Jason Xing wrote:
> From: Jason Xing <kernelxing@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Fix NULL pointer data-races in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue() which
> syzbot reported [1].
>
> [1]
> BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
>
> write to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1:
> sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline]
> sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843
> sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline]
> sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648
> unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048
> __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
> sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421
> __fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422
> __fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507
> __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline]
> __se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541
> __x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541
> do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
>
> read to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0:
> sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline]
> sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555
> sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606
> sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline]
> sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202
> unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline]
> unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682
> sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223
> unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339
> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
> __sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745
> ____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584
> ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
> __sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667
> __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline]
> __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline]
> __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674
> do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
>
> value changed: 0xffffffff83d7feb0 -> 0x0000000000000000
>
> Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
>
> Prior to this, commit 4cd12c6065df ("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer
> dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer
> similarly due to no protection of saved_data_ready. Here is another
> different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So
> we should protect it with sk_callback_lock read lock because the writer
> side in the sk_psock_drop() uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);".
>
> Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
> Reported-by: syzbot+aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d
> Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> net/core/skmsg.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c
> index 4d75ef9d24bf..67c4c01c5235 100644
> --- a/net/core/skmsg.c
> +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c
> @@ -552,7 +552,9 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb,
> msg->skb = skb;
>
> sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, msg);
> + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
> sk_psock_data_ready(sk, psock);
> + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
> return copied;
> }
The problem is the check and then usage presumably it is already set
to NULL:
static inline void sk_psock_data_ready(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock)
{
if (psock->saved_data_ready)
psock->saved_data_ready(sk);
I'm thinking we might be able to get away with just a READ_ONCE here with
similar WRITE_ONCE on other side. Something like this,
sk_psock_data_ready(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock)
{
saved_data_ready = READ_ONCE(psock->saved_data_ready)
if (saved_data_ready)
saved_data_ready(sk)
....
And then in sk_psock_stop_verdict,
WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_data_ready, psock->saved_data_ready);
WRITE_ONCE(psock->saved_data_ready, NULL);
And because we don't actually release the sock until a RCU grace period we
should be OK. The TCP stack manages to work correctly without wrapping
tcp_data_ready in locks like this. But nice thing there is you don't change
this callback on live sockets.
I think at least to keep backport simply above patch is ok, but lets move
the read_lock_bh()/unlock_bh() into the sk_psock_data_ready() call and then
we don't duplicate this error again. Does that make sense?
Thanks,
John
