Attaching to these hooks can break iptables because its optval is
usually quite big, or at least bigger than the current PAGE_SIZE limit.
There are two possible ways to fix it:
1. Increase the limit to match iptables max optval.
2. Implement some way to bypass the value if it's too big and trigger
BPF only with level/optname so BPF can still decide whether
to allow/deny big sockopts.
I went with #1 which means we are potentially increasing the
amount of data we copy from the userspace from PAGE_SIZE to 512M.
Fixes: 0d01da6afc54 ("bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks")
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
index fdf7836750a3..17988cacac50 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
@@ -1276,7 +1276,13 @@ static bool __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty(struct cgroup *cgrp,
static int sockopt_alloc_buf(struct bpf_sockopt_kern *ctx, int max_optlen)
{
- if (unlikely(max_optlen > PAGE_SIZE) || max_optlen < 0)
+ // The user with the largest known setsockopt optvals is iptables.
+ // Allocate enough space to accommodate it.
+ //
+ // See XT_MAX_TABLE_SIZE and sizeof(struct ipt_replace).
+ const int max_supported_optlen = 512 * 1024 * 1024 + 128;
+
+ if (unlikely(max_optlen > max_supported_optlen) || max_optlen < 0)
return -EINVAL;
ctx->optval = kzalloc(max_optlen, GFP_USER);
--
2.27.0.278.ge193c7cf3a9-goog
