On 03-Mär 14:44, Andrii Nakryiko wrote: > On Tue, Mar 3, 2020 at 6:12 AM KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > From: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > - Functions that are whitlisted by for error injection i.e. > > within_error_injection_list. > > - Security hooks, this is expected to be cleaned up after the KRSI > > patches introduce the LSM_HOOK macro: > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200220175250.10795-1-kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > Commit message can use a bit more work for sure. Why (and even what) > of the changes is not really explained well. Added some more details. > > > > > - The attachment is currently limited to functions that return an int. > > This can be extended later other types (e.g. PTR). > > > > Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@xxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > kernel/bpf/btf.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- > > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > [...] > > + t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, NULL); > > + if (!btf_type_is_int(t)) { > > Should the size of int be verified here? E.g., if some function > returns u8, is that ok for BPF program to return, say, (1<<30) ? Would this work? if (size != t->size) { bpf_log(log, "size accessed = %d should be %d\n", size, t->size); return false; } - KP > > > + bpf_log(log, > > + "ret type %s not allowed for fmod_ret\n", > > + btf_kind_str[BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info)]); > > + return false; > > + } > > + } > > } else if (arg >= nr_args) { > > bpf_log(log, "func '%s' doesn't have %d-th argument\n", > > tname, arg + 1); > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > > index 2460c8e6b5be..ae32517d4ccd 100644 > > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ > > #include <linux/sort.h> > > #include <linux/perf_event.h> > > #include <linux/ctype.h> > > +#include <linux/error-injection.h> > > > > #include "disasm.h" > > > > @@ -9800,6 +9801,33 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) > > > > return 0; > > } > > +#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" > > + > > +static int check_attach_modify_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) > > +{ > > + struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; > > + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) prog->aux->trampoline->func.addr; > > + > > + if (within_error_injection_list(addr)) > > + return 0; > > + > > + /* This is expected to be cleaned up in the future with the KRSI effort > > + * introducing the LSM_HOOK macro for cleaning up lsm_hooks.h. > > + */ > > + if (!strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name, > > + sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) { > > + > > + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) > > + return -EPERM; > > + > > + return 0; > > + } > > + > > + verbose(env, "fmod_ret attach_btf_id %u (%s) is not modifiable\n", > > + prog->aux->attach_btf_id, prog->aux->attach_func_name); > > + > > + return -EINVAL; > > +} > > > > static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) > > { > > @@ -10000,6 +10028,9 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) > > } > > tr->func.addr = (void *)addr; > > prog->aux->trampoline = tr; > > + > > + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) > > + ret = check_attach_modify_return(env); > > out: > > mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex); > > if (ret) > > -- > > 2.20.1 > >
