On Fri, Apr 02, 2021 at 02:24:51PM -0700, Cong Wang wrote: > > > where the key is the timer ID and the value is the timer expire > > > timer. > > > > The timer ID is unnecessary. We cannot introduce new IDR for every new > > bpf object. It doesn't scale. > > The IDR is per map, not per timer. Per-map is not acceptable. One IDR for all maps with timers is not acceptable either. We have 3 IDRs now: for progs, for maps, and for links. No other objects need IDRs. > > Here is how more general timers might look like: > > https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210310011905.ozz4xahpkqbfkkvd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > > > include/uapi/linux/bpf.h: > > struct bpf_timer { > > u64 opaque; > > }; > > The 'opaque' field contains a pointer to dynamically allocated struct timer_list and other data. > > This is my initial design as we already discussed, it does not work, > please see below. It does work. The perceived "issue" you referred to is a misunderstanding. See below. > > > > The prog would do: > > struct map_elem { > > int stuff; > > struct bpf_timer timer; > > }; > > > > struct { > > __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH); > > __uint(max_entries, 1); > > __type(key, int); > > __type(value, struct map_elem); > > } hmap SEC(".maps"); > > > > static int timer_cb(struct map_elem *elem) > > { > > if (whatever && elem->stuff) > > bpf_timer_mod(&elem->timer, new_expire); > > } > > > > int bpf_timer_test(...) > > { > > struct map_elem *val; > > > > val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&hmap, &key); > > if (val) { > > bpf_timer_init(&val->timer, timer_cb, flags); > > val->stuff = 123; > > bpf_timer_mod(&val->timer, expires); > > } > > } > > > > bpf_map_update_elem() either from bpf prog or from user space > > allocates map element and zeros 8 byte space for the timer pointer. > > bpf_timer_init() allocates timer_list and stores it into opaque if opaque == 0. > > The validation of timer_cb() is done by the verifier. > > bpf_map_delete_elem() either from bpf prog or from user space > > does del_timer() if elem->opaque != 0. > > If prog refers such hmap as above during prog free the kernel does > > for_each_map_elem {if (elem->opaque) del_timer().} > > I think that is the simplest way of prevent timers firing past the prog life time. > > There could be other ways to solve it (like prog_array and ref/uref). > > > > Pseudo code: > > int bpf_timer_init(struct bpf_timer *timer, void *timer_cb, int flags) > > { > > if (timer->opaque) > > return -EBUSY; > > t = alloc timer_list > > t->cb = timer_cb; > > t->.. > > timer->opaque = (long)t; > > } > > > > int bpf_timer_mod(struct bpf_timer *timer, u64 expires) > > { > > if (!time->opaque) > > return -EINVAL; > > t = (struct timer_list *)timer->opaque; > > mod_timer(t,..); > > } > > > > int bpf_timer_del(struct bpf_timer *timer) > > { > > if (!time->opaque) > > return -EINVAL; > > t = (struct timer_list *)timer->opaque; > > del_timer(t); > > } > > > > The verifier would need to check that 8 bytes occupied by bpf_timer and not accessed > > via load/store by the program. The same way it does it for bpf_spin_lock. > > This does not work, because bpf_timer_del() has to be matched > with bpf_timer_init(), otherwise we would leak timer resources. > For example: > > SEC("foo") > bad_ebpf_code() > { > struct bpf_timer t; > bpf_timer_init(&t, ...); // allocate a timer > bpf_timer_mod(&t, ..); > // end of BPF program > // now the timer is leaked, no one will delete it > } > > We can not enforce the matching in the verifier, because users would > have to call bpf_timer_del() before exiting, which is not what we want > either. ``` bad_ebpf_code() { struct bpf_timer t; ``` is not at all what was proposed. This kind of code will be rejected by the verifier. 'struct bpf_timer' has to be part of the map element and the verifier will enforce that just like it does so for bpf_spin_lock. Try writing the following program: ``` bad_ebpf_code() { struct bpf_spin_lock t; bpf_spin_lock(&t); } `` and then follow the code to see why the verifier rejects it. The implementation of what I'm proposing is straightforward. I certainly understand that it might look intimidating and "impossible", but it's really quite simple.