Similar to the earlier patch that avoids sk_setsockopt() from taking sk lock and doing capable test when called by bpf. This patch changes do_ip_setsockopt() to use the sockopt_{lock,release}_sock() and sockopt_[ns_]capable(). Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@xxxxxx> --- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c index a8a323ecbb54..a3c496580e6b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c @@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ static int do_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, err = 0; if (needs_rtnl) rtnl_lock(); - lock_sock(sk); + sockopt_lock_sock(sk); switch (optname) { case IP_OPTIONS: @@ -1333,14 +1333,14 @@ static int do_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, case IP_IPSEC_POLICY: case IP_XFRM_POLICY: err = -EPERM; - if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (!sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) break; err = xfrm_user_policy(sk, optname, optval, optlen); break; case IP_TRANSPARENT: - if (!!val && !ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) && - !ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { + if (!!val && !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) && + !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { err = -EPERM; break; } @@ -1368,13 +1368,13 @@ static int do_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, err = -ENOPROTOOPT; break; } - release_sock(sk); + sockopt_release_sock(sk); if (needs_rtnl) rtnl_unlock(); return err; e_inval: - release_sock(sk); + sockopt_release_sock(sk); if (needs_rtnl) rtnl_unlock(); return -EINVAL; -- 2.30.2