On Tue, Aug 13, 2024 at 6:30 AM Jordan Rome <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 13, 2024 at 6:27 AM Jordan Rome <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 10:10 PM Alexei Starovoitov
> > <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 6:26 PM Jordan Rome <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > This adds a kfunc wrapper around strncpy_from_user,
> > > > which can be called from sleepable BPF programs.
> > > >
> > > > This matches the non-sleepable 'bpf_probe_read_user_str'
> > > > helper.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > ---
> > > > kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > > > index d02ae323996b..e87d5df658cb 100644
> > > > --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > > > @@ -2939,6 +2939,41 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_bits_destroy(struct bpf_iter_bits *it)
> > > > bpf_mem_free(&bpf_global_ma, kit->bits);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > +/**
> > > > + * bpf_copy_from_user_str() - Copy a string from an unsafe user address
> > > > + * @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at
> > > > + * least @dst__szk bytes long.
> > > > + * @dst__szk: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
> > > > + * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Source address, in user space.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to BPF space. If user string is
> > > > + * too long this will still ensure zero termination in the dst buffer unless
> > > > + * buffer size is 0.
> > > > + */
> > > > +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_str(void *dst, u32 dst__szk, const void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign)
> > > > +{
> > > > + int ret;
> > > > + int count;
> > > > +
> > > > + if (unlikely(!dst__szk))
> > > > + return 0;
> > > > +
> > > > + count = dst__szk - 1;
> > > > + if (unlikely(!count)) {
> > > > + ((char *)dst)[0] = '\0';
> > > > + return 1;
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > > > + ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
> > > > + if (ret >= 0) {
> > > > + if (ret == count)
> > > > + ((char *)dst)[ret] = '\0';
> > > > + ret++;
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > > > + return ret;
> > > > +}
> > >
> > > The above will not pad the buffer and it will create instability
> > > when the target buffer is a part of the map key. Consider:
> > >
> > > struct map_key {
> > > char str[100];
> > > };
> > > struct {
> > > __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
> > > __type(key, struct map_key);
> > > } hash SEC(".maps");
> > >
> > > struct map_key key;
> > > bpf_copy_from_user_str(key.str, sizeof(key.str), user_string);
> > >
> > > The verifier will think that all of the 'key' is initialized,
> > > but for short strings the key will have garbage.
> > >
> > > bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() has the same issue as above, but
> > > let's fix it here first and update read_kernel_str() later.
> > >
> > > pw-bot: cr
> >
> > You're saying we should always do a memset using `dst__szk` on success
> > of copying the string?
>
> Something like this?
> ```
> ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_ptr__ign, count);
> if (ret >= 0) {
> if (ret <= count)
> memset((char *)dst + ret, 0, dst__szk - ret);
> ret++;
> }
> ```
yep. something like this. I didn't check the math.
