On Thu, Oct 29, 2020 at 3:19 PM Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
<mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 10/29/20 2:42 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 10:55 AM Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
> > <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> static bool
> >> getTargetPathname(struct seccomp_notif *req, int notifyFd,
> >> char *path, size_t len)
> >> {
> >> char procMemPath[PATH_MAX];
> >>
> >> snprintf(procMemPath, sizeof(procMemPath), "/proc/%d/mem", req->pid);
> >>
> >> int procMemFd = open(procMemPath, O_RDONLY);
> >> if (procMemFd == -1)
> >> errExit("\tS: open");
> >>
> >> /* Check that the process whose info we are accessing is still alive.
> >> If the SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID operation (performed
> >> in checkNotificationIdIsValid()) succeeds, we know that the
> >> /proc/PID/mem file descriptor that we opened corresponds to the
> >> process for which we received a notification. If that process
> >> subsequently terminates, then read() on that file descriptor
> >> will return 0 (EOF). */
> >>
> >> checkNotificationIdIsValid(notifyFd, req->id);
> >>
> >> /* Read bytes at the location containing the pathname argument
> >> (i.e., the first argument) of the mkdir(2) call */
> >>
> >> ssize_t nread = pread(procMemFd, path, len, req->data.args[0]);
> >> if (nread == -1)
> >> errExit("pread");
> >
> > As discussed at
> > <https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez0m4Y24ZBZCh+Tf4ORMm9_q4n7VOzpGjwGF7_Fe8EQH=Q@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
> > we need to re-check checkNotificationIdIsValid() after reading remote
> > memory but before using the read value in any way. Otherwise, the
> > syscall could in the meantime get interrupted by a signal handler, the
> > signal handler could return, and then the function that performed the
> > syscall could free() allocations or return (thereby freeing buffers on
> > the stack).
> >
> > In essence, this pread() is (unavoidably) a potential use-after-free
> > read; and to make that not have any security impact, we need to check
> > whether UAF read occurred before using the read value. This should
> > probably be called out elsewhere in the manpage, too...
>
> Thanks very much for pointing me at this!
>
> So, I want to conform that the fix to the code is as simple as
> adding a check following the pread() call, something like:
>
> [[
> ssize_t nread = pread(procMemFd, path, len, req->data.args[argNum]);
> if (nread == -1)
> errExit("Supervisor: pread");
>
> if (nread == 0) {
> fprintf(stderr, "\tS: pread() of /proc/PID/mem "
> "returned 0 (EOF)\n");
> exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
> }
>
> if (close(procMemFd) == -1)
> errExit("Supervisor: close-/proc/PID/mem");
>
> + /* Once again check that the notification ID is still valid. The
> + case we are particularly concerned about here is that just
> + before we fetched the pathname, the target's blocked system
> + call was interrupted by a signal handler, and after the handler
> + returned, the target carried on execution (past the interrupted
> + system call). In that case, we have no guarantees about what we
> + are reading, since the target's memory may have been arbitrarily
> + changed by subsequent operations. */
> +
> + if (!notificationIdIsValid(notifyFd, req->id, "post-open"))
> + return false;
> +
> /* We have no guarantees about what was in the memory of the target
> process. We therefore treat the buffer returned by pread() as
> untrusted input. The buffer should be terminated by a null byte;
> if not, then we will trigger an error for the target process. */
>
> if (strnlen(path, nread) < nread)
> return true;
> ]]
Yeah, that should do the job. With the caveat that a cancelled syscall
could've also led to the memory being munmap()ed, so the nread==0 case
could also happen legitimately - so you might want to move this check
up above the nread==0 (mm went away) and nread==-1 (mm still exists,
but read from address failed, errno EIO) checks if the error message
shouldn't appear spuriously.
