On 12/19, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following issue on:
>
> HEAD commit: 041fae9c105a Merge tag 'f2fs-for-6.2-rc1' of git://git.ker..
> git tree: upstream
> console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=136be5d0480000
> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e2f3d9d232a3cac5
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=59af7bf76d795311da8c
> compiler: Debian clang version 13.0.1-++20220126092033+75e33f71c2da-1~exp1~20220126212112.63, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1650d477880000
> C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1305f993880000
>
> Downloadable assets:
> disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/e228bf558f91/disk-041fae9c.raw.xz
> vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/11eeb90801b7/vmlinux-041fae9c.xz
> kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/1f9651f3b5bd/bzImage-041fae9c.xz
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+59af7bf76d795311da8c@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_array kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1072 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_verifier_state+0x130/0xbe0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1250
> Write of size 80 at addr ffff888022c71000 by task syz-executor186/5067
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 5067 Comm: syz-executor186 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller-10971-g041fae9c105a #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
> dump_stack_lvl+0x1e3/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
> print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306
> print_report+0x107/0x220 mm/kasan/report.c:417
> kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:517
> kasan_check_range+0x2a7/0x2e0 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
> memcpy+0x3c/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
> copy_array kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1072 [inline]
> copy_verifier_state+0x130/0xbe0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1250
> pop_stack kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1314 [inline]
> do_check+0x8e51/0x107b0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:14031
> do_check_common+0x909/0x1800 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289
> do_check_main kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16352 [inline]
> bpf_check+0x107e2/0x16170 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16936
> bpf_prog_load+0x1306/0x1be0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2619
> __sys_bpf+0x396/0x6d0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4979
> __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5083 [inline]
> __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5081 [inline]
> __x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5081
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> RIP: 0033:0x7ff1fb190c29
> Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> RSP: 002b:00007ffeaae55678 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff1fb190c29
> RDX: 0000000000000048 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000005
> RBP: 00007ff1fb154dd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ff1fb154e60
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> </TASK>
>
> Allocated by task 5067:
> kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
> kasan_set_track+0x4c/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:52
> ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline]
> __kasan_krealloc+0xbf/0xf0 mm/kasan/common.c:439
> kasan_krealloc include/linux/kasan.h:231 [inline]
> __do_krealloc mm/slab_common.c:1361 [inline]
> krealloc+0xb2/0x110 mm/slab_common.c:1398
> push_jmp_history kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2592 [inline]
> is_state_visited kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13552 [inline]
> do_check+0x9433/0x107b0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13752
> do_check_common+0x909/0x1800 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289
> do_check_main kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16352 [inline]
> bpf_check+0x107e2/0x16170 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16936
> bpf_prog_load+0x1306/0x1be0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2619
> __sys_bpf+0x396/0x6d0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4979
> __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5083 [inline]
> __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5081 [inline]
> __x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5081
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>
> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888022c71000
> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
> The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> 96-byte region [ffff888022c71000, ffff888022c71060)
>
> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> page:ffffea00008b1c40 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x22c71
> ksm flags: 0xfff00000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
> raw: 00fff00000000200 ffff888012841780 ffffea0000a6d880 0000000000000003
> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> page_owner tracks the page as allocated
> page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 4437, tgid 4437 (udevd), ts 26581643327, free_ts 26581082061
> prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2531 [inline]
> get_page_from_freelist+0x72b/0x7a0 mm/page_alloc.c:4283
> __alloc_pages+0x259/0x560 mm/page_alloc.c:5549
> alloc_slab_page+0xbd/0x190 mm/slub.c:1851
> allocate_slab+0x5e/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:1998
> new_slab mm/slub.c:2051 [inline]
> ___slab_alloc+0x7f4/0xeb0 mm/slub.c:3193
> __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3292 [inline]
> __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3345 [inline]
> slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3442 [inline]
> __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x25b/0x340 mm/slub.c:3491
> __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:967 [inline]
> __kmalloc+0x9e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:981
> kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
> kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:720 [inline]
> tomoyo_encode2 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45 [inline]
> tomoyo_encode+0x26f/0x540 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80
> tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x5ae/0x5f0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283
> tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline]
> tomoyo_path_perm+0x280/0x680 security/tomoyo/file.c:822
> security_inode_getattr+0xc0/0x140 security/security.c:1375
> vfs_getattr fs/stat.c:161 [inline]
> vfs_statx+0x198/0x4b0 fs/stat.c:236
> vfs_fstatat fs/stat.c:270 [inline]
> __do_sys_newfstatat fs/stat.c:440 [inline]
> __se_sys_newfstatat+0x104/0x7b0 fs/stat.c:434
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> page last free stack trace:
> reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
> free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1446 [inline]
> free_pcp_prepare+0x751/0x780 mm/page_alloc.c:1496
> free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3369 [inline]
> free_unref_page+0x19/0x4c0 mm/page_alloc.c:3464
> free_pipe_info+0x302/0x380 fs/pipe.c:851
> put_pipe_info fs/pipe.c:711 [inline]
> pipe_release+0x232/0x310 fs/pipe.c:734
> __fput+0x3ba/0x880 fs/file_table.c:320
> task_work_run+0x243/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:179
> resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
> exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x134/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:171
> exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xad/0x110 kernel/entry/common.c:203
> __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
> syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:296
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> ffff888022c70f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> ffff888022c70f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> >ffff888022c71000: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> ^
> ffff888022c71080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
> ffff888022c71100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
> ==================================================================
>
>
> ---
> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.
>
> syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
> syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see:
> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 041fae9c105a
commit 589aa8077dcf413b06c78c6d8095496c98720c25
Author: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Dec 20 11:51:17 2022 -0800
Commit: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Dec 20 11:51:17 2022 -0800
Revert "mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function"
This reverts commit 38931d8989b5760b0bd17c9ec99e81986258e4cb.
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
index 73684642c42d..0d59098f0876 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
@@ -783,30 +783,23 @@ static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
}
-/* Check that ksize() does NOT unpoison whole object. */
+/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
{
char *ptr;
- size_t size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 5;
- size_t real_size;
+ size_t size = 123, real_size;
ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
-
real_size = ksize(ptr);
- KUNIT_EXPECT_GT(test, real_size, size);
OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
- /* These accesses shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
- ptr[0] = 'x';
- ptr[size - 1] = 'x';
+ /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
+ ptr[size] = 'x';
- /* These must trigger a KASAN report. */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
- KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
- KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size + 5]);
- KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size - 1]);
+ /* This one must. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
kfree(ptr);
}
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 7e96abf1bd7d..33b1886b06eb 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1333,11 +1333,11 @@ __do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
void *ret;
size_t ks;
- /* Check for double-free before calling ksize. */
+ /* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
return NULL;
- ks = ksize(p);
+ ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p);
} else
ks = 0;
@@ -1405,10 +1405,8 @@ void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
void *mem = (void *)p;
ks = ksize(mem);
- if (ks) {
- kasan_unpoison_range(mem, ks);
+ if (ks)
memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
- }
kfree(mem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
@@ -1429,11 +1427,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
*/
size_t ksize(const void *objp)
{
+ size_t size;
+
/*
- * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid.
- * The KASAN report printed from ksize() is more useful, then when
- * it's printed later when the behaviour could be undefined due to
- * a potential use-after-free or double-free.
+ * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and
+ * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is
+ * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could
+ * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free.
*
* We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware
* tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write().
@@ -1447,7 +1447,13 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp))
return 0;
- return kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
+ size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
+ /*
+ * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
+ * so we need to unpoison this area.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison_range(objp, size);
+ return size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
