Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx> writes: > On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 9:28 AM Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> On 3/22/24 4:05 PM, Puranjay Mohan wrote: >> [...] >> >>> + /* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */ >> >>> + if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && >> >>> + (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || >> >>> + BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) { >> >>> + struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; >> >>> + u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(); >> >>> + >> >>> + if (!uaddress_limit) >> >>> + goto next_insn; >> >>> + >> >>> + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); >> >>> + if (insn->off) >> >>> + *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off); >> >>> + *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); >> >>> + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2); >> >>> + *patch++ = *insn; >> >>> + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); >> >>> + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); >> >> >> >> But how does this address other cases where we could fault e.g. non-canonical, >> >> vsyscall page, etc? Technically, we would have to call to copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() >> >> to really address all the cases aside from the overflow (good catch btw!) where kernel >> >> turns into user address. >> > >> > So, we are trying to ~simulate a call to >> > copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() here. If the address under >> > consideration is below TASK_SIZE (TASK_SIZE + 4GB to be precise) then we >> > skip that load because that address could be mapped by the user. >> > >> > If the address is above TASK_SIZE + 4GB, we allow the load and it could >> > cause a fault if the address is invalid, non-canonical etc. Taking the >> > fault is fine because JIT will add an exception table entry for >> > for that load with BPF_PBOBE_MEM. >> >> Are you sure? I don't think the kernel handles non-canonical fixup. > > I believe it handles it fine otherwise our selftest bpf_testmod_return_ptr: > case 4: return (void *)(1ull << 60); /* non-canonical and invalid */ > would have been crashing for the last 3 years, > since we've been running it. > >> > The vsyscall page is special, this approach skips all loads from this >> > page. I am not sure if that is acceptable. >> >> The bpf_probe_read_kernel() does handle it fine via copy_from_kernel_nofault(). >> >> So there is tail risk that BPF_PROBE_* could trigger a crash. > > For this patch let's do > return max(TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE, VSYSCALL_ADDR) > to cover both with one check? I agree, will add this in the next version. >> Other archs might >> have other quirks, e.g. in case of loongarch it says highest bit set means kernel >> space. > > let's tackle loongarch with whatever quirks it has separately. Yes, having the current patch will not break loongarch, it will help it skip some userspace addresses. We can later implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() in loongarch JIT to handle its specific quirks.