On Fri, Dec 9, 2022 at 5:58 AM Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > The verifier.c:regsafe() has the following shortcut: > > equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0; > ... > if (equal) > return true; > > Which is executed regardless old register type. This is incorrect for > register types that might have an ID checked by check_ids(), namely: > - PTR_TO_MAP_KEY > - PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE > - PTR_TO_PACKET_META > - PTR_TO_PACKET > > The following pattern could be used to exploit this: > > 0: r9 = map_lookup_elem(...) ; Returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL id=1. > 1: r8 = map_lookup_elem(...) ; Returns PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL id=2. > 2: r7 = ktime_get_ns() ; Unbound SCALAR_VALUE. > 3: r6 = ktime_get_ns() ; Unbound SCALAR_VALUE. > 4: if r6 > r7 goto +1 ; No new information about the state > ; is derived from this check, thus > ; produced verifier states differ only > ; in 'insn_idx'. > 5: r9 = r8 ; Optionally make r9.id == r8.id. > --- checkpoint --- ; Assume is_state_visisted() creates a > ; checkpoint here. > 6: if r9 == 0 goto <exit> ; Nullness info is propagated to all > ; registers with matching ID. > 7: r1 = *(u64 *) r8 ; Not always safe. > > Verifier first visits path 1-7 where r8 is verified to be not null > at (6). Later the jump from 4 to 6 is examined. The checkpoint for (6) > looks as follows: > R8_rD=map_value_or_null(id=2,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) > R9_rwD=map_value_or_null(id=2,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) > R10=fp0 > > The current state is: > R0=... R6=... R7=... fp-8=... > R8=map_value_or_null(id=2,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) > R9=map_value_or_null(id=1,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) > R10=fp0 > > Note that R8 states are byte-to-byte identical, so regsafe() would > exit early and skip call to check_ids(), thus ID mapping 2->2 will not > be added to 'idmap'. Next, states for R9 are compared: these are not > identical and check_ids() is executed, but 'idmap' is empty, so > check_ids() adds mapping 2->1 to 'idmap' and returns success. > > This commit pushes the 'equal' down to register types that don't need > check_ids(). > > Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx> > --- > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 29 ++++++++--------------------- > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > index 3194e9d9e4e4..d05c5d0344c6 100644 > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > @@ -12926,15 +12926,6 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, > > equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0; > > - if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK) > - /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to > - * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar > - */ > - return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; > - > - if (equal) > - return true; > - > if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) > /* explored state can't have used this */ > return true; > @@ -12942,6 +12933,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, > return false; > switch (base_type(rold->type)) { > case SCALAR_VALUE: > + if (equal) > + return true; > if (env->explore_alu_limits) > return false; > if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { > @@ -13012,20 +13005,14 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, > /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ > return range_within(rold, rcur) && > tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); > - case PTR_TO_CTX: > - case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: > - case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: > - case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: > - case PTR_TO_SOCKET: > - case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: > - case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: > - case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: > - /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above > - * would have accepted > + case PTR_TO_STACK: > + /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to > + * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar > */ > + return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; > default: > - /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */ > - return false; > + /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() */ > + return equal; Is it safe to assume this for any possible register type? Wouldn't register types that use id and/or ref_obj_id need extra checks here? I think preexisting default was a safer approach, in which if we forgot to explicitly add support for some new or updated register type, the worst thing is that for that *new* register we'd have suboptimal verification performance, but not safety concerns. > } > > /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ > -- > 2.34.1 >