On Tue, Jan 14, 2020 at 12:42:22PM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On 1/14/20 11:54 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On 1/10/20 12:53 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > > > On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 04:27:58PM +0100, KP Singh wrote: > > > > On 09-Jan 14:47, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > > On 1/9/20 2:43 PM, KP Singh wrote: > > > > > > On 10-Jan 06:07, James Morris wrote: > > > > > > > On Thu, 9 Jan 2020, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1/9/20 1:11 PM, James Morris wrote: > > > > > > > > > On Wed, 8 Jan 2020, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The cover letter subject line and the > > > > > > > > > > Kconfig help text refer to it as a > > > > > > > > > > BPF-based "MAC and Audit policy". It > > > > > > > > > > has an enforce config option that > > > > > > > > > > enables the bpf programs to deny access, > > > > > > > > > > providing access control. IIRC, > > > > > > > > > > in > > > > > > > > > > the earlier discussion threads, the BPF > > > > > > > > > > maintainers suggested that Smack > > > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > > other LSMs could be entirely > > > > > > > > > > re-implemented via it in the future, and > > > > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > > > such an implementation would be more optimal. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In this case, the eBPF code is similar to a > > > > > > > > > kernel module, rather than a > > > > > > > > > loadable policy file. It's a loadable > > > > > > > > > mechanism, rather than a policy, in > > > > > > > > > my view. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I thought you frowned on dynamically loadable > > > > > > > > LSMs for both security and > > > > > > > > correctness reasons? > > > > > > > > > > > > Based on the feedback from the lists we've updated the design for v2. > > > > > > > > > > > > In v2, LSM hook callbacks are allocated dynamically using BPF > > > > > > trampolines, appended to a separate security_hook_heads and run > > > > > > only after the statically allocated hooks. > > > > > > > > > > > > The security_hook_heads for all the other LSMs (SELinux, AppArmor etc) > > > > > > still remains __lsm_ro_after_init and cannot be modified. We are still > > > > > > working on v2 (not ready for review yet) but the general idea can be > > > > > > seen here: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://github.com/sinkap/linux-krsi/blob/patch/v1/trampoline_prototype/security/bpf/lsm.c > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Evaluating the security impact of this is the next > > > > > > > step. My understanding > > > > > > > is that eBPF via BTF is constrained to read only access to hook > > > > > > > parameters, and that its behavior would be entirely restrictive. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'd like to understand the security impact more > > > > > > > fully, though. Can the > > > > > > > eBPF code make arbitrary writes to the kernel, or > > > > > > > read anything other than > > > > > > > the correctly bounded LSM hook parameters? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As mentioned, the BPF verifier does not allow writes to BTF types. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > And a traditional security module would necessarily fall > > > > > > > > under GPL; is the eBPF code required to be > > > > > > > > likewise? If not, KRSI is a > > > > > > > > gateway for proprietary LSMs... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Right, we do not want this to be a GPL bypass. > > > > > > > > > > > > This is not intended to be a GPL bypass and the BPF verifier checks > > > > > > for license compatibility of the loaded program with GPL. > > > > > > > > > > IIUC, it checks that the program is GPL compatible if it > > > > > uses a function > > > > > marked GPL-only. But what specifically is marked GPL-only > > > > > that is required > > > > > for eBPF programs using KRSI? > > > > > > > > Good point! If no-one objects, I can add it to the BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM > > > > specific verification for the v2 of the patch-set which would require > > > > all BPF-LSM programs to be GPL. > > > > > > I don't think it's a good idea to enforce license on the program. > > > The kernel doesn't do it for modules. > > > For years all of BPF tracing progs were GPL because they have to use > > > GPL-ed helpers to do anything meaningful. > > > So for KRSI just make sure that all helpers are GPL-ed as well. > > > > IIUC, the example eBPF code included in this patch series showed a > > program that used a GPL-only helper for the purpose of reporting event > > output to userspace. But it could have just as easily omitted the use of > > that helper and still implemented its own arbitrary access control model > > on the LSM hooks to which it attached. It seems like the question is > > whether the kernel developers are ok with exposing the entire LSM hook > > interface and all the associated data structures to non-GPLd code, > > irrespective of what helpers it may or may not use. > > Also, to be clear, while kernel modules aren't necessarily GPL, prior to > this patch series, all Linux security modules were necessarily GPLd in order > to use the LSM interface. Because they use securityfs_create_file() GPL-ed api, right? but not because module license is enforced. > So allowing non-GPL eBPF-based LSMs would be a > change. I don't see it this way. seccomp progs technically unlicensed. Yet they can disallow any syscall. Primitive KRSI progs like int bpf-prog(void*) { return REJECT; } would be able to do selectively disable a syscall with an overhead acceptable in production systems (unlike seccomp). I want this use case to be available to people. It's a bait, because to do real progs people would need to GPL them. Key helpers bpf_perf_event_output, bpf_ktime_get_ns, bpf_trace_printk are all GPL-ed. It may look that most networking helpers are not-GPL, but real life is different. To debug programs bpf_trace_printk() is necessary. To have communication with user space bpf_perf_event_output() is necssary. To measure anything or implement timestamps bpf_ktime_get_ns() is necessary. So today all meaninful bpf programs are GPL. Those that are not GPL probably exist, but they're toy programs. Hence I have zero concerns about GPL bypass coming from tracing, networking, and, in the future, KRSI progs too.
