On 11/9/24 12:14 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
On Fri, Nov 8, 2024 at 6:53 PM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
stack_depth = bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth;
+ if (bpf_prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr) {
+ priv_frame_ptr = bpf_prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr + round_up(stack_depth, 16);
+ stack_depth = 0;
+ }
...
+ priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr;
+ if (!priv_stack_ptr && prog->aux->jits_use_priv_stack) {
+ priv_stack_ptr = __alloc_percpu_gfp(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16, GFP_KERNEL);
After applying I started to see crashes running test_progs -j like:
[ 173.465191] Oops: general protection fault, probably for
non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000af9: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
[ 173.466053] KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range
[0x00000000000057c8-0x00000000000057cf]
[ 173.466053] RIP: 0010:dst_dev_put+0x1e/0x220
[ 173.466053] Call Trace:
[ 173.466053] <IRQ>
[ 173.466053] ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0
[ 173.466053] ? exc_general_protection+0x138/0x1f0
[ 173.466053] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
[ 173.466053] ? dst_dev_put+0x1e/0x220
[ 173.466053] rt_fibinfo_free_cpus.part.0+0x8c/0x130
[ 173.466053] fib_nh_common_release+0xd6/0x2a0
[ 173.466053] free_fib_info_rcu+0x129/0x360
[ 173.466053] ? rcu_core+0xa55/0x1340
[ 173.466053] rcu_core+0xa55/0x1340
[ 173.466053] ? rcutree_report_cpu_dead+0x380/0x380
[ 173.466053] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x319/0x7c0
[ 173.466053] handle_softirqs+0x14c/0x4d0
[ 35.134115] Oops: general protection fault, probably for
non-canonical address 0xe0000bfff101fbbc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
[ 35.135089] KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range
[0x00007fff880fdde0-0x00007fff880fdde7]
[ 35.135089] RIP: 0010:destroy_workqueue+0x4b4/0xa70
[ 35.135089] Call Trace:
[ 35.135089] <TASK>
[ 35.135089] ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0
[ 35.135089] ? exc_general_protection+0x138/0x1f0
[ 35.135089] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
[ 35.135089] ? destroy_workqueue+0x4b4/0xa70
[ 35.135089] ? destroy_workqueue+0x592/0xa70
[ 35.135089] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.isra.0+0x270/0x270
[ 35.135089] ext4_put_super+0xff/0xd70
[ 35.135089] generic_shutdown_super+0x148/0x4c0
[ 35.135089] kill_block_super+0x3b/0x90
[ 35.135089] ext4_kill_sb+0x65/0x90
I think I see the bug... quoted it above...
Please make sure you reproduce it first.
Indeed, to use the allocation size round_up(stack_depth, 16) for __alloc_percpu_gfp()
indeed fixed the problem.
The following is additional change on top of this patch set to
- fix the memory access bug as suggested by Alexei in the above
- Add guard space for private stack, additional 16 bytes at the
end of stack will be the guard space. The content is prepopulated
and checked at per cpu private stack free site. If the content
is not expected, a kernel message will emit.
- Add kasan support for guard space.
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 55556a64f776..d796d419bb48 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -1446,6 +1446,9 @@ static void emit_priv_frame_ptr(u8 **pprog, void __percpu *priv_frame_ptr)
#define LOAD_TAIL_CALL_CNT_PTR(stack) \
__LOAD_TCC_PTR(BPF_TAIL_CALL_CNT_PTR_STACK_OFF(stack))
+#define PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ 16
+#define PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL 0xEB9F1234eb9f1234ULL
+
static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, u8 *rw_image,
int oldproglen, struct jit_context *ctx, bool jmp_padding)
{
@@ -1462,10 +1465,11 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, u8 *rw_image
u8 *prog = temp;
u32 stack_depth;
int err;
+ // int stack_size;
stack_depth = bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth;
if (bpf_prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr) {
- priv_frame_ptr = bpf_prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr + round_up(stack_depth, 16);
+ priv_frame_ptr = bpf_prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr + round_up(stack_depth, 16) + PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ;
stack_depth = 0;
}
@@ -1496,8 +1500,18 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image, u8 *rw_image
emit_mov_imm64(&prog, X86_REG_R12,
arena_vm_start >> 32, (u32) arena_vm_start);
- if (priv_frame_ptr)
+ if (priv_frame_ptr) {
+#if 0
+ /* hack to emit and write some data to guard area */
+ emit_priv_frame_ptr(&prog, bpf_prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr);
+
+ /* See case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W */
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0xC7);
+ EMIT2(add_1reg(0x40, X86_REG_R9), 0);
+ EMIT(0xFFFFFFFF, bpf_size_to_x86_bytes(BPF_W));
+#endif
emit_priv_frame_ptr(&prog, priv_frame_ptr);
+ }
ilen = prog - temp;
if (rw_image)
@@ -3383,11 +3397,13 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
struct x64_jit_data *jit_data;
int proglen, oldproglen = 0;
struct jit_context ctx = {};
+ int priv_stack_size, cpu;
bool tmp_blinded = false;
bool extra_pass = false;
bool padding = false;
u8 *rw_image = NULL;
u8 *image = NULL;
+ u64 *guard_ptr;
int *addrs;
int pass;
int i;
@@ -3418,11 +3434,17 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
}
priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr;
if (!priv_stack_ptr && prog->aux->jits_use_priv_stack) {
- priv_stack_ptr = __alloc_percpu_gfp(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16, GFP_KERNEL);
+ priv_stack_size = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16) + PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ;
+ priv_stack_ptr = __alloc_percpu_gfp(priv_stack_size, 16, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv_stack_ptr) {
prog = orig_prog;
goto out_priv_stack;
}
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ guard_ptr = per_cpu_ptr(priv_stack_ptr, cpu);
+ guard_ptr[0] = guard_ptr[1] = PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL;
+ kasan_poison_vmalloc(guard_ptr, PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ);
+ }
prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr = priv_stack_ptr;
}
addrs = jit_data->addrs;
@@ -3561,6 +3583,10 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
out_addrs:
kvfree(addrs);
if (!image && priv_stack_ptr) {
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ guard_ptr = per_cpu_ptr(priv_stack_ptr, cpu);
+ kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(guard_ptr, PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ }
free_percpu(priv_stack_ptr);
prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr = NULL;
}
@@ -3603,6 +3629,9 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
if (prog->jited) {
struct x64_jit_data *jit_data = prog->aux->jit_data;
struct bpf_binary_header *hdr;
+ void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr;
+ u64 *guard_ptr;
+ int cpu;
/*
* If we fail the final pass of JIT (from jit_subprogs),
@@ -3618,7 +3647,21 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
prog->bpf_func = (void *)prog->bpf_func - cfi_get_offset();
hdr = bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr(prog);
bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(hdr, NULL);
- free_percpu(prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr);
+
+ priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr;
+ if (priv_stack_ptr) {
+ int stack_size;
+
+ stack_size = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16) + PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ;
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ guard_ptr = per_cpu_ptr(priv_stack_ptr, cpu);
+ kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(guard_ptr, PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ if (guard_ptr[0] != PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL || guard_ptr[1] != PRIV_STACK_GUARD_VAL)
+ pr_err("Private stack Overflow happened for prog %sx\n", prog->aux->name);
+ }
+ free_percpu(priv_stack_ptr);
+ }
+
WARN_ON_ONCE(!bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off(prog));
}
This fixed the issue Alexei discovered.
16 bytes guard space is allocated since allocation is done with 16byte aligned
with multiple-16 size. If bpf program overflows the stack (change '#if 0' to '#if 1')
in the above change, we will see:
[root@arch-fb-vm1 bpf]# ./test_progs -n 336
[ 28.447390] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
[ 28.448180] bpf_testmod: module verification failed: signature and/or required key missing - tainting kernel
#336/1 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack:OK
#336/2 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_fail:OK
#336/3 struct_ops_private_stack/private_stack_recur:OK
#336 struct_ops_private_stack:OK
Summary: 1/3 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
[ 28.737710] Private stack Overflow happened for prog Fx
[ 28.739284] Private stack Overflow happened for prog Fx
[ 28.968732] Private stack Overflow happened for prog Fx
Here the func name is 'Fx' (representing the sub prog). We might need
to add more meaningful info (e.g. main prog name) to make message more
meaningful.
I added some changes related kasan. If I made a change to guard space in kernel (not in bpf prog),
the kasan can print out the error message properly. But unfortunately, in jit, there is no
kasan instrumentation so warning (with "#if 1" change) is not reported. One possibility is
if kernel config enables kasan, bpf jit could add kasan to jited binary. Not sure the
complexity and whether it is worthwhile or not since supposedly verifier should already
prevent overflow and we already have a guard check (Private stack overflow happened ...)
in jit.
Then let's figure out a way how to test for such things and
what we can do to make kasan detect it sooner,
since above crashes have no indication at all that bpf priv stack
is responsible.
If there is another bug in priv stack and it will cause future
crashes we need to make sure that priv stack corruption is
detected by kasan (or whatever mechanism) earlier.
We cannot land private stack support when there is
a possibility of such silent corruption.
pw-bot: cr
