On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 06:36:34PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 12:34 PM David Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > It's kernel code executing in userspace. If you don't trust the > > signed code you don't trust the signed code. > > > > Nothing is magic about a piece of code executing in userspace. > > Well, there's one real issue: the most likely thing that code is going > to do is execute llvm to generate more code. > > And that's I think the real security issue here: the context in which > the code executes. It may be triggered in one namespace, but what > namespaces and what rules should the thing actually then execute in. > > So no, trying to dismiss this as "there are no security issues" is > bogus. There very much are security issues. I think you're referring to: >> We might need to invent built-in "protected userspace" because existing >> "unprotected userspace" is not trustworthy enough to run kernel modules. >> That's not just inventing fork_usermode_blob(). Another root process can modify the memory of usermode_blob process. I think that's Tetsuo's point about lack of LSM hooks is kernel_sock_shutdown(). Obviously, kernel_sock_shutdown() can be called by kernel only. I suspect he's imaging a hypothetical situation where kernel bits of kernel module interact with userblob bits of kernel module. Then another root process tampers with memory of userblob. Then userblob interaction with kernel module can do kernel_sock_shutdown() on something that initial design of kernel+userblob module didn't intend. I think this is trivially enforceable without creating new features. Existing security_ptrace_access_check() LSM hook can prevent tampering with memory of userblob. As far as userblob calling llvm and other things in sequence. That is no different from systemd calling things. security label can carry that execution context. > My personally strongest argument for remoiving this kernel code is > that it's been there for a couple of years now, and it has never > actually done anything useful, and there's no actual sign that it ever > will, or that there is a solid plan in place for it. you probably missed the detailed plan: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200609235631.ukpm3xngbehfqthz@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ The project #3 is the above is the one we're working on right now. It should be ready to post in a week. > We can dance around the "what about security modules", but that > fundamental problem of "this code hasn't done anything useful for two > years and we don't even know if it's the right thing to do or what the > real security issues _will_ be" is I think the real issue here. Please see above link. bpfilter didn't go anywhere, but fork_usermode_blob() has plenty of use cases that will materialize soon.
