Re: [PATCH bpf V2 1/1] bpf: fix verification of indirect var-off stack access

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 5:05 PM Andrii Nakryiko
<andrii.nakryiko@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 4, 2023 at 11:52 AM Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > > index af2819d5c8ee..b646bdde09cd 100644
> > > > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > > > @@ -6816,10 +6816,9 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
> > > >                         return -EACCES;
> > > >                 }
> > > >                 min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
> > > > +               max_off = reg->smax_value + off;
> > > >                 if (access_size > 0)
> > > > -                       max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
> > > > -               else
> > > > -                       max_off = min_off;
> > > > +                       max_off += access_size - 1;
> > >
> > > this special casing of access_size == 0 feels wrong (and I mean before
> > > your patch as well).
> > >
> > > Looking at the code, we only really calculate max_off to check that we
> > > don't go to a non-negative stack offset, e.g., r10+0 or r10+1 (and
> > > beyond).
> > >
> > > So given that, I propose to calculate max_off as an exclusive bound,
> > > and instead of doing a mostly useless check_stack_slot_within_bounds()
> > > call for it, just check that max_off is <= 0.
> > >
> > > Something like this:
> > >
> > > min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
> > > max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size;
> > > err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
> > > if (!err && max_off > 0)
> > >     err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */
> >
> > Dealing with access_size == 0 indeed feels dubious to me, but I'm not entirely
> > sure that your suggested code is better. min_off being inclusive and
> > max_off being
> > exclusive seems surprising. I'll do it if you want, I don't care too much.
> > We could keep max_off exclusive, and still not call
> > check_stack_slot_within_bounds() for it:
> >
> >  min_off = reg->smin_value + off;
> >  max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1;
> >  err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
> >  if (!err && max_off >= 0)
> >      err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */
> >
>
> Yeah, we can do that. The reason I go for max_off being exclusive is
> because using half-opened ranges is very convenient [start, end) (end
> exclusive) is much more uniform and natural to handle compared to
> closed [start, end] (end inclusive), in all sorts of checks, including
> handling empty ranges. The math just works out better and more
> naturally. And it's not like this will be the first time where in BPF
> we have half-open ranges.

Yeah, after hitting send, I was also thinking that half-open is the more common
interval representation; it just wasn't how this code right here was written.
Will do.

>
> > But now max_off can be below min_off, which again seems confusing.
>
> That's ok, the point here is to validate that we don't access stack
> out of bounds.
>
> >
> > What I'd really like to know is whether this whole zero access_size business
> > deserves to exist. Do you know what the point of verifying a zero-sized access
> > is exactly / could we turn 0-byte access into 1-byte accesses and
> > verify that instead?
> > Because then there'd be no more special case to consider.
> >
>
>
> I think zero is a natural case that can come up, at least with
> helpers. As we have ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO. So yeah, I wouldn't treat
> zero-sized access as 1-byte access, that seems to be more confusing
> and potentially broken.

Ack. Still, if you don't mind entertaining me further, two more questions:

1. What do you make of the code in check_mem_size_reg() [1] where we do

if (reg->umin_value == 0) {
  err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
        zero_size_allowed,
        meta);

followed by

err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
      reg->umax_value,
      zero_size_allowed, meta);

[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/bee0e7762ad2c6025b9f5245c040fcc36ef2bde8/kernel/bpf/verifier.c#L7486-L7489

What's the point of the first check_helper_mem_access() call - the
zero-sized one
(given that we also have the second, broader, check)? Could it be
simply replaced by a

if (reg->umin_value == 0 && !zero_sized_allowed)
    err = no_bueno;

?

2. I believe you're saying that, if we were to verify zero-sized
accesses as 1-byte-sized accesses, we
might refuse some accesses that we permit today, and that wouldn't be
good. But what about
permitting zero-sized accesses with no further checks - i.e.
considering *any* pointer value to
be ok when the access_size == 0 ? Would that be bad? The question is,
morally, what checks are
important (if any) when the size of access is zero?
Or to phrase another way - when a helper is called with a zero access
size, do we expect the helper
to do anything with that pointer, or do we expect the helper to be a no-op?

Thank you!


>
> > >
> > >
> > > Now, one more issue that jumped out at me is that we calculate min/max
> > > off as a sum of smin/smax values (which are checked to be within
> > > +/-1<<29, all good so far) *and* insn->off, which can be a full s32,
> > > it seems. So we are running into overflow/underflow territory with
> > > using int for min_off/max_off.
> > >
> > > While you are at it, can you please use s64 for all these calculations? Thanks!
> > >
> > >
> > > >         }
> > > >
> > > >         err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type);
> >
> > Will do.





[Index of Archives]     [Linux Samsung SoC]     [Linux Rockchip SoC]     [Linux Actions SoC]     [Linux for Synopsys ARC Processors]     [Linux NFS]     [Linux NILFS]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]


  Powered by Linux