Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 03/11] bpf: Fix partial dynptr stack slot reads/writes

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On Wed, Jan 18, 2023 at 6:14 PM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
<memxor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Currently, while reads are disallowed for dynptr stack slots, writes are
> not. Reads don't work from both direct access and helpers, while writes
> do work in both cases, but have the effect of overwriting the slot_type.
>
> While this is fine, handling for a few edge cases is missing. Firstly,
> a user can overwrite the stack slots of dynptr partially.
>
> Consider the following layout:
> spi: [d][d][?]
>       2  1  0
>
> First slot is at spi 2, second at spi 1.
> Now, do a write of 1 to 8 bytes for spi 1.
>
> This will essentially either write STACK_MISC for all slot_types or
> STACK_MISC and STACK_ZERO (in case of size < BPF_REG_SIZE partial write
> of zeroes). The end result is that slot is scrubbed.
>
> Now, the layout is:
> spi: [d][m][?]
>       2  1  0
>
> Suppose if user initializes spi = 1 as dynptr.
> We get:
> spi: [d][d][d]
>       2  1  0
>
> But this time, both spi 2 and spi 1 have first_slot = true.
>
> Now, when passing spi 2 to dynptr helper, it will consider it as
> initialized as it does not check whether second slot has first_slot ==
> false. And spi 1 should already work as normal.
>
> This effectively replaced size + offset of first dynptr, hence allowing
> invalid OOB reads and writes.
>
> Make a few changes to protect against this:
> When writing to PTR_TO_STACK using BPF insns, when we touch spi of a
> STACK_DYNPTR type, mark both first and second slot (regardless of which
> slot we touch) as STACK_INVALID. Reads are already prevented.
>
> Second, prevent writing to stack memory from helpers if the range may
> contain any STACK_DYNPTR slots. Reads are already prevented.
>
> For helpers, we cannot allow it to destroy dynptrs from the writes as
> depending on arguments, helper may take uninit_mem and dynptr both at
> the same time. This would mean that helper may write to uninit_mem
> before it reads the dynptr, which would be bad.
>
> PTR_TO_MEM: [?????dd]
>
> Depending on the code inside the helper, it may end up overwriting the
> dynptr contents first and then read those as the dynptr argument.
>
> Verifier would only simulate destruction when it does byte by byte
> access simulation in check_helper_call for meta.access_size, and
> fail to catch this case, as it happens after argument checks.
>
> The same would need to be done for any other non-trivial objects created
> on the stack in the future, such as bpf_list_head on stack, or
> bpf_rb_root on stack.
>
> A common misunderstanding in the current code is that MEM_UNINIT means
> writes, but note that writes may also be performed even without
> MEM_UNINIT in case of helpers, in that case the code after handling meta
> && meta->raw_mode will complain when it sees STACK_DYNPTR. So that
> invalid read case also covers writes to potential STACK_DYNPTR slots.
> The only loophole was in case of meta->raw_mode which simulated writes
> through instructions which could overwrite them.
>
> A future series sequenced after this will focus on the clean up of
> helper access checks and bugs around that.
>
> Fixes: 97e03f521050 ("bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs")
> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c                         | 102 ++++++++++++++++++
>  .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c |   6 +-
>  2 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index eeb6f1b2bd60..09c09d9bfd89 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -769,6 +769,8 @@ static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
>         __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true);
>  }
>
> +static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> +                                       struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi);
>
>  static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
>                                    enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx)
> @@ -863,6 +865,69 @@ static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_re
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> +static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> +                              struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
> +
> +static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> +                                       struct bpf_func_state *state, int spi)
> +{
> +       int i;
> +
> +       /* We always ensure that STACK_DYNPTR is never set partially,
> +        * hence just checking for slot_type[0] is enough. This is
> +        * different for STACK_SPILL, where it may be only set for
> +        * 1 byte, so code has to use is_spilled_reg.
> +        */
> +       if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR)
> +               return 0;
> +
> +       /* Reposition spi to first slot */
> +       if (!state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
> +               spi = spi + 1;
> +
> +       if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) {
> +               verbose(env, "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr\n");
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +       }
> +
> +       mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
> +       mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - 1);
> +
> +       /* Writing partially to one dynptr stack slot destroys both. */
> +       for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
> +               state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
> +               state->stack[spi - 1].slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
> +       }
> +
> +       /* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */
> +       if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) {

We'll never get here because referenced dynptrs can't be overwritten
(we check this above and return -EINVAL if dynptr_type_refcounted() is
true).
I think we should invalidate any slices associated with non-referenced
dynptrs as well.

> +               int ref_obj_id = state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id;
> +               struct bpf_func_state *fstate;
> +               struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
> +
> +               bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, fstate, reg, ({
> +                       if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) {
> +                               if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
> +                                       __mark_reg_not_init(env, reg);
> +                               else
> +                                       __mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
> +                       }
> +               }));
> +       }
> +
> +       /* Do not release reference state, we are destroying dynptr on stack,
> +        * not using some helper to release it. Just reset register.
> +        */
> +       __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
> +       __mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
> +
> +       /* Same reason as unmark_stack_slots_dynptr above */
> +       state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
> +       state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
>  {
>         struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
> @@ -3391,6 +3456,10 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>                         env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true;
>         }
>
> +       err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi);
> +       if (err)
> +               return err;
> +
>         mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
>         if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && register_is_bounded(reg) &&
>             !register_is_null(reg) && env->bpf_capable) {
> @@ -3504,6 +3573,14 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>         if (err)
>                 return err;
>
> +       for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
> +               int spi;
> +
> +               spi = __get_spi(i);
> +               err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi);
> +               if (err)
> +                       return err;
> +       }
>
>         /* Variable offset writes destroy any spilled pointers in range. */
>         for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {
> @@ -5531,6 +5608,31 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
>         }
>
>         if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
> +               /* Ensure we won't be overwriting dynptrs when simulating byte
> +                * by byte access in check_helper_call using meta.access_size.
> +                * This would be a problem if we have a helper in the future
> +                * which takes:
> +                *
> +                *      helper(uninit_mem, len, dynptr)
> +                *
> +                * Now, uninint_mem may overlap with dynptr pointer. Hence, it
> +                * may end up writing to dynptr itself when touching memory from
> +                * arg 1. This can be relaxed on a case by case basis for known
> +                * safe cases, but reject due to the possibilitiy of aliasing by
> +                * default.
> +                */
> +               for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
> +                       int stack_off = -i - 1;
> +
> +                       spi = __get_spi(i);
> +                       /* raw_mode may write past allocated_stack */
> +                       if (state->allocated_stack <= stack_off)
> +                               continue;
> +                       if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[stack_off % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_DYNPTR) {
> +                               verbose(env, "potential write to dynptr at off=%d disallowed\n", i);
> +                               return -EACCES;
> +                       }
> +               }
>                 meta->access_size = access_size;
>                 meta->regno = regno;
>                 return 0;
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c
> index 02d57b95cf6e..9dc3f23a8270 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c
> @@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ int invalid_write1(void *ctx)
>   * offset
>   */
>  SEC("?raw_tp")
> -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #3")
> +__failure __msg("cannot overwrite referenced dynptr")
>  int invalid_write2(void *ctx)
>  {
>         struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
> @@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ int invalid_write2(void *ctx)
>   * non-const offset
>   */
>  SEC("?raw_tp")
> -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #1")
> +__failure __msg("cannot overwrite referenced dynptr")
>  int invalid_write3(void *ctx)
>  {
>         struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
> @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static int invalid_write4_callback(__u32 index, void *data)
>   * be invalidated as a dynptr
>   */
>  SEC("?raw_tp")
> -__failure __msg("arg 1 is an unacquired reference")
> +__failure __msg("cannot overwrite referenced dynptr")
>  int invalid_write4(void *ctx)
>  {
>         struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
> --
> 2.39.1
>



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