Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On Sat, Sep 19, 2020 at 4:50 AM Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> From the checks and commit messages for modify_return, it seems it was
>> never the intention that it should be possible to attach a tracing program
>> with expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN to another BPF program.
>> However, check_attach_modify_return() will only look at the function name,
>> so if the target function starts with "security_", the attach will be
>> allowed even for bpf2bpf attachment.
>>
>> Fix this oversight by also blocking the modification if a target program is
>> supplied.
>>
>> Fixes: 18644cec714a ("bpf: Fix use-after-free in fmod_ret check")
>> Fixes: 6ba43b761c41 ("bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN")
>> Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index 4161b6c406bc..cb1b0f9fd770 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -11442,7 +11442,7 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> prog->aux->attach_func_name);
>> } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) {
>> ret = check_attach_modify_return(prog, addr);
>> - if (ret)
>> + if (ret || tgt_prog)
>
> can you please do it as a separate check with a more appropriate and
> meaningful message?
Heh, okay, maybe I was being a bit too lazy here ;)
-Toke
