Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx> writes: > On Wed, Apr 8, 2020 at 8:14 AM Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx> writes: >> >> > On Mon, Apr 6, 2020 at 4:34 AM Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> >> >> Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@xxxxxx> writes: >> >> >> >> > Add support to look up bpf_link by ID and iterate over all existing bpf_links >> >> > in the system. GET_FD_BY_ID code handles not-yet-ready bpf_link by checking >> >> > that its ID hasn't been set to non-zero value yet. Setting bpf_link's ID is >> >> > done as the very last step in finalizing bpf_link, together with installing >> >> > FD. This approach allows users of bpf_link in kernel code to not worry about >> >> > races between user-space and kernel code that hasn't finished attaching and >> >> > initializing bpf_link. >> >> > >> >> > Further, it's critical that BPF_LINK_GET_FD_BY_ID only ever allows to create >> >> > bpf_link FD that's O_RDONLY. This is to protect processes owning bpf_link and >> >> > thus allowed to perform modifications on them (like LINK_UPDATE), from other >> >> > processes that got bpf_link ID from GET_NEXT_ID API. In the latter case, only >> >> > querying bpf_link information (implemented later in the series) will be >> >> > allowed. >> >> >> >> I must admit I remain sceptical about this model of restricting access >> >> without any of the regular override mechanisms (for instance, enforcing >> >> read-only mode regardless of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE in this series). Since you >> >> keep saying there would be 'some' override mechanism, I think it would >> >> be helpful if you could just include that so we can see the full >> >> mechanism in context. >> > >> > I wasn't aware of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, thanks for bringing this up. >> > >> > One way to go about this is to allow creating writable bpf_link for >> > GET_FD_BY_ID if CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is set. Then we can allow LINK_DETACH >> > operation on writable links, same as we do with LINK_UPDATE here. >> > LINK_DETACH will do the same as cgroup bpf_link auto-detachment on >> > cgroup dying: it will detach bpf_link, but will leave it alive until >> > last FD is closed. >> >> Yup, I think this would be a reasonable way to implement the override >> mechanism - it would ensure 'full root' users (like a root shell) can >> remove attachments, while still preventing applications from doing so by >> limiting their capabilities. > > So I did some experiments and I think I want to keep GET_FD_BY_ID for > bpf_link to return only read-only bpf_links. Why, exactly? (also, see below) > After that, one can pin bpf_link temporarily and re-open it as > writable one, provided CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE capability is present. All > that works already, because pinned bpf_link is just a file, so one can > do fchmod on it and all that will go through normal file access > permission check code path. Ah, I did not know that was possible - I was assuming that bpffs was doing something special to prevent that. But if not, great! > Unfortunately, just re-opening same FD as writable (which would > be possible if fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, S_IRUSR > S_IWUSR) was supported on Linux) without pinning is not possible. > Opening link from /proc/<pid>/fd/<link-fd> doesn't seem to work > either, because backing inode is not BPF FS inode. I'm not sure, but > maybe we can support the latter eventually. But either way, I think > given this is to be used for manual troubleshooting, going through few > extra hoops to force-detach bpf_link is actually a good thing. Hmm, I disagree that deliberately making users jump through hoops is a good thing. Smells an awful lot like security through obscurity to me; and we all know how well that works anyway... >> Extending on the concept of RO/RW bpf_link attachments, maybe it should >> even be possible for an application to choose which mode it wants to pin >> its fd in? With the same capability being able to override it of >> course... > > Isn't that what patch #2 is doing?... Ah yes, so it is! I guess I skipped over that a bit too fast ;) > There are few bugs in the implementation currently, but it will work > in the final version. Cool. >> > We need to consider, though, if CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is something that can >> > be disabled for majority of real-life applications to prevent them >> > from doing this. If every realistic application has/needs >> > CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, then that's essentially just saying that anyone can >> > get writable bpf_link and do anything with it. >> >> I poked around a bit, and looking at the sandboxing configurations >> shipped with various daemons in their systemd unit files, it appears >> that the main case where daemons are granted CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is if they >> have to be able to read /etc/shadow (which is installed as chmod 0). If >> this is really the case, that would indicate it's not a widely needed >> capability; but I wouldn't exactly say that I've done a comprehensive >> survey, so probably a good idea for you to check your users as well :) > > Right, it might not be possible to drop it for all applications right > away, but at least CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE is not CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which is > absolutely necessary to work with BPF. Yeah, I do hope that we'll eventually get CAP_BPF... -Toke
