Re: [PATCH bpf-next 4/7] selftests/bpf: verify states_equal() maintains idmap across all frames

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On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 5:58 AM Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> A test case that would erroneously pass verification if
> verifier.c:states_equal() maintains separate register ID mappings for
> call frames.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---

It's so hard to read these tests. Moving forward, let's try adding new
verifier tests like this using __naked functions and embedded
assembly. With recent test loader changes ([0]), there isn't much
that's needed, except for a few simple examples to get us started and
perhaps __flags(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) support. The upside is that
using maps or global variables from assembly is now possible and easy,
and doesn't require any custom loader support at all.


  [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=702713&state=*


>  tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 82 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
> index 3193915c5ee6..bcd15b26dcee 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
> @@ -2305,3 +2305,85 @@
>         .errstr = "!read_ok",
>         .result = REJECT,
>  },
> +/* Make sure that verifier.c:states_equal() considers IDs from all
> + * frames when building 'idmap' for check_ids().
> + */
> +{
> +       "calls: check_ids() across call boundary",
> +       .insns = {
> +       /* Function main() */
> +       BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
> +       /* fp[-24] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; get a MAP_VALUE_PTR_OR_NULL with some ID */
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
> +       BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
> +       BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1,
> +                     0),
> +       BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
> +       BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -24),
> +       /* fp[-32] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; get a MAP_VALUE_PTR_OR_NULL with some ID */
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
> +       BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
> +       BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1,
> +                     0),
> +       BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
> +       BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -32),
> +       /* call foo(&fp[-24], &fp[-32])   ; both arguments have IDs in the current
> +        *                                ; stack frame
> +        */
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_FP),
> +       BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -24),
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_FP),
> +       BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -32),
> +       BPF_CALL_REL(2),
> +       /* exit 0 */
> +       BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
> +       BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
> +       /* Function foo()
> +        *
> +        * r9 = &frame[0].fp[-24]  ; save arguments in the callee saved registers,
> +        * r8 = &frame[0].fp[-32]  ; arguments are pointers to pointers to map value
> +        */
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_1),
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_2),
> +       /* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */
> +       BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0),
> +       /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
> +       BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
> +       /* if r6 > r7 goto +1      ; no new information about the state is derived from
> +        *                         ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ
> +        *                         ; only in 'insn_idx'
> +        * r9 = r8
> +        */
> +       BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 1),
> +       BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_8),
> +       /* r9 = *r9                ; verifier get's to this point via two paths:
> +        *                         ; (I) one including r9 = r8, verified first;
> +        *                         ; (II) one excluding r9 = r8, verified next.
> +        *                         ; After load of *r9 to r9 the frame[0].fp[-24].id == r9.id.
> +        *                         ; Suppose that checkpoint is created here via path (I).
> +        *                         ; When verifying via (II) the r9.id must be compared against
> +        *                         ; frame[0].fp[-24].id, otherwise (I) and (II) would be
> +        *                         ; incorrectly deemed equivalent.
> +        * if r9 == 0 goto <exit>
> +        */
> +       BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_9, 0),
> +       BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_9, 0, 1),
> +       /* r8 = *r8                ; read map value via r8, this is not safe
> +        * r0 = *r8                ; because r8 might be not equal to r9.
> +        */
> +       BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_8, 0),
> +       BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0),
> +       /* exit 0 */
> +       BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
> +       BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
> +       },
> +       .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
> +       .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3, 9 },
> +       .result = REJECT,
> +       .errstr = "R8 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'",
> +       .result_unpriv = REJECT,
> +       .errstr_unpriv = "",
> +       .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
> +},
> --
> 2.34.1
>



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