On Fri, Mar 15, 2024 at 2:41 PM Jens Axboe <axboe@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 3/15/24 10:45 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> >> +/**
> >> + * ns_capable_any - Determine if the current task has one of two superior capabilities in effect
> >> + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
> >> + * @cap1: The capabilities to be tested for first
> >> + * @cap2: The capabilities to be tested for secondly
> >> + *
> >> + * Return true if the current task has at least one of the two given superior
> >> + * capabilities currently available for use, false if not.
> >> + *
> >> + * In contrast to or'ing capable() this call will create exactly one audit
> >> + * message, either for @cap1, if it is granted or both are not permitted,
> >> + * or @cap2, if it is granted while the other one is not.
> >> + *
> >> + * The capabilities should be ordered from least to most invasive, i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
> >> + *
> >> + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
> >> + * assumption that it's about to be used.
> >> + */
> >> +bool ns_capable_any(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap1, int cap2)
> >> +{
> >> + if (cap1 == cap2)
> >> + return ns_capable(ns, cap1);
> >> +
> >> + if (ns_capable_noauditondeny(ns, cap1))
> >> + return true;
> >> +
> >> + if (ns_capable_noauditondeny(ns, cap2))
> >> + return true;
> >> +
> >> + return ns_capable(ns, cap1);
> >
> > this will incur an extra capable() check (with all the LSMs involved,
> > etc), and so for some cases where capability is expected to not be
> > present, this will be a regression. Is there some way to not redo the
> > check, but just audit the failure? At this point we do know that cap1
> > failed before, so might as well just log that.
>
> Not sure why that's important - if it's a failure case, and any audit
> failure should be, then why would we care if that's now doing a bit of
> extra work?
Exactly. We discussed this in an earlier patchset in 2022 (lore link below):
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHC9VhS8ASN+BB7adi=uoAj=LeNhiD4LEidbMc=_bcD3UTqabg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> I say this not knowing the full picture, as I unhelpfully was only CC'ed
> on two of the patches... Please don't do that when sending patchsets.
Agreed, if the patchset touches anything in the audit, LSM, or SELinux
code please send the full patchset to the related lists. If I have to
dig the full patchset out of lore for review it makes me grumpy.
Don't resend the patchset for just this reason, but please keep it in
mind for future patchsets.
--
paul-moore.com
