Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 06/13] bpf: Prevent escaping of kptr loaded from maps

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On Sun, Mar 20, 2022 at 8:55 AM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
<memxor@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> While we can guarantee that even for unreferenced kptr, the object
> pointer points to being freed etc. can be handled by the verifier's
> exception handling (normal load patching to PROBE_MEM loads), we still
> cannot allow the user to pass these pointers to BPF helpers and kfunc,
> because the same exception handling won't be done for accesses inside
> the kernel. The same is true if a referenced pointer is loaded using
> normal load instruction. Since the reference is not guaranteed to be
> held while the pointer is used, it must be marked as untrusted.
>
> Hence introduce a new type flag, PTR_UNTRUSTED, which is used to mark
> all registers loading unreferenced and referenced kptr from BPF maps,
> and ensure they can never escape the BPF program and into the kernel by
> way of calling stable/unstable helpers.
>
> In check_ptr_to_btf_access, the !type_may_be_null check to reject type
> flags is still correct, as apart from PTR_MAYBE_NULL, only MEM_USER,
> MEM_PERCPU, and PTR_UNTRUSTED may be set for PTR_TO_BTF_ID. The first
> two are checked inside the function and rejected using a proper error
> message, but we still want to allow dereference of untrusted case.
>
> Also, we make sure to inherit PTR_UNTRUSTED when chain of pointers are
> walked, so that this flag is never dropped once it has been set on a
> PTR_TO_BTF_ID (i.e. trusted to untrusted transition can only be in one
> direction).
>
> In convert_ctx_accesses, extend the switch case to consider untrusted
> PTR_TO_BTF_ID in addition to normal PTR_TO_BTF_ID for PROBE_MEM
> conversion for BPF_LDX.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  include/linux/bpf.h   | 10 +++++++++-
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>

[...]

> -       if (reg->type != PTR_TO_BTF_ID && reg->type != PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL)
> -               goto bad_type;
> +       if (off_desc->flags & BPF_MAP_VALUE_OFF_F_REF) {
> +               if (reg->type != PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
> +                   reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL))
> +                       goto bad_type;
> +       } else { /* only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */
> +               if (reg->type != PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
> +                   reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) &&
> +                   reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED) &&
> +                   reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED))

use base_type(), Luke! ;)

> +                       goto bad_type;
> +       }
>
>         if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
>                 verbose(env, "R%d must point to kernel BTF\n", regno);

[...]



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