On 27-Mär 08:27, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 3/26/20 8:24 PM, James Morris wrote:
> > On Thu, 26 Mar 2020, KP Singh wrote:
> >
> > > +int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
> > > + const struct bpf_prog *prog)
> > > +{
> > > + /* Only CAP_MAC_ADMIN users are allowed to make changes to LSM hooks
> > > + */
> > > + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> > > + return -EPERM;
> > > +
> >
> > Stephen, can you confirm that your concerns around this are resolved
> > (IIRC, by SELinux implementing a bpf_prog callback) ?
>
> I guess the only residual concern I have is that CAP_MAC_ADMIN means
> something different to SELinux (ability to get/set file security contexts
> unknown to the currently loaded policy), so leaving the CAP_MAC_ADMIN check
> here (versus calling a new security hook here and checking CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
> the implementation of that hook for the modules that want that) conflates
> two very different things. Prior to this patch, there are no users of
> CAP_MAC_ADMIN outside of individual security modules; it is only checked in
> module-specific logic within apparmor, safesetid, selinux, and smack, so the
> meaning was module-specific.
As we had discussed, We do have a security hook as well:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200324180652.GA11855@xxxxxxxxxxxx/
The bpf_prog hook which can check for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM and implement
module specific logic for LSM programs. I thougt that was okay?
Kees was in favor of keeping the CAP_MAC_ADMIN check here:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/202003241133.16C02BE5B@keescook
If you feel strongly and Kees agrees, we can remove the CAP_MAC_ADMIN
check here, but given that we already have a security hook that meets
the requirements, we probably don't need another one.
- KP
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