Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: Support private stack for bpf progs

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 




On 7/22/24 6:05 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 1:58 PM Andrii Nakryiko
<andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 8:28 PM Andrii Nakryiko
<andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Thu, Jul 18, 2024 at 1:52 PM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The main motivation for private stack comes from nested
scheduler in sched-ext from Tejun. The basic idea is that
  - each cgroup will its own associated bpf program,
  - bpf program with parent cgroup will call bpf programs
    in immediate child cgroups.

Let us say we have the following cgroup hierarchy:
   root_cg (prog0):
     cg1 (prog1):
       cg11 (prog11):
         cg111 (prog111)
         cg112 (prog112)
       cg12 (prog12):
         cg121 (prog121)
         cg122 (prog122)
     cg2 (prog2):
       cg21 (prog21)
       cg22 (prog22)
       cg23 (prog23)

In the above example, prog0 will call a kfunc which will
call prog1 and prog2 to get sched info for cg1 and cg2 and
then the information is summarized and sent back to prog0.
Similarly, prog11 and prog12 will be invoked in the kfunc
and the result will be summarized and sent back to prog1, etc.

Currently, for each thread, the x86 kernel allocate 8KB stack.
The each bpf program (including its subprograms) has maximum
512B stack size to avoid potential stack overflow.
And nested bpf programs increase the risk of stack overflow.
To avoid potential stack overflow caused by bpf programs,
this patch implemented a private stack so bpf program stack
space is allocated dynamically when the program is jited.
Such private stack is applied to tracing programs like
kprobe/uprobe, perf_event, tracepoint, raw tracepoint and
tracing.

But more than one instance of the same bpf program may
run in the system. To make things simple, percpu private
stack is allocated for each program, so if the same program
is running on different cpus concurrently, we won't have
any issue. Note that the kernel already have logic to prevent
the recursion for the same bpf program on the same cpu
(kprobe, fentry, etc.).

The patch implemented a percpu private stack based approach
for x86 arch.
   - The stack size will be 0 and any stack access is from
     jit-time allocated percpu storage.
   - In the beginning of jit, r9 is used to save percpu
     private stack pointer.
   - Each rbp in the bpf asm insn is replaced by r9.
   - For each call, push r9 before the call and pop r9
     after the call to preserve r9 value.

Compared to previous RFC patch [1], this patch added
some conditions to enable private stack, e.g., verifier
calculated stack size, prog type, etc. The new patch
also added a performance test to compare private stack
vs. no private stack.

The following are some code example to illustrate the idea
for selftest cgroup_skb_sk_lookup:

    the existing code                        the private-stack approach code
    endbr64                                  endbr64
    nop    DWORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]         nop    DWORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
    xchg   ax,ax                             xchg   ax,ax
    push   rbp                               push   rbp
    mov    rbp,rsp                           mov    rbp,rsp
    endbr64                                  endbr64
    sub    rsp,0x68
    push   rbx                               push   rbx
    ...                                      ...
    ...                                      mov    r9d,0x8c1c860
    ...                                      add    r9,QWORD PTR gs:0x21a00
    ...                                      ...
    mov    rdx,rbp                           mov    rdx, r9
    add    rdx,0xffffffffffffffb4            rdx,0xffffffffffffffb4
    ...                                      ...
    mov    ecx,0x28                          mov    ecx,0x28
                                             push   r9
    call   0xffffffffe305e474                call   0xffffffffe305e524
                                             pop    r9
    mov    rdi,rax                           mov    rdi,rax
    ...                                      ...
    movzx  rdi,BYTE PTR [rbp-0x46]           movzx  rdi,BYTE PTR [r9-0x46]
    ...                                      ...

Eduard nerd-sniped me today with this a bit... :)

I have a few questions and suggestions.

So it seems like each *subprogram* (not the entire BPF program) gets
its own per-CPU private stack allocation. Is that intentional? That
seems a bit unnecessary. It also prevents any sort of actual
recursion. Not sure if it's possible to write recursive BPF subprogram
today, verifier seems to reject obvious limited recursion cases, but
still, eventually we might need/want to support that, and this will be
just another hurdle to overcome (so it's best to avoid adding it in
the first place).

I'm sure Eduard is going to try something like below and it will
probably break badly (I haven't tried, sorry):

int entry(void *ctx);

struct {
         __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY);
         __uint(max_entries, 1);
         __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32));
         __array(values, int (void *));
} prog_array_init SEC(".maps") = {
         .values = {
                 [0] = (void *)&entry,
         },
};

static __noinline int subprog1(void)
{
     <some state on the stack>

     /* here entry will replace subprog1, and so we'll have
      * entry -> entry -> entry -> ..... <tail call limit> -> subprog1
      */
     bpf_tail_call(ctx, &prog_array_init, 0);

     return 0;
}


SEC("raw_tp/sys_enter")
int entry(void *ctx)
{
      <some state on the stack>

      subprog1();
}

And we effectively have limited recursion where the entry's stack
state is clobbered, no?

So it seems like we need to support recursion.

How come everyone just completely ignored the main point of my entire
email and a real problem that has to be solved?...

Anyways, I did write a below program:

$ cat minimal.bpf.c
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause
/* Copyright (c) 2020 Facebook */
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>

char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "Dual BSD/GPL";

int my_pid = 0;

int handle_tp(void *ctx);

struct {
         __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY);
         __uint(max_entries, 1);
         __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32));
         __array(values, int (void *));
} prog_array_init SEC(".maps") = {
         .values = {
                 [0] = (void *)&handle_tp,
         },
};

static __noinline int subprog(void *ctx)
{
         static int cnt;

         cnt++;

         bpf_printk("SUBPROG - BEFORE %d", cnt);

         bpf_tail_call(ctx, &prog_array_init, 0);

         bpf_printk("SUBPROG - AFTER %d", cnt);

     return 0;
}

SEC("tp/syscalls/sys_enter_write")
int handle_tp(void *ctx)
{
         static int cnt;
         int pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;

         if (pid != my_pid)
                 return 0;

         cnt++;

         bpf_printk("ENTRY - BEFORE %d", cnt);

         subprog(ctx);

         bpf_printk("ENTRY - AFTER %d", cnt);

         return 0;
}


And triggered one write syscall, getting the log above. You can see
that only subprogs are replaced (we only get "SUBPROG - AFTER 34" due
to the tail call limit). And we do indeed get lots of entry program
recurrence.

We *need to support recursion* is my main point.
Not quite.
It's not a recursion. The stack collapsed/gone/wiped out before tail_call.
static int cnt counts stuff because it's static.

So we don't need to support recursion with private stack,
but tail_calls and private stack are buggy indeed.

emit_bpf_tail_call*() shouldn't be adjusting 'rsp' when the private
stack is used.

Right, stack_depth argument in emit_bpf_tail_call_direct()/emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect()
should be 0 if private stack is used. Will fix in next revision.





[Index of Archives]     [Linux Samsung SoC]     [Linux Rockchip SoC]     [Linux Actions SoC]     [Linux for Synopsys ARC Processors]     [Linux NFS]     [Linux NILFS]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]


  Powered by Linux