I found the following typos in the comments, and fixed them:
s/unpriviledged/unprivileged/
s/reponsible/responsible/
s/possiblities/possibilities/
s/Divison/Division/
s/precsion/precision/
s/havea/have a/
s/reponsible/responsible/
s/responsibile/responsible/
s/tigher/tighter/
s/respecitve/respective/
Signed-off-by: Rafael Passos <rafael@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/core.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 12 ++++++------
5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
index bdea1a459153..976cb258a0ed 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static bool check_storage_bpf_ma(struct bpf_local_storage *local_storage,
*
* If the local_storage->list is already empty, the caller will not
* care about the bpf_ma value also because the caller is not
- * responsibile to free the local_storage.
+ * responsible to free the local_storage.
*/
if (storage_smap)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index a41718eaeefe..95c7fd093e55 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -2814,7 +2814,7 @@ void bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_free);
-/* RNG for unpriviledged user space with separated state from prandom_u32(). */
+/* RNG for unprivileged user space with separated state from prandom_u32(). */
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, bpf_user_rnd_state);
void bpf_user_rnd_init_once(void)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
index 83a9a74260e9..c3e79a0b9361 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ static void htab_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
*/
/* htab no longer uses call_rcu() directly. bpf_mem_alloc does it
- * underneath and is reponsible for waiting for callbacks to finish
+ * underneath and is responsible for waiting for callbacks to finish
* during bpf_mem_alloc_destroy().
*/
if (!htab_is_prealloc(htab)) {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 8cde717137bd..61126180d398 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -2412,7 +2412,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc void *bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 o
/* bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr is the same logic as bpf_dynptr_slice.
*
* For skb-type dynptrs, it is safe to write into the returned pointer
- * if the bpf program allows skb data writes. There are two possiblities
+ * if the bpf program allows skb data writes. There are two possibilities
* that may occur when calling bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr:
*
* 1) The requested slice is in the head of the skb. In this case, the
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 68cfd6fc6ad4..537cdccb8363 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static bool bpf_global_percpu_ma_set;
/* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
- /* verifer state is 'st'
+ /* verifier state is 'st'
* before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
* and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
*/
@@ -2131,7 +2131,7 @@ static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
static void __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
/* Try to tighten 64-bit bounds from 32-bit knowledge, using 32-bit
- * values on both sides of 64-bit range in hope to have tigher range.
+ * values on both sides of 64-bit range in hope to have tighter range.
* E.g., if r1 is [0x1'00000000, 0x3'80000000], and we learn from
* 32-bit signed > 0 operation that s32 bounds are now [1; 0x7fffffff].
* With this, we can substitute 1 as low 32-bits of _low_ 64-bit bound
@@ -2139,7 +2139,7 @@ static void __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
* _high_ 64-bit bound (0x380000000 -> 0x37fffffff) and arrive at a
* better overall bounds for r1 as [0x1'000000001; 0x3'7fffffff].
* We just need to make sure that derived bounds we are intersecting
- * with are well-formed ranges in respecitve s64 or u64 domain, just
+ * with are well-formed ranges in respective s64 or u64 domain, just
* like we do with similar kinds of 32-to-64 or 64-to-32 adjustments.
*/
__u64 new_umin, new_umax;
@@ -14714,7 +14714,7 @@ static void regs_refine_cond_op(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state
/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg and
* src_reg are both SCALAR_VALUE registers (or we are simply doing a BPF_K
- * check, in which case we havea fake SCALAR_VALUE representing insn->imm).
+ * check, in which case we have a fake SCALAR_VALUE representing insn->imm).
* Technically we can do similar adjustments for pointers to the same object,
* but we don't support that right now.
*/
@@ -17352,7 +17352,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur);
/* if previous state reached the exit with precision and
- * current state is equivalent to it (except precsion marks)
+ * current state is equivalent to it (except precision marks)
* the precision needs to be propagated back in
* the current state.
*/
@@ -20209,7 +20209,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* divide-by-3 through multiplication, followed by further
* division by 8 through 3-bit right shift.
* Refer to book "Hacker's Delight, 2nd ed." by Henry S. Warren, Jr.,
- * p. 227, chapter "Unsigned Divison by 3" for details and proofs.
+ * p. 227, chapter "Unsigned Division by 3" for details and proofs.
*
* N / 3 <=> M * N / 2^33, where M = (2^33 + 1) / 3 = 0xaaaaaaab.
*/
--
2.44.0
