On Tue, 2024-01-02 at 08:56 -0800, Yonghong Song wrote:
> On 1/2/24 7:11 AM, Bram Schuur wrote:
> > Me and my colleague Jan-Gerd Tenberge encountered this issue in production on the 5.15, 6.1 and 6.2 kernel versions. We make a small reproducible case that might help find the root cause:
> >
> > simple_repo.c:
> >
> > #include <linux/bpf.h>
> > #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
> >
> > SEC("socket")
> > int socket__http_filter(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
> > volatile __u32 r = bpf_get_prandom_u32();
> > if (r == 0) {
> > goto done;
> > }
> >
> >
> > #pragma clang loop unroll(full)
> > for (int i = 0; i < 12000; i++) {
> > r += 1;
> > }
> >
> > #pragma clang loop unroll(full)
> > for (int i = 0; i < 12000; i++) {
> > r += 1;
> > }
> > done:
> > return r;
> > }
> >
> > Looking at kernel/bpf/core.c it seems that during constant blinding every instruction which has an constant operand gets 2 additional instructions. This increases the amount of instructions between the JMP and target of the JMP cause rewrite of the JMP to fail because the offset becomes bigger than S16_MAX.
>
> This is indeed possible as verifier might increase insn account in various cases.
> -mcpu=v4 is designed to solve this problem but it is only available at 6.6 and above.
There might be situations when -mcpu=v4 won't help, as currently llvm
would generate long jumps only when it knows at compile time that jump
is indeed long. However here constant blinding would probably triple
the size of the loop body, so for llvm this jump won't be long.
If we consider this corner case an issue, it might be possible to fix
it by teaching bpf_jit_blind_constants() to insert 'BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA'
when jump targets cross the 2**16 thresholds.
Wdyt?
