Re: [PATCH bpf-next 3/7] bpf: enforce precision for r0 on callback return

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Thu, Nov 9, 2023 at 9:38 AM Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2023-11-09 at 09:32 -0800, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 9, 2023 at 7:20 AM Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, 2023-10-30 at 22:03 -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > > > > Given verifier checks actual value, r0 has to be precise, so we need to
> > > > > propagate precision properly.
> > > > >
> > > > > Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper")
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > >
> > > I don't follow why this is necessary, could you please conjure
> > > an example showing that current behavior is not safe?
> > > This example could be used as a test case, as this change
> > > seems to not be covered by test cases.
> >
> > We rely on callbacks to return specific value (0 or 1, for example),
> > and use or might use that in kernel code. So if we rely on the
> > specific value of a register, it has to be precise. Marking r0 as
> > precise will have implications on other registers from which r0 was
> > derived. This might have implications on state pruning and stuff. If
> > r0 and its ancestors are not precise, we might erroneously assume some
> > states are safe and prune them, even though they are not.
>
> The r0 returned from bpf_loop's callback says bpf_loop to stop iteration,
> bpf_loop returns the number of completed iterations. However, the return
> value of bpf_loop modeled by verifier is unbounded scalar.
> Same for map's for each.

return value of bpf_loop() is a different thing from return value of
bpf_loop's callback. Right now bpf_loop implementation in kernel does

ret = callback(...);
/* return value: 0 - continue, 1 - stop and return */
if (ret)
   return i + 1;

So yes, it doesn't rely explicitly on return value to be 1 just due to
the above implementation. But verifier is meant to enforce that and
the protocol is that bpf_loop and other callback calling helpers
should rely on this value.

I think we have the same problem in check_return_code() for entry BPF
programs. So let me taking this one out of this patch set and post a
new one concentrating on this particular issue. I've been meaning to
use umin/umax for return value checking anyways, so might be a good
idea to do this anyways.

>
> I'm not sure we have callback calling functions that can expose this as a
> safety issue.

Even if we can't exploit it today, it's breaking the protocol and
guarantees that verifier provides, so I think this needs to be fixed.

>
> [...]





[Index of Archives]     [Linux Samsung SoC]     [Linux Rockchip SoC]     [Linux Actions SoC]     [Linux for Synopsys ARC Processors]     [Linux NFS]     [Linux NILFS]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]


  Powered by Linux