On Thu, Nov 30, 2023 at 6:18 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 11:03:54AM -0800, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > Add few new mount options to BPF FS that allow to specify that a given
> > BPF FS instance allows creation of BPF token (added in the next patch),
> > and what sort of operations are allowed under BPF token. As such, we get
> > 4 new mount options, each is a bit mask
> > - `delegate_cmds` allow to specify which bpf() syscall commands are
> > allowed with BPF token derived from this BPF FS instance;
> > - if BPF_MAP_CREATE command is allowed, `delegate_maps` specifies
> > a set of allowable BPF map types that could be created with BPF token;
> > - if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_progs` specifies
> > a set of allowable BPF program types that could be loaded with BPF token;
> > - if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_attachs` specifies
> > a set of allowable BPF program attach types that could be loaded with
> > BPF token; delegate_progs and delegate_attachs are meant to be used
> > together, as full BPF program type is, in general, determined
> > through both program type and program attach type.
> >
> > Currently, these mount options accept the following forms of values:
> > - a special value "any", that enables all possible values of a given
> > bit set;
> > - numeric value (decimal or hexadecimal, determined by kernel
> > automatically) that specifies a bit mask value directly;
> > - all the values for a given mount option are combined, if specified
> > multiple times. E.g., `mount -t bpf nodev /path/to/mount -o
> > delegate_maps=0x1 -o delegate_maps=0x2` will result in a combined 0x3
> > mask.
> >
> > Ideally, more convenient (for humans) symbolic form derived from
> > corresponding UAPI enums would be accepted (e.g., `-o
> > delegate_progs=kprobe|tracepoint`) and I intend to implement this, but
> > it requires a bunch of UAPI header churn, so I postponed it until this
> > feature lands upstream or at least there is a definite consensus that
> > this feature is acceptable and is going to make it, just to minimize
> > amount of wasted effort and not increase amount of non-essential code to
> > be reviewed.
> >
> > Attentive reader will notice that BPF FS is now marked as
> > FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which theoretically makes it mountable inside non-init
> > user namespace as long as the process has sufficient *namespaced*
> > capabilities within that user namespace. But in reality we still
> > restrict BPF FS to be mountable only by processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN *in
> > init userns* (extra check in bpf_fill_super()). FS_USERNS_MOUNT is added
> > to allow creating BPF FS context object (i.e., fsopen("bpf")) from
> > inside unprivileged process inside non-init userns, to capture that
> > userns as the owning userns. It will still be required to pass this
> > context object back to privileged process to instantiate and mount it.
> >
> > This manipulation is important, because capturing non-init userns as the
> > owning userns of BPF FS instance (super block) allows to use that userns
> > to constraint BPF token to that userns later on (see next patch). So
> > creating BPF FS with delegation inside unprivileged userns will restrict
> > derived BPF token objects to only "work" inside that intended userns,
> > making it scoped to a intended "container". Also, setting these
> > delegation options requires capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so unprivileged
> > process cannot set this up without involvement of a privileged process.
> >
> > There is a set of selftests at the end of the patch set that simulates
> > this sequence of steps and validates that everything works as intended.
> > But careful review is requested to make sure there are no missed gaps in
> > the implementation and testing.
> >
> > This somewhat subtle set of aspects is the result of previous
> > discussions ([0]) about various user namespace implications and
> > interactions with BPF token functionality and is necessary to contain
> > BPF token inside intended user namespace.
> >
> > [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
>
> I still think this is a little weird because this isn't really
> unprivileged bpf and it isn't really safe bpf as well.
>
> All this does is allow an administrator to punch a big fat hole into an
> unprivileged container so workloads get to play with their favorite toy.
>
> I think that having a way to have signed bpf programs in addition to
> this would be much more interesting to generic workloads that don't know
> who or what they can trust.
Absolutely, that is the trust part of the puzzle. Song's LSM+fsverity
patch set is a step in that direction.
>
> And there's a few things to remember:
>
> * This absolutely isn't a safety mechanism.
> * This absolutely isn't safe to enable generically in containers.
100% agreed, this should be used only with trusted workloads (however
the trust is established in any particular setup: signing, fsverity,
whatnot)
> * This is a workaround and not a solution to unprivileged bpf.
>
> And this is an ACK solely on the code of this patch, not the concept.
> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> (reluctantly)
Thank you anyways! I appreciate your efforts to make sure this doesn't
create unintended security holes.
