Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: Track aligned st store as imprecise spilled registers

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On 1/4/24 11:14 PM, Yonghong Song wrote:

On 1/4/24 5:05 PM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
On Thu, Jan 4, 2024 at 3:29 PM Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Thu, 2024-01-04 at 15:09 -0800, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
[...]
This seemed logical at the time of discussion, however, I can't figure
a counter example at the moment. It appears that whatever are
assumptions in check_stack_write_var_off() if spill is used in the
precise context it would be marked eventually.
E.g. the following is correctly rejected:

SEC("raw_tp")
__log_level(2) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__failure
__naked void var_stack_1(void)
{
         asm volatile (
                 "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
                 "r9 = 100500;"
                 "if r0 > 42 goto +1;"
                 "r9 = 0;"
                 "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r9;"
                 "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
                 "r0 &= 0xf;"
                 "r1 = -1;"
                 "r1 -= r0;"
                 "r2 = r10;"
                 "r2 += r1;"
                 "r0 = 0;"
                 "*(u8 *)(r2 + 0) = r0;"
                 "r1 = %[two_byte_buf];"
                 "r2 = *(u32 *)(r10 -16);"
                 "r1 += r2;"
                 "*(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2;" /* this should not be fine */
                 "exit;"
         :
         : __imm_ptr(two_byte_buf),
           __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
         : __clobber_common);
}

So now I'm not sure :(
Sorry for too much noise.

hm... does that test have to do so many things and do all these u64 vs
u32 vs u8 conversions?
The test is actually quite minimal, the longest part is conjuring of
varying offset pointer in r2, here it is with additional comments:

     /* Write 0 or 100500 to fp-16, 0 is on the first verification pass */
     "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
     "r9 = 100500;"
     "if r0 > 42 goto +1;"
     "r9 = 0;"
     "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r9;"
     /* prepare a variable length access */
     "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
     "r0 &= 0xf;" /* r0 range is [0; 15] */
     "r1 = -1;"
     "r1 -= r0;"  /* r1 range is [-16; -1] */
     "r2 = r10;"
     "r2 += r1;"  /* r2 range is [fp-16; fp-1] */
     /* do a variable length write of constant 0 */
     "r0 = 0;"
     "*(u8 *)(r2 + 0) = r0;"
I meant this u8

     /* use fp-16 to access an array of length 2 */
     "r1 = %[two_byte_buf];"
     "r2 = *(u32 *)(r10 -16);"
and this u32. I'm not saying it's anything wrong, but it's simpler to
deal with u64 consistently. There is nothing wrong with the test per
se, I'm just saying we should try eliminate unnecessary cross-plays
with narrowing/widening stores/loads.

But that's offtopic, sorry.

     "r1 += r2;"
     "*(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2;" /* this should not be fine */
     "exit;"

Can we try a simple test were we spill u64
SCALAR (imprecise) zero register to fp-8 or fp-16, and then use those
fp-8|fp-16 slot as an index into an array in precise context. Then
have a separate delayed branch that will write non-zero to fp-8|fp-16.
States shouldn't converge and this should be rejected.
That is what test above does but it also includes varying offset access.

Yes, and the test fails, but if you read the log, you'll see that fp-8
is never marked precise, but it should. So we need more elaborate test
that would somehow exploit fp-8 imprecision.

I ran out of time. But what I tried was replacing


"r2 = *(u32 *)(r10 -16);"

with

"r2 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0);"

So keep both read and write as variable offset. And we are saved by
some missing logic in read_var_off that would set r2 as known zero
(because it should be for the branch where both fp-8 and fp-16 are
zero). But that fails in the branch that should succeed, and if that
branch actually succeeds, I suspect the branch where we initialize
with non-zero r9 will erroneously succeed.

I did some experiments but still confused.
With the current patch set and the above Andrii's suggested changes, we have
...
13: R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-16,smax=smax32=-1,umin=0xfffffffffffffff0,umin32=0xfffffff0,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0xf)) R2_w=fp(smin=smin32=-16,smax=smax32=-1,umin=0xfffffffffffffff0,umin32=0xfffffff0,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0xf))
13: (b7) r0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
14: (73) *(u8 *)(r2 +0) = r0          ; R0_w=0 R2_w=fp(smin=smin32=-16,smax=smax32=-1,umin=0xfffffffffffffff0,umin32=0xfffffff0,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0xf)) fp-8=mmmmmmmm fp-16=0 15: (bf) r1 = r6                      ; R1_w=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) 16: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)          ; R2_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) fp-16=0
17: (0f) r1 += r2
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 17 first_idx 8 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 16: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
18: R1_w=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R2_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
18: (73) *(u8 *)(r1 +0) = r2
invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=255 size=1
R1 max value is outside of the allowed memory range

Now, let us add the precision marking,
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4619,11 +4619,18 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,

                slot = -i - 1;
                spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
+               mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);

                /* If writing_zero and the the spi slot contains a spill of value 0,
                 * maintain the spill type.
                 */
                if (writing_zero && !(i % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi])) {
+                       if (value_regno >= 0) {
+                               err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
+                               if (err)
+                                       return err;
+                       }
+
                        spill_reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
                        if (tnum_is_const(spill_reg->var_off) && spill_reg->var_off.value == 0) {
                                for (j = BPF_REG_SIZE; j > 0; j--) {
@@ -4636,7 +4643,6 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
                }

                stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
-               mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);

                if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && *stype != STACK_MISC && *stype != STACK_ZERO) {                         /* Reject the write if range we may write to has not


With the above change, the verifier output:
...
13: R1_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-16,smax=smax32=-1,umin=0xfffffffffffffff0,umin32=0xfffffff0,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0xf)) R2_w=fp(smin=smin32=-16,smax=smax32=-1,umin=0xfffffffffffffff0,umin32=0xfffffff0,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0xf))
13: (b7) r0 = 0                       ; R0_w=0
14: (73) *(u8 *)(r2 +0) = r0
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 14 first_idx 8 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 13: (b7) r0 = 0
    <==== added precision marking for the value register
15: R0_w=0 R2_w=fp(smin=smin32=-16,smax=smax32=-1,umin=0xfffffffffffffff0,umin32=0xfffffff0,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0xf)) fp-8=mmmmmmmm fp-16=0 15: (bf) r1 = r6                      ; R1_w=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) 16: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)          ; R2_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) fp-16=0
17: (0f) r1 += r2
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 17 first_idx 8 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 16: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
18: R1_w=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R2_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff))
18: (73) *(u8 *)(r1 +0) = r2
invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=255 size=1
R1 max value is outside of the allowed memory range

Note that we do have precision marking for register r0 at insn 14.
But backtracking at insn 17 stops at insn 16 and it did not reach back
to insn 14, so precision marking is not really needed in this particular
case. Maybe I missed something here.

There is an alternative implementation in check_stack_write_var_off().
For a spill of value/reg 0, we can convert it to STACK_ZERO instead
of trying to maintain STACK_SPILL. If we convert it to STACK_ZERO,
then we can reuse the rest of logic in check_stack_write_var_off()
and at the end we have

        if (zero_used) {
                /* backtracking doesn't work for STACK_ZERO yet. */
                err = mark_chain_precision(env, value_regno);
                if (err)
                        return err;
        }

although I do not fully understand the above either. Need to go back to
git history to find why.

Did some investigation with selftests. test_progs/test_progs-cpuv4 run
did not hit the above mark_chain_precision. Only one test in test_verifier
hits the above code.

{
        "BPF_ST_MEM stack imm zero, variable offset",
        .insns = {
        /* set fp[-16], fp[-24] to zeros */
        BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0),
        BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -24, 0),
        /* r0 = random value in range [-32, -15] */
        BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
        BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_0, 16, 2),
        BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
        BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
        BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, 32),
        /* fp[r0] = 0, make a variable offset write of zero,
         *             this should preserve zero marks on stack.
         */
        BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10),
        BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
        /* r0 = fp[-20], if variable offset write was tracked correctly
         *               r0 would be a known zero.
         */
        BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10, -20),
        /* Would fail return code verification if r0 range is not tracked correctly. */
        BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
        },
        .result = ACCEPT,
        /* Use prog type that requires return value in range [0, 1] */
        .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP,
        .expected_attach_type = BPF_SK_LOOKUP,
        .runs = -1,
},

The verifier output for the insn with variable range and with writing 0:
8: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0            ; R0_w=fp(smin=smin32=-32,smax=smax32=-16,umin=0xffffffffffffffe0,umax=0xfffffffffffffff0,umin32=0xffffffe0,umax32=0xfffffff0,var_off=(0xffffffffffffffe0; 0x1f)) fp-16_w=00000000 fp-24_w=00000000 fp-32=mmmmmmmm
9: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r10 -20)         ; R0_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-24_w=00000000

In the above, value_regno is -1, so backtracking is actually a noop.



Anyways, I still claim that we are mishandling a precision of spilled
register when doing zero var_off writes.



[...]





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