);
> > -
> >       if (attr->insn_cnt == 0 ||
> >           attr->insn_cnt > (bpf_capable() ? BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS : BPF_MAXINSNS))
> >               return -E2BIG;
> > @@ -2700,7 +2689,16 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
> >       prog->jited = 0;
> >
> >       atomic64_set(&prog->aux->refcnt, 1);
> > -     prog->gpl_compatible = is_gpl ? 1 : 0;
> > +
> > +     /* copy eBPF program license from user space */
> > +     if (strncpy_from_bpfptr(license,
> > +                             make_bpfptr(attr->license, uattr.is_kernel),
> > +                             sizeof(license) - 1) < 0)
> > +             return -EFAULT;
>
> This 'return' is incorrect. It misses lots of cleanup.
> Should probably be 'goto free_prog_sec', but pls double check.
> We don't have tests to check error handling. Just lucky code review.
>

yep, lucky indeed. My bad, I should have adjusted it to `goto free_prog_sec;`.


> > +     license[sizeof(license) - 1] = 0;
> > +
> > +     /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
> > +     prog->gpl_compatible = license_is_gpl_compatible(license) ? 1 : 0;
> >
> >       if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux)) {
> >               err = bpf_prog_dev_bound_init(prog, attr);
> > --
> > 2.34.1
> >





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