On Mon, Jan 20, 2025 at 8:35 PM Daniel Xu <dxu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Save the null elision decision from verification so that it can be > reused later during bpf_map_lookup_elem inlining. There's a generated > jump that can be omitted if the null was elided. > > Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@xxxxxxxxx> > --- > include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 ++++ > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 +++- > 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h > index 32c23f2a3086..1bcd6d66e546 100644 > --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h > +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h > @@ -515,6 +515,10 @@ struct bpf_map_ptr_state { > struct bpf_map *map_ptr; > bool poison; > bool unpriv; > + /* true if instruction is a bpf_map_lookup_elem() with statically > + * known in-bounds key. > + */ > + bool inbounds; > }; > > /* Possible states for alu_state member. */ > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > index 74525392714e..e83145c2260d 100644 > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > @@ -11265,8 +11265,10 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn > if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && > can_elide_value_nullness(meta.map_ptr->map_type) && > meta.const_map_key >= 0 && > - meta.const_map_key < meta.map_ptr->max_entries) > + meta.const_map_key < meta.map_ptr->max_entries) { > ret_flag &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; > + env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].map_ptr_state.inbounds = true; > + } I don't think it handles the case where the same call insn is used with const key and non-const/out-of-range. insn_aux_data will be sticky and incorrect. pw-bot: cr