Dear all,
I found out that every time an offset stored in a 2 (or more) bytes
variable is added to a packet pointer subsequent checks against packet
boundaries become ineffective.
Here is a toy example to test the problem (it doesn't do anything useful):
int test(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {
void *data = (void *)(long)ctx->data;
void *data_end = (void *)(long)ctx->data_end;
/* Skipping an amount of bytes stored in __u8 works */
if (data + sizeof(__u8) > data_end)
return TC_ACT_OK;
bpf_trace_printk("Skipping %d bytes", *(__u8 *)data);
data += *(__u8 *)data;
/* Skipping an amount of bytes stored in __u16 works but... */
if (data + sizeof(__u16) > data_end)
return TC_ACT_OK;
bpf_trace_printk("Skipping %d bytes", *(__u16 *)data);
data += *(__u16 *)data;
/* ...this check is not effective and packet access is rejected */
if (data + sizeof(__u8) > data_end)
return TC_ACT_OK;
bpf_trace_printk("Next byte is %x", *(__u8 *)data);
return TC_ACT_OK;
}
My practical use case would be skipping variable-size TLS header
extensions until I reach the desired one (the length of these options is
2 bytes long).
Another use case can be found here:
https://lists.iovisor.org/g/iovisor-dev/topic/access_packet_payload_in_tc/86442134
After I use the bpf_skb_pull_data() I would like to directly jump to the
part of packet I was working on and avoid re-parsing everything from
scratch, however if I save the offset in a 2 bytes variable and then add
it to the packet pointer I'm no longer able to access it (if the offset
is stored in a 1 byte var everything works).
Is this a verifier bug?
Best regards,
Federico Parola