On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 1:17 PM Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 06/19, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 10:00 AM Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > Implement new BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT program type and
> > > BPF_CGROUP_{G,S}ETSOCKOPT cgroup hooks.
> > >
> > > BPF_CGROUP_SETSOCKOPT get a read-only view of the setsockopt arguments.
> > > BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT can modify the supplied buffer.
> > > Both of them reuse existing PTR_TO_PACKET{,_END} infrastructure.
> > >
> > > The buffer memory is pre-allocated (because I don't think there is
> > > a precedent for working with __user memory from bpf). This might be
> > > slow to do for each {s,g}etsockopt call, that's why I've added
> > > __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty that exits early if there is nothing
> > > attached to a cgroup. Note, however, that there is a race between
> > > __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty and BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY where cgroup
> > > program layout might have changed; this should not be a problem
> > > because in general there is a race between multiple calls to
> > > {s,g}etsocktop and user adding/removing bpf progs from a cgroup.
> > >
> > > The return code of the BPF program is handled as follows:
> > > * 0: EPERM
> > > * 1: success, continue with next BPF program in the cgroup chain
> > >
> > > v7:
> > > * return only 0 or 1 (Alexei Starovoitov)
> > > * always run all progs (Alexei Starovoitov)
> > > * use optval=0 as kernel bypass in setsockopt (Alexei Starovoitov)
> > > (decided to use optval=-1 instead, optval=0 might be a valid input)
> > > * call getsockopt hook after kernel handlers (Alexei Starovoitov)
> > >
> > > v6:
> > > * rework cgroup chaining; stop as soon as bpf program returns
> > > 0 or 2; see patch with the documentation for the details
> > > * drop Andrii's and Martin's Acked-by (not sure they are comfortable
> > > with the new state of things)
> >
> > I like the general approach, just overall unclear about seemingly
> > artificial restrictions I mentioned below.
> >
> > >
> > > v5:
> > > * skip copy_to_user() and put_user() when ret == 0 (Martin Lau)
> > >
> > > v4:
> > > * don't export bpf_sk_fullsock helper (Martin Lau)
> > > * size != sizeof(__u64) for uapi pointers (Martin Lau)
> > > * offsetof instead of bpf_ctx_range when checking ctx access (Martin Lau)
> > >
> > > v3:
> > > * typos in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY comments (Andrii Nakryiko)
> > > * reverse christmas tree in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY (Andrii
> > > Nakryiko)
> > > * use __bpf_md_ptr instead of __u32 for optval{,_end} (Martin Lau)
> > > * use BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF() for consistency (Martin Lau)
> > > * new CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS macro to wrap repeated parts
> > >
> > > v2:
> > > * moved bpf_sockopt_kern fields around to remove a hole (Martin Lau)
> > > * aligned bpf_sockopt_kern->buf to 8 bytes (Martin Lau)
> > > * bpf_prog_array_is_empty instead of bpf_prog_array_length (Martin Lau)
> > > * added [0,2] return code check to verifier (Martin Lau)
> > > * dropped unused buf[64] from the stack (Martin Lau)
> > > * use PTR_TO_SOCKET for bpf_sockopt->sk (Martin Lau)
> > > * dropped bpf_target_off from ctx rewrites (Martin Lau)
> > > * use return code for kernel bypass (Martin Lau & Andrii Nakryiko)
> > >
> > > Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@xxxxxx>
> > > Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > ---
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > >
> > > +struct bpf_sockopt_kern {
> > > + struct sock *sk;
> > > + u8 *optval;
> > > + u8 *optval_end;
> > > + s32 level;
> > > + s32 optname;
> > > + u32 optlen;
> >
> > Optlen is used below as signed integer, so switch it to s32?
> Good catch, should be s32 here and below, thanks!
>
> > > + s32 retval;
> > > +
> > > + /* Small on-stack optval buffer to avoid small allocations.
> > > + */
> > > + u8 buf[64] __aligned(8);
> > > +};
> > > +
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > >
> > > +struct bpf_sockopt {
> > > + __bpf_md_ptr(struct bpf_sock *, sk);
> > > + __bpf_md_ptr(void *, optval);
> > > + __bpf_md_ptr(void *, optval_end);
> > > +
> > > + __s32 level;
> > > + __s32 optname;
> > > + __u32 optlen;
> >
> > Same as above, we expect BPF program to be able to set it to -1, so __s32?
> >
> > > + __s32 retval;
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > #endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_BPF_H__ */
> > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > +
> > > + if (ctx.optlen == -1)
> > > + /* optlen set to -1, bypass kernel */
> > > + ret = 1;
> > > + else if (ctx.optlen == optlen)
> > > + /* optlen not changed, run kernel handler */
> > > + ret = 0;
> > > + else
> > > + /* any other value is rejected */
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> >
> > I'm consufed about this assymetry between getsockopt and setsockopt
> > behavior. Why we are disallowing setsockopt from changing optlen (and
> > value itself)? Is there any harm in allowing that? Imagining some use
> > case that provides transparent "support" for some option, you'd need
> > to be able to intercept and provide custom values both for setsockopt
> > and getsockopt. So unless I'm missing some security implications, why
> > not make both sides able to write?
> Because kernel setsockopt handlers use get_user to read the data. We
> can definitely allow changing optval+optlen, but we'd have to copy
> that data back to userspace to let kernel handle it. I'm not sure how
> userspace might feel about it. Can it be a buffer in the readonly
> elf section?
Ah, ok, now I see why :) Yeah, I guess it can be in read-only section.
Alright, I don't see an easy solution to that, I guess we can live
with that for now.
>
> > Similar will apply w.r.t. retval, why can't setsockopt return EINVAL
> > to reject some options? This seems very useful and very similar to
> > what sysctl BPF hooks do.
> I was just being defensive because I'm not sure what's the use-case.
> We can already return EPERM, why do we need to return a different
> error code? Are we comfortable letting progs return arbitrary number?
> Or you just want to allow a bunch of pre-defined error codes?
>
> I haven't seen the ability to return arbitrary error from the sysctl
> hooks, but maybe I didn't look hard enough.
Yeah, seems like sysctl is only 0 or EPERM. I missed for a moment that
there is return value from BPF program and retval from the context. I
think it's good enough as is.
>
> > > +
> > > +out:
> > > + sockopt_free_buf(&ctx);
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt);
> > > +
> > > +int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
> > > + int optname, char __user *optval,
> > > + int __user *optlen, int max_optlen,
> > > + int retval)
> > > +{
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > +
> > > + if (ctx.optlen > max_optlen) {
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* BPF programs only allowed to set retval to 0, not some
> > > + * arbitrary value.
> > > + */
> > > + if (ctx.retval != 0 && ctx.retval != retval) {
> >
> > Lookin at manpage of getsockopt, seems like at least two error codes
> > are relevant and generally useful for BPF program to be able to
> > return: EINVAL and ENOPROTOOPT? Why we are disallowing anything but 0
> > (or preserving original retval)?
> I was thinking about simple use-case where it's either BPF that
> handles the opt or the kernel. And then it's BFP returning success or
> EPERM. I don't think I understand why BPF needs to be able to
> return different error codes. We can certainly do that if you think
> that it makes sense; alternatively, we can start with 0 or kernel retval
> and relax the requirements if someone really needs that in the future.
>
> (I don't have a strong opinion here tbh).
As replied above, EPERM is probably good enough for practical
purposes, I was being a bit pedantic :)
>
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (copy_to_user(optval, ctx.optval, ctx.optlen) ||
> > > + put_user(ctx.optlen, optlen)) {
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + ret = ctx.retval;
> > > +
> > > +out:
> > > + sockopt_free_buf(&ctx);
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_getsockopt);
> > > +
> >
> > <snip>
