verifier.c:states_equal() must maintain register ID mapping across all
function frames. Otherwise the following example might be erroneously
marked as safe:
main:
fp[-24] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; frame[0].fp[-24].id == 1
fp[-32] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; frame[0].fp[-32].id == 2
r1 = &fp[-24]
r2 = &fp[-32]
call foo()
r0 = 0
exit
foo:
0: r9 = r1
1: r8 = r2
2: r7 = ktime_get_ns()
3: r6 = ktime_get_ns()
4: if (r6 > r7) goto skip_assign
5: r9 = r8
skip_assign: ; <--- checkpoint
6: r9 = *r9 ; (a) frame[1].r9.id == 2
; (b) frame[1].r9.id == 1
7: if r9 == 0 goto exit: ; mark_ptr_or_null_regs() transfers != 0 info
; for all regs sharing ID:
; (a) r9 != 0 => &frame[0].fp[-32] != 0
; (b) r9 != 0 => &frame[0].fp[-24] != 0
8: r8 = *r8 ; (a) r8 == &frame[0].fp[-32]
; (b) r8 == &frame[0].fp[-32]
9: r0 = *r8 ; (a) safe
; (b) unsafe
exit:
10: exit
While processing call to foo() verifier considers the following
execution paths:
(a) 0-10
(b) 0-4,6-10
(There is also path 0-7,10 but it is not interesting for the issue at
hand. (a) is verified first.)
Suppose that checkpoint is created at (6) when path (a) is verified,
next path (b) is verified and (6) is reached.
If states_equal() maintains separate 'idmap' for each frame the
mapping at (6) for frame[1] would be empty and
regsafe(r9)::check_ids() would add a pair 2->1 and return true,
which is an error.
If states_equal() maintains single 'idmap' for all frames the mapping
at (6) would be { 1->1, 2->2 } and regsafe(r9)::check_ids() would
return false when trying to add a pair 2->1.
This issue was suggested in the following discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzbFB5g4oUfyxk9rHy-PJSLQ3h8q9mV=rVoXfr_JVm8+1Q@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 ++--
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 70d06a99f0b8..c1f769515beb 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ struct bpf_id_pair {
u32 cur;
};
-/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
-#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE)
#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
+/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
+#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES)
struct bpf_verifier_state {
/* call stack tracking */
struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d05c5d0344c6..9188370a7ebe 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -13122,7 +13122,6 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat
{
int i;
- memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
env->idmap_scratch))
@@ -13146,6 +13145,8 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
+ memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
+
/* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
* must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
*/
--
2.34.1
