Hi! I'm wodering about the cap check against CAP_SYS_ADMIN: static inline bool bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(struct bpf_prog *prog) { /* These are the prerequisites, should someone ever have the * idea to call blinding outside of them, we make sure to * bail out. */ if (!bpf_jit_is_ebpf()) return false; if (!prog->jit_requested) return false; if (!bpf_jit_harden) return false; if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return false; return true; } Is it intentional to provide more security or oversight in commit 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF") (and should be bpf_capable())? -- WBR, Yauheni Kaliuta