On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 6:00 PM Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> The current bpf_probe_read() and bpf_probe_read_str() helpers are broken
> in that they assume they can be used for probing memory access for kernel
> space addresses /as well as/ user space addresses.
>
> However, plain use of probe_kernel_read() for both cases will attempt to
> always access kernel space address space given access is performed under
> KERNEL_DS and some archs in-fact have overlapping address spaces where a
> kernel pointer and user pointer would have the /same/ address value and
> therefore accessing application memory via bpf_probe_read{,_str}() would
> read garbage values.
>
> Lets fix BPF side by making use of recently added 3d7081822f7f ("uaccess:
> Add non-pagefault user-space read functions"). Unfortunately, the only way
> to fix this status quo is to add dedicated bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}()
> and bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}_str() helpers. The bpf_probe_read{,_str}()
> helpers are kept as-is to retain their current behavior.
>
> The two *_user() variants attempt the access always under USER_DS set, the
> two *_kernel() variants will -EFAULT when accessing user memory if the
> underlying architecture has non-overlapping address ranges, also avoiding
> throwing the kernel warning via 00c42373d397 ("x86-64: add warning for
> non-canonical user access address dereferences").
>
> Fixes: a5e8c07059d0 ("bpf: add bpf_probe_read_str helper")
> Fixes: 2541517c32be ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs attached to kprobes")
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
LGTM!
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@xxxxxx>
> include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 120 +++++++++++++++-------
> kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 120 +++++++++++++++-------
> 3 files changed, 297 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
>
