Re: BPF LSM prevent program unload

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On Wed, Dec 6, 2023 at 4:39 AM Frederick Lawler <fred@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> IIUC, LSMs are supposed to give us the ability to design policy around
> unprivileged users and in addition to privileged users. As we expand
> our usage of BPF LSM's, there are cases where we want to restrict
> privileged users from unloading our progs. For instance, any privileged
> user that wants to remove restrictions we've placed on privileged users.
>
> We currently have a loader application doesn't leverage BPF skeletons. We
> instead load BPF object files, and then pin the progs to a mount point that
> is a bpf filesystem. On next run, if we have new policies, load in new
> policies, and finally unload the old.
>
> Here are some conditions a privileged user may unload programs:
>
>         umount /sys/fs/bpf
>         rm -rf /sys/fs/bpf/lsm
>         rm /sys/fs/bpf/lsm/some_prog
>         unlink /sys/fs/bpf/lsm/some_prog
>
> This works because once we remove the last reference, the programs and
> pinned maps are cleaned up.
>
> Moving individual pins or moving the mount entirely with mount --move
> do not perform any clean up operations. Lastly, bpftool doesn't currently
> have the ability to unload LSM's AFAIK.
>
> The few ideas I have floating around are:
>
> 1. Leverage some LSM hooks (BPF or otherwise) to restrict on the functions
>    security_sb_umount(), security_path_unlink(), security_inode_unlink().
>
>    Both security_path_unlink() and security_inode_unlink() handle the
>    unlink/remove case, but not the umount case.
>
> 3. Leverage SELinux/Apparmor to possibly handle these cases.
>
> 4. Introduce a security_bpf_prog_unload() to target hopefully the
>    umount and unlink cases at the same time.
>

All the above programs can also be removed by privileged users.

> 5. Possible moonshot idea: introduce a interface to pin _specifically_
>    BPF LSM's to the kernel, and avoid the bpf sysfs problems all
>    together.

Introducing non-auto-detachable lsm programs seems like a workable
solution.  That said, we can't remove the lsm program before it has
been detached explicitly by the task which attaches it.

>
> We're making the assumption this problem has been thought about before,
> and are wondering if there's anything obvious we're missing here.
>
> Fred
>


-- 
Regards
Yafang





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