On 7/8/22 7:10 AM, Christian Göttsche wrote:
,On Fri, 8 Jul 2022 at 00:32, Frederick Lawler <fred@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
While creating a LSM BPF MAC policy to block user namespace creation, we
used the LSM cred_prepare hook because that is the closest hook to prevent
a call to create_user_ns().
The calls look something like this:
cred = prepare_creds()
security_prepare_creds()
call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
if (cred)
create_user_ns(cred)
We noticed that error codes were not propagated from this hook and
introduced a patch [1] to propagate those errors.
The discussion notes that security_prepare_creds()
is not appropriate for MAC policies, and instead the hook is
meant for LSM authors to prepare credentials for mutation. [2]
Ultimately, we concluded that a better course of action is to introduce
a new security hook for LSM authors. [3]
This patch set first introduces a new security_create_user_ns() function
and create_user_ns LSM hook, then marks the hook as sleepable in BPF.
Some thoughts:
I.
Why not make the hook more generic, e.g. support all other existing
and potential future namespaces?
The main issue with a generic hook is that different namespaces have
different calling contexts. We decided in a previous discussion to
opt-out of a generic hook for this reason. [1]
Also I think the naming scheme is <object>_<verb>.
That's a good call out. I was originally hoping to keep the security_*()
match with the hook name matched with the caller function to keep things
all aligned. If no one objects to renaming the hook, I can rename the
hook for v3.
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_create, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned int flags)
where flags is a bitmap of CLONE flags from include/uapi/linux/sched.h
(like CLONE_NEWUSER).
II.
While adding policing for namespaces maybe also add a new hook for setns(2)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_join, const struct cred *subj, const
struct cred *obj, unsigned int flags)
IIUC, setns() will create a new namespace for the other namespaces
except for user namespace. If we add a security hook for the other
create_*_ns() functions, then we can catch setns() at that point.
III.
Maybe even attach a security context to namespaces so they can be
further governed?
SELinux example:
type domainA_userns_t;
type_transition domainA_t domainA_t : namespace domainA_userns_t "user";
allow domainA_t domainA_userns_t:namespace create;
# domainB calling setns(2) with domainA as target
allow domainB_t domainA_userns_t:namespace join;
Links:
1.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHC9VhSTkEMT90Tk+=iTyp3npWEm+3imrkFVX2qb=XsOPp9F=A@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Links:
1. https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220608150942.776446-1-fred@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
2. https://lore.kernel.org/all/87y1xzyhub.fsf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
3. https://lore.kernel.org/all/9fe9cd9f-1ded-a179-8ded-5fde8960a586@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
Changes since v1:
- Add selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm create_user_ns hook patch
- Add selinux: Implement create_user_ns hook patch
- Change function signature of security_create_user_ns() to only take
struct cred
- Move security_create_user_ns() call after id mapping check in
create_user_ns()
- Update documentation to reflect changes
Frederick Lawler (4):
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_create_user_ns() sleepable
selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm create_user_ns hook
selinux: Implement create_user_ns hook
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++
kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 1 +
kernel/user_namespace.c | 5 ++
security/security.c | 5 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c | 39 ++++++++
10 files changed, 160 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c
--
2.30.2
