Hi, On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 9:17 AM, Rashmi Srinivasan <rashmisrinivasan2007@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > We are trying to port the fix for CVE (CVE-2016-8743) to 2.4.18. Tried > checking the revision on git for the list of files fixed for this CVE. > There are lots of changes related to RFC7320 and was difficult to figure out > the files changed for this CVE as We couldnt find the CVE-2016-8743 in the > log either. The branch [1] collects all the related changes between versions 2.4.25 (latest) and 2.4.23 (previous). Attached is the output of: $ svn diff -x-p https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@r1767912 https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x-merge-http-strict >httpd-2.4.23-CVE-2016-8743.patch It should apply cleanly to 2.4.23, though it may not to 2.4.18 (possibly more work needed...). Hope this helps. Regards, Yann. [1] https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x-merge-http-strict
Index: docs/manual/mod/core.xml
===================================================================
--- docs/manual/mod/core.xml (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ docs/manual/mod/core.xml (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -1239,6 +1239,82 @@ EnableSendfile On
</directivesynopsis>
<directivesynopsis>
+<name>HttpProtocolOptions</name>
+<description>Modify restrictions on HTTP Request Messages</description>
+<syntax>HttpProtocolOptions [Strict|Unsafe] [RegisteredMethods|LenientMethods]
+ [Allow0.9|Require1.0]</syntax>
+<default>HttpProtocolOptions Strict LenientMethods Allow0.9</default>
+<contextlist><context>server config</context>
+<context>virtual host</context></contextlist>
+<compatibility>2.2.32 or 2.4.24 and later</compatibility>
+
+<usage>
+ <p>This directive changes the rules applied to the HTTP Request Line
+ (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.1.1";
+ >RFC 7230 §3.1.1</a>) and the HTTP Request Header Fields
+ (<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2";
+ >RFC 7230 §3.2</a>), which are now applied by default or using
+ the <code>Strict</code> option. Due to legacy modules, applications or
+ custom user-agents which must be deperecated the <code>Unsafe</code>
+ option has been added to revert to the legacy behaviors. These rules
+ are applied prior to request processing, so must be configured at the
+ global or default (first) matching virtual host section, by IP/port
+ interface (and not by name) to be honored.</p>
+
+ <p>Prior to the introduction of this directive, the Apache HTTP Server
+ request message parsers were tolerant of a number of forms of input
+ which did not conform to the protocol.
+ <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-9.4";
+ >RFC 7230 §9.4 Request Splitting</a> and
+ <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-9.5";
+ >§9.5 Response Smuggling</a> call out only two of the potential
+ risks of accepting non-conformant request messages, while
+ <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.5";
+ >RFC 7230 §3.5</a> "Message Parsing Robustness" identify the
+ risks of accepting obscure whitespace and request message formatting.
+ As of the introduction of this directive, all grammer rules of the
+ specification are enforced in the default <code>Strict</code> operating
+ mode, and the strict whitespace suggested by section 3.5 is enforced
+ and cannot be relaxed.</p>
+
+ <p>Users are strongly cautioned against toggling the <code>Unsafe</code>
+ mode of operation, particularly on outward-facing, publicly accessible
+ server deployments. If an interface is required for faulty monitoring
+ or other custom service consumers running on an intranet, users should
+ toggle the Unsafe option only on a specific virtual host configured
+ to service their internal private network.</p>
+
+ <p>Reviewing the messages logged to the <directive>ErrorLog</directive>,
+ configured with <directive>LogLevel</directive> <code>debug</code> level,
+ can help identify such faulty requests along with their origin.
+ Users should pay particular attention to the 400 responses in the access
+ log for invalid requests which were unexpectedly rejected.</p>
+
+ <p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231#section-4.1";
+ >RFC 7231 §4.1</a> "Request Methods" "Overview" requires that
+ origin servers shall respond with an error when an unsupported method
+ is encountered in the request line. This already happens when the
+ <code>LenientMethods</code> option is used, but administrators may wish
+ to toggle the <code>RegisteredMethods</code> option and register any
+ non-standard methods using the <directive>RegisterHttpMethod</directive>
+ directive, particularly if the <code>Unsafe</code> option has been toggled.
+ The <code>RegisteredMethods</code> option should <strong>not</strong>
+ be toggled for forward proxy hosts, as the methods supported by the
+ origin servers are unknown to the proxy server.</p>
+
+ <p><a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#section-19.6";
+ >RFC 2616 §19.6</a> "Compatibility With Previous Versions" had
+ encouraged HTTP servers to support legacy HTTP/0.9 requests. RFC 7230
+ superceeds this with "The expectation to support HTTP/0.9 requests has
+ been removed" and offers additional comments in
+ <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#appendix-A";
+ >RFC 7230 Appendix A</a>. The <code>Require1.0</code> option allows
+ the user to remove support of the default <code>Allow0.9</code> option's
+ behavior.</p>
+</usage>
+</directivesynopsis>
+
+<directivesynopsis>
<name>Error</name>
<description>Abort configuration parsing with a custom error message</description>
<syntax>Error <var>message</var></syntax>
@@ -4766,5 +4842,20 @@ as if 'QualifyRedirectURL ON' was configured.</com
</directivesynopsis>
+<directivesynopsis>
+<name>RegisterHttpMethod</name>
+<description>Register non-standard HTTP methods</description>
+<syntax>RegisterHttpMethod <var>method</var> [<var>method</var> [...]]</syntax>
+<contextlist><context>server config</context></contextlist>
+<usage>
+<p>HTTP Methods that are not conforming to the relvant RFCs are normally
+rejected by request processing in Apache HTTPD. To avoid this, modules
+can register non-standard HTTP methods they support.
+The <directive>RegisterHttpMethod</directive> allows to register such
+methods manually. This can be useful for if such methods are forwared
+for external processing, e.g. to a CGI script.</p>
+</usage>
+</directivesynopsis>
+
</modulesynopsis>
Index: docs/manual
===================================================================
--- docs/manual (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ docs/manual (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
Property changes on: docs/manual
___________________________________________________________________
Modified: svn:mergeinfo
## -0,0 +0,1 ##
Merged /httpd/httpd/trunk/docs/manual:r1407599,1756540,1756649,1756729,1756862,1756959,1757589,1757711,1757920,1758265-1758266,1764961
Index: server/gen_test_char.c
===================================================================
--- server/gen_test_char.c (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ server/gen_test_char.c (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@
#ifdef CROSS_COMPILE
+#include <ctype.h>
#define apr_isalnum(c) (isalnum(((unsigned char)(c))))
#define apr_isalpha(c) (isalpha(((unsigned char)(c))))
#define apr_iscntrl(c) (iscntrl(((unsigned char)(c))))
#define apr_isprint(c) (isprint(((unsigned char)(c))))
-#include <ctype.h>
#define APR_HAVE_STDIO_H 1
#define APR_HAVE_STRING_H 1
@@ -52,11 +52,13 @@
#define T_ESCAPE_LOGITEM (0x10)
#define T_ESCAPE_FORENSIC (0x20)
#define T_ESCAPE_URLENCODED (0x40)
+#define T_HTTP_CTRLS (0x80)
+#define T_VCHAR_OBSTEXT (0x100)
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
unsigned c;
- unsigned char flags;
+ unsigned short flags;
printf("/* this file is automatically generated by gen_test_char, "
"do not edit */\n"
@@ -67,8 +69,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
"#define T_ESCAPE_LOGITEM (%u)\n"
"#define T_ESCAPE_FORENSIC (%u)\n"
"#define T_ESCAPE_URLENCODED (%u)\n"
+ "#define T_HTTP_CTRLS (%u)\n"
+ "#define T_VCHAR_OBSTEXT (%u)\n"
"\n"
- "static const unsigned char test_char_table[256] = {",
+ "static const unsigned short test_char_table[256] = {",
T_ESCAPE_SHELL_CMD,
T_ESCAPE_PATH_SEGMENT,
T_OS_ESCAPE_PATH,
@@ -75,11 +79,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
T_HTTP_TOKEN_STOP,
T_ESCAPE_LOGITEM,
T_ESCAPE_FORENSIC,
- T_ESCAPE_URLENCODED);
+ T_ESCAPE_URLENCODED,
+ T_HTTP_CTRLS,
+ T_VCHAR_OBSTEXT);
for (c = 0; c < 256; ++c) {
flags = 0;
- if (c % 20 == 0)
+ if (c % 8 == 0)
printf("\n ");
/* escape_shell_cmd */
@@ -107,7 +113,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
flags |= T_ESCAPE_PATH_SEGMENT;
}
- if (!apr_isalnum(c) && !strchr("$-_.+!*'(),:@&=/~", c)) {
+ if (!apr_isalnum(c) && !strchr("$-_.+!*'(),:;@&=/~", c)) {
flags |= T_OS_ESCAPE_PATH;
}
@@ -115,11 +121,32 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
flags |= T_ESCAPE_URLENCODED;
}
- /* these are the "tspecials" (RFC2068) or "separators" (RFC2616) */
- if (c && (apr_iscntrl(c) || strchr(" \t()<>@,;:\\\"/[]?={}", c))) {
+ /* Stop for any non-'token' character, including ctrls, obs-text,
+ * and "tspecials" (RFC2068) a.k.a. "separators" (RFC2616), which
+ * is easer to express as characters remaining in the ASCII token set
+ */
+ if (!c || !(apr_isalnum(c) || strchr("!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~", c))) {
flags |= T_HTTP_TOKEN_STOP;
}
+ /* Catch CTRLs other than VCHAR, HT and SP, and obs-text (RFC7230 3.2)
+ * This includes only the C0 plane, not C1 (which is obs-text itself.)
+ * XXX: We should verify that all ASCII C0 ctrls/DEL corresponding to
+ * the current EBCDIC translation are captured, and ASCII C1 ctrls
+ * corresponding are all permitted (as they fall under obs-text rule)
+ */
+ if (!c || (apr_iscntrl(c) && c != '\t')) {
+ flags |= T_HTTP_CTRLS;
+ }
+
+ /* From RFC3986, the specific sets of gen-delims, sub-delims (2.2),
+ * and unreserved (2.3) that are possible somewhere within a URI.
+ * Spec requires all others to be %XX encoded, including obs-text.
+ */
+ if (c && !apr_iscntrl(c) && c != ' ') {
+ flags |= T_VCHAR_OBSTEXT;
+ }
+
/* For logging, escape all control characters,
* double quotes (because they delimit the request in the log file)
* backslashes (because we use backslash for escaping)
@@ -137,7 +164,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
flags |= T_ESCAPE_FORENSIC;
}
- printf("%u%c", flags, (c < 255) ? ',' : ' ');
+ printf("0x%03x%c", flags, (c < 255) ? ',' : ' ');
}
printf("\n};\n");
Index: server/util.c
===================================================================
--- server/util.c (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ server/util.c (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
* char in here and get it to work, because if char is signed then it
* will first be sign extended.
*/
-#define TEST_CHAR(c, f) (test_char_table[(unsigned)(c)] & (f))
+#define TEST_CHAR(c, f) (test_char_table[(unsigned char)(c)] & (f))
/* Win32/NetWare/OS2 need to check for both forward and back slashes
* in ap_getparents() and ap_escape_url.
@@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_stric
while (!string_end) {
const unsigned char c = (unsigned char)*cur;
- if (!TEST_CHAR(c, T_HTTP_TOKEN_STOP) && c != '\0') {
+ if (!TEST_CHAR(c, T_HTTP_TOKEN_STOP)) {
/* Non-separator character; we are finished with leading
* whitespace. We must never have encountered any trailing
* whitespace before the delimiter (comma) */
@@ -1593,6 +1593,37 @@ AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_stric
return NULL;
}
+/* Scan a string for HTTP VCHAR/obs-text characters including HT and SP
+ * (as used in header values, for example, in RFC 7230 section 3.2)
+ * returning the pointer to the first non-HT ASCII ctrl character.
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_scan_http_field_content(const char *ptr)
+{
+ for ( ; !TEST_CHAR(*ptr, T_HTTP_CTRLS); ++ptr) ;
+
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+/* Scan a string for HTTP token characters, returning the pointer to
+ * the first non-token character.
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_scan_http_token(const char *ptr)
+{
+ for ( ; !TEST_CHAR(*ptr, T_HTTP_TOKEN_STOP); ++ptr) ;
+
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+/* Scan a string for visible ASCII (0x21-0x7E) or obstext (0x80+)
+ * and return a pointer to the first ctrl/space character encountered.
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_scan_vchar_obstext(const char *ptr)
+{
+ for ( ; TEST_CHAR(*ptr, T_VCHAR_OBSTEXT); ++ptr) ;
+
+ return ptr;
+}
+
/* Retrieve a token, spacing over it and returning a pointer to
* the first non-white byte afterwards. Note that these tokens
* are delimited by semis and commas; and can also be delimited
Index: server/core.c
===================================================================
--- server/core.c (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ server/core.c (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -519,6 +519,15 @@ static void *merge_core_server_configs(apr_pool_t
if (virt->trace_enable != AP_TRACE_UNSET)
conf->trace_enable = virt->trace_enable;
+ if (virt->http09_enable != AP_HTTP09_UNSET)
+ conf->http09_enable = virt->http09_enable;
+
+ if (virt->http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSET)
+ conf->http_conformance = virt->http_conformance;
+
+ if (virt->http_methods != AP_HTTP_METHODS_UNSET)
+ conf->http_methods = virt->http_methods;
+
/* no action for virt->accf_map, not allowed per-vhost */
if (virt->protocol)
@@ -3895,6 +3904,57 @@ static const char *set_protocols_honor_order(cmd_p
return NULL;
}
+static const char *set_http_protocol_options(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy,
+ const char *arg)
+{
+ core_server_config *conf =
+ ap_get_core_module_config(cmd->server->module_config);
+
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "allow0.9") == 0)
+ conf->http09_enable |= AP_HTTP09_ENABLE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "require1.0") == 0)
+ conf->http09_enable |= AP_HTTP09_DISABLE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "strict") == 0)
+ conf->http_conformance |= AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_STRICT;
+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "unsafe") == 0)
+ conf->http_conformance |= AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "registeredmethods") == 0)
+ conf->http_methods |= AP_HTTP_METHODS_REGISTERED;
+ else if (strcasecmp(arg, "lenientmethods") == 0)
+ conf->http_methods |= AP_HTTP_METHODS_LENIENT;
+ else
+ return "HttpProtocolOptions accepts "
+ "'Unsafe' or 'Strict' (default), "
+ "'RegisteredMethods' or 'LenientMethods' (default), and "
+ "'Require1.0' or 'Allow0.9' (default)";
+
+ if ((conf->http09_enable & AP_HTTP09_ENABLE)
+ && (conf->http09_enable & AP_HTTP09_DISABLE))
+ return "HttpProtocolOptions 'Allow0.9' and 'Require1.0'"
+ " are mutually exclusive";
+
+ if ((conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_STRICT)
+ && (conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE))
+ return "HttpProtocolOptions 'Strict' and 'Unsafe'"
+ " are mutually exclusive";
+
+ if ((conf->http_methods & AP_HTTP_METHODS_REGISTERED)
+ && (conf->http_methods & AP_HTTP_METHODS_LENIENT))
+ return "HttpProtocolOptions 'RegisteredMethods' and 'LenientMethods'"
+ " are mutually exclusive";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *set_http_method(cmd_parms *cmd, void *conf, const char *arg)
+{
+ const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, GLOBAL_ONLY);
+ if (err != NULL)
+ return err;
+ ap_method_register(cmd->pool, arg);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static apr_hash_t *errorlog_hash;
static int log_constant_item(const ap_errorlog_info *info, const char *arg,
@@ -4419,6 +4479,12 @@ AP_INIT_ITERATE("Protocols", set_protocols, NULL,
AP_INIT_TAKE1("ProtocolsHonorOrder", set_protocols_honor_order, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
"'off' (default) or 'on' to respect given order of protocols, "
"by default the client specified order determines selection"),
+AP_INIT_ITERATE("HttpProtocolOptions", set_http_protocol_options, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "'Allow0.9' or 'Require1.0' (default); "
+ "'RegisteredMethods' or 'LenientMethods' (default); "
+ "'Unsafe' or 'Strict' (default). Sets HTTP acceptance rules"),
+AP_INIT_ITERATE("RegisterHttpMethod", set_http_method, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Registers non-standard HTTP methods"),
{ NULL }
};
Index: server/protocol.c
===================================================================
--- server/protocol.c (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ server/protocol.c (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -191,6 +191,10 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_time_t) ap_rationalize_mtime(reques
/* Get a line of protocol input, including any continuation lines
* caused by MIME folding (or broken clients) if fold != 0, and place it
* in the buffer s, of size n bytes, without the ending newline.
+ *
+ * Pulls from r->proto_input_filters instead of r->input_filters for
+ * stricter protocol adherence and better input filter behavior during
+ * chunked trailer processing (for http).
*
* If s is NULL, ap_rgetline_core will allocate necessary memory from r->pool.
*
@@ -200,7 +204,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_time_t) ap_rationalize_mtime(reques
* APR_ENOSPC is returned if there is not enough buffer space.
* Other errors may be returned on other errors.
*
- * The LF is *not* returned in the buffer. Therefore, a *read of 0
+ * The [CR]LF are *not* returned in the buffer. Therefore, a *read of 0
* indicates that an empty line was read.
*
* Notes: Because the buffer uses 1 char for NUL, the most we can return is
@@ -211,7 +215,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_time_t) ap_rationalize_mtime(reques
*/
AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s, apr_size_t n,
apr_size_t *read, request_rec *r,
- int fold, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
+ int flags, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
apr_status_t rv;
apr_bucket *e;
@@ -218,6 +222,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s
apr_size_t bytes_handled = 0, current_alloc = 0;
char *pos, *last_char = *s;
int do_alloc = (*s == NULL), saw_eos = 0;
+ int fold = flags & AP_GETLINE_FOLD;
+ int crlf = flags & AP_GETLINE_CRLF;
/*
* Initialize last_char as otherwise a random value will be compared
@@ -229,13 +235,15 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s
for (;;) {
apr_brigade_cleanup(bb);
- rv = ap_get_brigade(r->input_filters, bb, AP_MODE_GETLINE,
+ rv = ap_get_brigade(r->proto_input_filters, bb, AP_MODE_GETLINE,
APR_BLOCK_READ, 0);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
- /* Something horribly wrong happened. Someone didn't block! */
+ /* Something horribly wrong happened. Someone didn't block!
+ * (this also happens at the end of each keepalive connection)
+ */
if (APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(bb)) {
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
@@ -321,6 +329,13 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s
}
}
+ if (crlf && (last_char <= *s || last_char[-1] != APR_ASCII_CR)) {
+ *last_char = '\0';
+ bytes_handled = last_char - *s;
+ *read = bytes_handled;
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
+
/* Now NUL-terminate the string at the end of the line;
* if the last-but-one character is a CR, terminate there */
if (last_char > *s && last_char[-1] == APR_ASCII_CR) {
@@ -343,7 +358,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s
apr_brigade_cleanup(bb);
/* We only care about the first byte. */
- rv = ap_get_brigade(r->input_filters, bb, AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE,
+ rv = ap_get_brigade(r->proto_input_filters, bb, AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE,
APR_BLOCK_READ, 1);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
@@ -394,7 +409,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s
*/
if (do_alloc) {
tmp = NULL;
- } else {
+ }
+ else {
/* We're null terminated. */
tmp = last_char;
}
@@ -464,7 +480,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline(char **s, apr
}
#endif
-AP_DECLARE(int) ap_getline(char *s, int n, request_rec *r, int fold)
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_getline(char *s, int n, request_rec *r, int flags)
{
char *tmp_s = s;
apr_status_t rv;
@@ -472,7 +488,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline(char **s, apr
apr_bucket_brigade *tmp_bb;
tmp_bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc);
- rv = ap_rgetline(&tmp_s, n, &len, r, fold, tmp_bb);
+ rv = ap_rgetline(&tmp_s, n, &len, r, flags, tmp_bb);
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
/* Map the out-of-space condition to the old API. */
@@ -552,16 +568,29 @@ AP_CORE_DECLARE(void) ap_parse_uri(request_rec *r,
}
}
+/* get the length of the field name for logging, but no more than 80 bytes */
+#define LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN 80
+static int field_name_len(const char *field)
+{
+ const char *end = ap_strchr_c(field, ':');
+ if (end == NULL || end - field > LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN)
+ return LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN;
+ return end - field;
+}
+
static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
- const char *ll;
- const char *uri;
- const char *pro;
-
- unsigned int major = 1, minor = 0; /* Assume HTTP/1.0 if non-"HTTP" protocol */
- char http[5];
+ enum {
+ rrl_none, rrl_badmethod, rrl_badwhitespace, rrl_excesswhitespace,
+ rrl_missinguri, rrl_baduri, rrl_badprotocol, rrl_trailingtext,
+ rrl_badmethod09, rrl_reject09
+ } deferred_error = rrl_none;
+ char *ll;
+ char *uri;
apr_size_t len;
int num_blank_lines = DEFAULT_LIMIT_BLANK_LINES;
+ core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
+ int strict = (conf->http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE);
/* Read past empty lines until we get a real request line,
* a read error, the connection closes (EOF), or we timeout.
@@ -586,7 +615,7 @@ static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_b
*/
r->the_request = NULL;
rv = ap_rgetline(&(r->the_request), (apr_size_t)(r->server->limit_req_line + 2),
- &len, r, 0, bb);
+ &len, r, strict ? AP_GETLINE_CRLF : 0, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
@@ -596,7 +625,7 @@ static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_b
* happen if it exceeds the configured limit for a request-line.
*/
if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rv)) {
- r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE;
+ r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE;
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT;
@@ -617,58 +646,266 @@ static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_b
}
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
- ll = r->the_request;
- r->method = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
- uri = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
+ r->method = r->the_request;
- if (!*r->method || !*uri) {
- r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
- r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1,0);
- r->protocol = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "HTTP/1.0");
- return 0;
+ /* If there is whitespace before a method, skip it and mark in error */
+ if (apr_isspace(*r->method)) {
+ deferred_error = rrl_badwhitespace;
+ for ( ; apr_isspace(*r->method); ++r->method)
+ ;
}
- /* Provide quick information about the request method as soon as known */
+ /* Scan the method up to the next whitespace, ensure it contains only
+ * valid http-token characters, otherwise mark in error
+ */
+ if (strict) {
+ ll = (char*) ap_scan_http_token(r->method);
+ }
+ else {
+ ll = (char*) ap_scan_vchar_obstext(r->method);
+ }
+ if (((ll == r->method) || (*ll && !apr_isspace(*ll)))
+ && deferred_error == rrl_none) {
+ deferred_error = rrl_badmethod;
+ ll = strpbrk(ll, "\t\n\v\f\r ");
+ }
+
+ /* Verify method terminated with a single SP, or mark as specific error */
+ if (!ll) {
+ if (deferred_error == rrl_none)
+ deferred_error = rrl_missinguri;
+ r->protocol = uri = "";
+ len = 0;
+ goto rrl_done;
+ }
+ else if (strict && ll[0] && apr_isspace(ll[1])
+ && deferred_error == rrl_none) {
+ deferred_error = rrl_excesswhitespace;
+ }
+
+ /* Advance uri pointer over leading whitespace, NUL terminate the method
+ * If non-SP whitespace is encountered, mark as specific error
+ */
+ for (uri = ll; apr_isspace(*uri); ++uri)
+ if (*uri != ' ' && deferred_error == rrl_none)
+ deferred_error = rrl_badwhitespace;
+ *ll = '\0';
+
+ if (!*uri && deferred_error == rrl_none)
+ deferred_error = rrl_missinguri;
+
+ /* Scan the URI up to the next whitespace, ensure it contains no raw
+ * control characters, otherwise mark in error
+ */
+ ll = (char*) ap_scan_vchar_obstext(uri);
+ if (ll == uri || (*ll && !apr_isspace(*ll))) {
+ deferred_error = rrl_baduri;
+ ll = strpbrk(ll, "\t\n\v\f\r ");
+ }
+
+ /* Verify URI terminated with a single SP, or mark as specific error */
+ if (!ll) {
+ r->protocol = "";
+ len = 0;
+ goto rrl_done;
+ }
+ else if (strict && ll[0] && apr_isspace(ll[1])
+ && deferred_error == rrl_none) {
+ deferred_error = rrl_excesswhitespace;
+ }
+
+ /* Advance protocol pointer over leading whitespace, NUL terminate the uri
+ * If non-SP whitespace is encountered, mark as specific error
+ */
+ for (r->protocol = ll; apr_isspace(*r->protocol); ++r->protocol)
+ if (*r->protocol != ' ' && deferred_error == rrl_none)
+ deferred_error = rrl_badwhitespace;
+ *ll = '\0';
+
+ /* Scan the protocol up to the next whitespace, validation comes later */
+ if (!(ll = (char*) ap_scan_vchar_obstext(r->protocol))) {
+ len = strlen(r->protocol);
+ goto rrl_done;
+ }
+ len = ll - r->protocol;
+
+ /* Advance over trailing whitespace, if found mark in error,
+ * determine if trailing text is found, unconditionally mark in error,
+ * finally NUL terminate the protocol string
+ */
+ if (*ll && !apr_isspace(*ll)) {
+ deferred_error = rrl_badprotocol;
+ }
+ else if (strict && *ll) {
+ deferred_error = rrl_excesswhitespace;
+ }
+ else {
+ for ( ; apr_isspace(*ll); ++ll)
+ if (*ll != ' ' && deferred_error == rrl_none)
+ deferred_error = rrl_badwhitespace;
+ if (*ll && deferred_error == rrl_none)
+ deferred_error = rrl_trailingtext;
+ }
+ *((char *)r->protocol + len) = '\0';
+
+rrl_done:
+ /* For internal integrety and palloc efficiency, reconstruct the_request
+ * in one palloc, using only single SP characters, per spec.
+ */
+ r->the_request = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, r->method, *uri ? " " : NULL, uri,
+ *r->protocol ? " " : NULL, r->protocol, NULL);
+
+ if (len == 8
+ && r->protocol[0] == 'H' && r->protocol[1] == 'T'
+ && r->protocol[2] == 'T' && r->protocol[3] == 'P'
+ && r->protocol[4] == '/' && apr_isdigit(r->protocol[5])
+ && r->protocol[6] == '.' && apr_isdigit(r->protocol[7])
+ && r->protocol[5] != '0') {
+ r->assbackwards = 0;
+ r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(r->protocol[5] - '0', r->protocol[7] - '0');
+ }
+ else if (len == 8
+ && (r->protocol[0] == 'H' || r->protocol[0] == 'h')
+ && (r->protocol[1] == 'T' || r->protocol[1] == 't')
+ && (r->protocol[2] == 'T' || r->protocol[2] == 't')
+ && (r->protocol[3] == 'P' || r->protocol[3] == 'p')
+ && r->protocol[4] == '/' && apr_isdigit(r->protocol[5])
+ && r->protocol[6] == '.' && apr_isdigit(r->protocol[7])
+ && r->protocol[5] != '0') {
+ r->assbackwards = 0;
+ r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(r->protocol[5] - '0', r->protocol[7] - '0');
+ if (strict && deferred_error == rrl_none)
+ deferred_error = rrl_badprotocol;
+ else
+ memcpy((char*)r->protocol, "HTTP", 4);
+ }
+ else if (r->protocol[0]) {
+ r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(0, 9);
+ /* Defer setting the r->protocol string till error msg is composed */
+ if (deferred_error == rrl_none)
+ deferred_error = rrl_badprotocol;
+ }
+ else {
+ r->assbackwards = 1;
+ r->protocol = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "HTTP/0.9");
+ r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(0, 9);
+ }
+
+ /* Determine the method_number and parse the uri prior to invoking error
+ * handling, such that these fields are available for subsitution
+ */
r->method_number = ap_method_number_of(r->method);
- if (r->method_number == M_GET && r->method[0] == 'H') {
+ if (r->method_number == M_GET && r->method[0] == 'H')
r->header_only = 1;
+
+ ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
+
+ /* With the request understood, we can consider HTTP/0.9 specific errors */
+ if (r->proto_num == HTTP_VERSION(0, 9) && deferred_error == rrl_none) {
+ if (conf->http09_enable == AP_HTTP09_DISABLE)
+ deferred_error = rrl_reject09;
+ else if (strict && (r->method_number != M_GET || r->header_only))
+ deferred_error = rrl_badmethod09;
}
- ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
- if (r->status != HTTP_OK) {
- r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1,0);
- r->protocol = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "HTTP/1.0");
+ /* Now that the method, uri and protocol are all processed,
+ * we can safely resume any deferred error reporting
+ */
+ if (deferred_error != rrl_none) {
+ if (deferred_error == rrl_badmethod)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03445)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Invalid method token: '%.*s'",
+ field_name_len(r->method), r->method);
+ else if (deferred_error == rrl_badmethod09)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03444)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Invalid method token: '%.*s'"
+ " (only GET is allowed for HTTP/0.9 requests)",
+ field_name_len(r->method), r->method);
+ else if (deferred_error == rrl_missinguri)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03446)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Missing URI");
+ else if (deferred_error == rrl_baduri)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03454)
+ "HTTP Request Line; URI incorrectly encoded: '%.*s'",
+ field_name_len(r->uri), r->uri);
+ else if (deferred_error == rrl_badwhitespace)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03447)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Invalid whitespace");
+ else if (deferred_error == rrl_excesswhitespace)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03448)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Excess whitespace "
+ "(disallowed by HttpProtocolOptions Strict");
+ else if (deferred_error == rrl_trailingtext)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03449)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Extraneous text found '%.*s' "
+ "(perhaps whitespace was injected?)",
+ field_name_len(ll), ll);
+ else if (deferred_error == rrl_reject09)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02401)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Rejected HTTP/0.9 request");
+ else if (deferred_error == rrl_badprotocol)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02418)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Unrecognized protocol '%.*s' "
+ "(perhaps whitespace was injected?)",
+ field_name_len(r->protocol), r->protocol);
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ goto rrl_failed;
+ }
+
+ if (conf->http_methods == AP_HTTP_METHODS_REGISTERED
+ && r->method_number == M_INVALID) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02423)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Unrecognized HTTP method: '%.*s' "
+ "(disallowed by RegisteredMethods)",
+ field_name_len(r->method), r->method);
+ r->status = HTTP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+ /* This can't happen in an HTTP/0.9 request, we verified GET above */
return 0;
}
- if (ll[0]) {
- r->assbackwards = 0;
- pro = ll;
- len = strlen(ll);
- } else {
- r->assbackwards = 1;
- pro = "HTTP/0.9";
- len = 8;
+ if (r->status != HTTP_OK) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03450)
+ "HTTP Request Line; Unable to parse URI: '%.*s'",
+ field_name_len(r->uri), r->uri);
+ goto rrl_failed;
}
- r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
- /* Avoid sscanf in the common case */
- if (len == 8
- && pro[0] == 'H' && pro[1] == 'T' && pro[2] == 'T' && pro[3] == 'P'
- && pro[4] == '/' && apr_isdigit(pro[5]) && pro[6] == '.'
- && apr_isdigit(pro[7])) {
- r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(pro[5] - '0', pro[7] - '0');
+ if (strict) {
+ if (r->parsed_uri.fragment) {
+ /* RFC3986 3.5: no fragment */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02421)
+ "HTTP Request Line; URI must not contain a fragment");
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ goto rrl_failed;
+ }
+ if (r->parsed_uri.user || r->parsed_uri.password) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02422)
+ "HTTP Request Line; URI must not contain a "
+ "username/password");
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ goto rrl_failed;
+ }
}
- else if (3 == sscanf(r->protocol, "%4s/%u.%u", http, &major, &minor)
- && (strcasecmp("http", http) == 0)
- && (minor < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) ) /* don't allow HTTP/0.1000 */
- r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(major, minor);
- else
- r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1, 0);
return 1;
+
+rrl_failed:
+ if (r->proto_num == HTTP_VERSION(0, 9)) {
+ /* Send all parsing and protocol error response with 1.x behavior,
+ * and reserve 505 errors for actual HTTP protocols presented.
+ * As called out in RFC7230 3.5, any errors parsing the protocol
+ * from the request line are nearly always misencoded HTTP/1.x
+ * requests. Only a valid 0.9 request with no parsing errors
+ * at all may be treated as a simple request, if allowed.
+ */
+ r->assbackwards = 0;
+ r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
+ r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1, 0);
+ r->protocol = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "HTTP/1.0");
+ }
+ return 0;
}
static int table_do_fn_check_lengths(void *r_, const char *key,
@@ -680,26 +917,13 @@ static int table_do_fn_check_lengths(void *r_, con
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
- apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "Size of a request header field "
- "after merging exceeds server limit.<br />"
- "\n<pre>\n",
- ap_escape_html(r->pool, key),
- "</pre>\n", NULL));
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00560) "Request header "
- "exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize after merging: %s", key);
+ "Size of a request header field exceeds server limit.");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00560) "Request "
+ "header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize after merging: %.*s",
+ field_name_len(key), key);
return 0;
}
-/* get the length of the field name for logging, but no more than 80 bytes */
-#define LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN 80
-static int field_name_len(const char *field)
-{
- const char *end = ap_strchr_c(field, ':');
- if (end == NULL || end - field > LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN)
- return LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN;
- return end - field;
-}
-
AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
char *last_field = NULL;
@@ -710,6 +934,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_
apr_size_t len;
int fields_read = 0;
char *tmp_field;
+ core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
+ int strict = (conf->http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE);
/*
* Read header lines until we get the empty separator line, a read error,
@@ -717,11 +943,10 @@ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_
*/
while(1) {
apr_status_t rv;
- int folded = 0;
field = NULL;
rv = ap_rgetline(&field, r->server->limit_req_fieldsize + 2,
- &len, r, 0, bb);
+ &len, r, strict ? AP_GETLINE_CRLF : 0, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
if (APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(rv)) {
@@ -738,104 +963,125 @@ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_
* exceeds the configured limit for a field size.
*/
if (rv == APR_ENOSPC) {
- const char *field_escaped;
- if (field && len) {
- /* ensure ap_escape_html will terminate correctly */
- field[len - 1] = '\0';
- field_escaped = ap_escape_html(r->pool, field);
- }
- else {
- field_escaped = field = "";
- }
-
apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
- apr_psprintf(r->pool,
- "Size of a request header field "
- "exceeds server limit.<br />\n"
- "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>\n",
- field_name_len(field_escaped),
- field_escaped));
+ "Size of a request header field "
+ "exceeds server limit.");
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00561)
"Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize%s"
"%.*s",
- *field ? ": " : "",
- field_name_len(field), field);
+ (field && *field) ? ": " : "",
+ (field) ? field_name_len(field) : 0,
+ (field) ? field : "");
}
return;
}
- if (last_field != NULL) {
- if ((len > 0) && ((*field == '\t') || *field == ' ')) {
- /* This line is a continuation of the preceding line(s),
- * so append it to the line that we've set aside.
- * Note: this uses a power-of-two allocator to avoid
- * doing O(n) allocs and using O(n^2) space for
- * continuations that span many many lines.
- */
- apr_size_t fold_len = last_len + len + 1; /* trailing null */
+ /* For all header values, and all obs-fold lines, the presence of
+ * additional whitespace is a no-op, so collapse trailing whitespace
+ * to save buffer allocation and optimize copy operations.
+ * Do not remove the last single whitespace under any condition.
+ */
+ while (len > 1 && (field[len-1] == '\t' || field[len-1] == ' ')) {
+ field[--len] = '\0';
+ }
- if (fold_len >= (apr_size_t)(r->server->limit_req_fieldsize)) {
- const char *field_escaped;
+ if (*field == '\t' || *field == ' ') {
- r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
- /* report what we have accumulated so far before the
- * overflow (last_field) as the field with the problem
- */
- field_escaped = ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field);
- apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
- apr_psprintf(r->pool,
- "Size of a request header field "
- "after folding "
- "exceeds server limit.<br />\n"
- "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>\n",
- field_name_len(field_escaped),
- field_escaped));
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00562)
- "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize "
- "after folding: %.*s",
- field_name_len(last_field), last_field);
- return;
- }
+ /* Append any newly-read obs-fold line onto the preceding
+ * last_field line we are processing
+ */
+ apr_size_t fold_len;
+ if (last_field == NULL) {
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03442)
+ "Line folding encountered before first"
+ " header line");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (field[1] == '\0') {
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03443)
+ "Empty folded line encountered");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Leading whitespace on an obs-fold line can be
+ * similarly discarded */
+ while (field[1] == '\t' || field[1] == ' ') {
+ ++field; --len;
+ }
+
+ /* This line is a continuation of the preceding line(s),
+ * so append it to the line that we've set aside.
+ * Note: this uses a power-of-two allocator to avoid
+ * doing O(n) allocs and using O(n^2) space for
+ * continuations that span many many lines.
+ */
+ fold_len = last_len + len + 1; /* trailing null */
+
+ if (fold_len >= (apr_size_t)(r->server->limit_req_fieldsize)) {
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ /* report what we have accumulated so far before the
+ * overflow (last_field) as the field with the problem
+ */
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
+ "Size of a request header field "
+ "exceeds server limit.");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00562)
+ "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize "
+ "after folding: %.*s",
+ field_name_len(last_field), last_field);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (fold_len > alloc_len) {
+ char *fold_buf;
+ alloc_len += alloc_len;
if (fold_len > alloc_len) {
- char *fold_buf;
- alloc_len += alloc_len;
- if (fold_len > alloc_len) {
- alloc_len = fold_len;
- }
- fold_buf = (char *)apr_palloc(r->pool, alloc_len);
- memcpy(fold_buf, last_field, last_len);
- last_field = fold_buf;
+ alloc_len = fold_len;
}
- memcpy(last_field + last_len, field, len +1); /* +1 for nul */
- last_len += len;
- folded = 1;
+ fold_buf = (char *)apr_palloc(r->pool, alloc_len);
+ memcpy(fold_buf, last_field, last_len);
+ last_field = fold_buf;
}
- else /* not a continuation line */ {
+ memcpy(last_field + last_len, field, len +1); /* +1 for nul */
+ /* Replace obs-fold w/ SP per RFC 7230 3.2.4 */
+ last_field[last_len] = ' ';
+ last_len += len;
- if (r->server->limit_req_fields
+ /* We've appended this obs-fold line to last_len, proceed to
+ * read the next input line
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
+ else if (last_field != NULL) {
+
+ /* Process the previous last_field header line with all obs-folded
+ * segments already concatinated (this is not operating on the
+ * most recently read input line).
+ */
+
+ if (r->server->limit_req_fields
&& (++fields_read > r->server->limit_req_fields)) {
- r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
- apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
- "The number of request header fields "
- "exceeds this server's limit.");
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00563)
- "Number of request headers exceeds "
- "LimitRequestFields");
- return;
- }
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
+ "The number of request header fields "
+ "exceeds this server's limit.");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00563)
+ "Number of request headers exceeds "
+ "LimitRequestFields");
+ return;
+ }
- if (!(value = strchr(last_field, ':'))) { /* Find ':' or */
- r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; /* abort bad request */
- apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
- apr_psprintf(r->pool,
- "Request header field is "
- "missing ':' separator.<br />\n"
- "<pre>\n%.*s</pre>\n",
- (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN,
- ap_escape_html(r->pool,
- last_field)));
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00564)
+ if (!strict)
+ {
+ /* Not Strict ('Unsafe' mode), using the legacy parser */
+
+ if (!(value = strchr(last_field, ':'))) { /* Find ':' or */
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; /* abort bad request */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00564)
"Request header field is missing ':' "
"separator: %.*s", (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN,
last_field);
@@ -842,52 +1088,93 @@ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_
return;
}
- tmp_field = value - 1; /* last character of field-name */
+ /* last character of field-name */
+ tmp_field = value - (value > last_field ? 1 : 0);
*value++ = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate at colon */
+ if (strpbrk(last_field, "\t\n\v\f\r ")) {
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03452)
+ "Request header field name presented"
+ " invalid whitespace");
+ return;
+ }
+
while (*value == ' ' || *value == '\t') {
- ++value; /* Skip to start of value */
+ ++value; /* Skip to start of value */
}
- /* Strip LWS after field-name: */
- while (tmp_field > last_field
- && (*tmp_field == ' ' || *tmp_field == '\t')) {
- *tmp_field-- = '\0';
+ if (strpbrk(value, "\n\v\f\r")) {
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03451)
+ "Request header field value presented"
+ " bad whitespace");
+ return;
}
- /* Strip LWS after field-value: */
- tmp_field = last_field + last_len - 1;
- while (tmp_field > value
- && (*tmp_field == ' ' || *tmp_field == '\t')) {
- *tmp_field-- = '\0';
+ if (tmp_field == last_field) {
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(03453)
+ "Request header field name was empty");
+ return;
}
+ }
+ else /* Using strict RFC7230 parsing */
+ {
+ /* Ensure valid token chars before ':' per RFC 7230 3.2.4 */
+ value = (char *)ap_scan_http_token(last_field);
+ if ((value == last_field) || *value != ':') {
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02426)
+ "Request header field name is malformed: "
+ "%.*s", (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN, last_field);
+ return;
+ }
- apr_table_addn(r->headers_in, last_field, value);
+ *value++ = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate last_field name at ':' */
- /* reset the alloc_len so that we'll allocate a new
- * buffer if we have to do any more folding: we can't
- * use the previous buffer because its contents are
- * now part of r->headers_in
+ while (*value == ' ' || *value == '\t') {
+ ++value; /* Skip LWS of value */
+ }
+
+ /* Find invalid, non-HT ctrl char, or the trailing NULL */
+ tmp_field = (char *)ap_scan_http_field_content(value);
+
+ /* Reject value for all garbage input (CTRLs excluding HT)
+ * e.g. only VCHAR / SP / HT / obs-text are allowed per
+ * RFC7230 3.2.6 - leave all more explicit rule enforcement
+ * for specific header handler logic later in the cycle
*/
- alloc_len = 0;
+ if (*tmp_field != '\0') {
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02427)
+ "Request header value is malformed: "
+ "%.*s", (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN, value);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
- } /* end if current line is not a continuation starting with tab */
+ apr_table_addn(r->headers_in, last_field, value);
+
+ /* This last_field header is now stored in headers_in,
+ * resume processing of the current input line.
+ */
}
- /* Found a blank line, stop. */
+ /* Found the terminating empty end-of-headers line, stop. */
if (len == 0) {
break;
}
- /* Keep track of this line so that we can parse it on
- * the next loop iteration. (In the folded case, last_field
- * has been updated already.)
+ /* Keep track of this new header line so that we can extend it across
+ * any obs-fold or parse it on the next loop iteration. We referenced
+ * our previously allocated buffer in r->headers_in,
+ * so allocate a fresh buffer if required.
*/
- if (!folded) {
- last_field = field;
- last_len = len;
- }
+ alloc_len = 0;
+ last_field = field;
+ last_len = len;
}
/* Combine multiple message-header fields with the same
@@ -912,7 +1199,7 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
request_rec *r;
apr_pool_t *p;
const char *expect;
- int access_status = HTTP_OK;
+ int access_status;
apr_bucket_brigade *tmp_bb;
apr_socket_t *csd;
apr_interval_time_t cur_timeout;
@@ -971,8 +1258,11 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
/* Get the request... */
if (!read_request_line(r, tmp_bb)) {
- if (r->status == HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE
- || r->status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST) {
+ switch (r->status) {
+ case HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE:
+ case HTTP_BAD_REQUEST:
+ case HTTP_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+ case HTTP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED:
if (r->status == HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00565)
"request failed: client's request-line exceeds LimitRequestLine (longer than %d)",
@@ -979,8 +1269,8 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
r->server->limit_req_line);
}
else if (r->method == NULL) {
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00566)
- "request failed: invalid characters in URI");
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00566)
+ "request failed: malformed request line");
}
access_status = r->status;
r->status = HTTP_OK;
@@ -990,19 +1280,17 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
r = NULL;
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
goto traceout;
- }
- else if (r->status == HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT) {
+ case HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT:
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, NULL);
- if (!r->connection->keepalives) {
+ if (!r->connection->keepalives)
ap_run_log_transaction(r);
- }
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
goto traceout;
+ default:
+ apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
+ r = NULL;
+ goto traceout;
}
-
- apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
- r = NULL;
- goto traceout;
}
/* We may have been in keep_alive_timeout mode, so toggle back
@@ -1021,7 +1309,7 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
ap_get_mime_headers_core(r, tmp_bb);
if (r->status != HTTP_OK) {
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00567)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00567)
"request failed: error reading the headers");
ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
@@ -1040,7 +1328,7 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
*/
if (!(strcasecmp(tenc, "chunked") == 0 /* fast path */
|| ap_find_last_token(r->pool, tenc, "chunked"))) {
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(02539)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02539)
"client sent unknown Transfer-Encoding "
"(%s): %s", tenc, r->uri);
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
@@ -1061,25 +1349,6 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
apr_table_unset(r->headers_in, "Content-Length");
}
}
- else {
- if (r->header_only) {
- /*
- * Client asked for headers only with HTTP/0.9, which doesn't send
- * headers! Have to dink things just to make sure the error message
- * comes through...
- */
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00568)
- "client sent invalid HTTP/0.9 request: HEAD %s",
- r->uri);
- r->header_only = 0;
- r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
- ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
- ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
- ap_run_log_transaction(r);
- apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
- goto traceout;
- }
- }
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
@@ -1087,6 +1356,7 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
* now read. may update status.
*/
ap_update_vhost_from_headers(r);
+ access_status = r->status;
/* Toggle to the Host:-based vhost's timeout mode to fetch the
* request body and send the response body, if needed.
@@ -1110,7 +1380,7 @@ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
* a Host: header, and the server MUST respond with 400 if it doesn't.
*/
access_status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00569)
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00569)
"client sent HTTP/1.1 request without hostname "
"(see RFC2616 section 14.23): %s", r->uri);
}
Index: server/vhost.c
===================================================================
--- server/vhost.c (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ server/vhost.c (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -687,6 +687,116 @@ static int vhost_check_config(apr_pool_t *p, apr_p
* run-time vhost matching functions
*/
+static apr_status_t fix_hostname_v6_literal(request_rec *r, char *host)
+{
+ char *dst;
+ int double_colon = 0;
+
+ for (dst = host; *dst; dst++) {
+ if (apr_isxdigit(*dst)) {
+ if (apr_isupper(*dst)) {
+ *dst = apr_tolower(*dst);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (*dst == ':') {
+ if (*(dst + 1) == ':') {
+ if (double_colon)
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ double_colon = 1;
+ }
+ else if (*(dst + 1) == '.') {
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (*dst == '.') {
+ /* For IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses like ::FFFF:129.144.52.38 */
+ if (*(dst + 1) == ':' || *(dst + 1) == '.')
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
+ else {
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static apr_status_t fix_hostname_non_v6(request_rec *r, char *host)
+{
+ char *dst;
+
+ for (dst = host; *dst; dst++) {
+ if (apr_islower(*dst)) {
+ /* leave char unchanged */
+ }
+ else if (*dst == '.') {
+ if (*(dst + 1) == '.') {
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (apr_isupper(*dst)) {
+ *dst = apr_tolower(*dst);
+ }
+ else if (*dst == '/' || *dst == '\\') {
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* strip trailing gubbins */
+ if (dst > host && dst[-1] == '.') {
+ dst[-1] = '\0';
+ }
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If strict mode ever becomes the default, this should be folded into
+ * fix_hostname_non_v6()
+ */
+static apr_status_t strict_hostname_check(request_rec *r, char *host)
+{
+ char *ch;
+ int is_dotted_decimal = 1, leading_zeroes = 0, dots = 0;
+
+ for (ch = host; *ch; ch++) {
+ if (!apr_isascii(*ch)) {
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ else if (apr_isalpha(*ch) || *ch == '-') {
+ is_dotted_decimal = 0;
+ }
+ else if (ch[0] == '.') {
+ dots++;
+ if (ch[1] == '0' && apr_isdigit(ch[2]))
+ leading_zeroes = 1;
+ }
+ else if (!apr_isdigit(*ch)) {
+ /* also takes care of multiple Host headers by denying commas */
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ if (is_dotted_decimal) {
+ if (host[0] == '.' || (host[0] == '0' && apr_isdigit(host[1])))
+ leading_zeroes = 1;
+ if (leading_zeroes || dots != 3) {
+ /* RFC 3986 7.4 */
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* The top-level domain must start with a letter (RFC 1123 2.1) */
+ while (ch > host && *ch != '.')
+ ch--;
+ if (ch[0] == '.' && ch[1] != '\0' && !apr_isalpha(ch[1]))
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+
+bad:
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02415)
+ "[strict] Invalid host name '%s'%s%.6s",
+ host, *ch ? ", problem near: " : "", ch);
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+}
+
/* Lowercase and remove any trailing dot and/or :port from the hostname,
* and check that it is sane.
*
@@ -700,79 +810,90 @@ static int vhost_check_config(apr_pool_t *p, apr_p
* Instead we just check for filesystem metacharacters: directory
* separators / and \ and sequences of more than one dot.
*/
-static void fix_hostname(request_rec *r)
+static int fix_hostname(request_rec *r, const char *host_header,
+ unsigned http_conformance)
{
+ const char *src;
char *host, *scope_id;
- char *dst;
apr_port_t port;
apr_status_t rv;
const char *c;
+ int is_v6literal = 0;
+ int strict = (http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE);
- /* According to RFC 2616, Host header field CAN be blank. */
- if (!*r->hostname) {
- return;
+ src = host_header ? host_header : r->hostname;
+
+ /* According to RFC 2616, Host header field CAN be blank */
+ if (!*src) {
+ return is_v6literal;
}
/* apr_parse_addr_port will interpret a bare integer as a port
* which is incorrect in this context. So treat it separately.
*/
- for (c = r->hostname; apr_isdigit(*c); ++c);
- if (!*c) { /* pure integer */
- return;
+ for (c = src; apr_isdigit(*c); ++c);
+ if (!*c) {
+ /* pure integer */
+ if (strict) {
+ /* RFC 3986 7.4 */
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02416)
+ "[strict] purely numeric host names not allowed: %s",
+ src);
+ goto bad_nolog;
+ }
+ r->hostname = src;
+ return is_v6literal;
}
- rv = apr_parse_addr_port(&host, &scope_id, &port, r->hostname, r->pool);
- if (rv != APR_SUCCESS || scope_id) {
- goto bad;
+ if (host_header) {
+ rv = apr_parse_addr_port(&host, &scope_id, &port, src, r->pool);
+ if (rv != APR_SUCCESS || scope_id)
+ goto bad;
+ if (port) {
+ /* Don't throw the Host: header's port number away:
+ save it in parsed_uri -- ap_get_server_port() needs it! */
+ /* @@@ XXX there should be a better way to pass the port.
+ * Like r->hostname, there should be a r->portno
+ */
+ r->parsed_uri.port = port;
+ r->parsed_uri.port_str = apr_itoa(r->pool, (int)port);
+ }
+ if (host_header[0] == '[')
+ is_v6literal = 1;
}
-
- if (port) {
- /* Don't throw the Host: header's port number away:
- save it in parsed_uri -- ap_get_server_port() needs it! */
- /* @@@ XXX there should be a better way to pass the port.
- * Like r->hostname, there should be a r->portno
+ else {
+ /*
+ * Already parsed, surrounding [ ] (if IPv6 literal) and :port have
+ * already been removed.
*/
- r->parsed_uri.port = port;
- r->parsed_uri.port_str = apr_itoa(r->pool, (int)port);
+ host = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, r->hostname);
+ if (ap_strchr(host, ':') != NULL)
+ is_v6literal = 1;
}
- /* if the hostname is an IPv6 numeric address string, it was validated
- * already; otherwise, further validation is needed
- */
- if (r->hostname[0] != '[') {
- for (dst = host; *dst; dst++) {
- if (apr_islower(*dst)) {
- /* leave char unchanged */
- }
- else if (*dst == '.') {
- if (*(dst + 1) == '.') {
- goto bad;
- }
- }
- else if (apr_isupper(*dst)) {
- *dst = apr_tolower(*dst);
- }
- else if (*dst == '/' || *dst == '\\') {
- goto bad;
- }
- }
- /* strip trailing gubbins */
- if (dst > host && dst[-1] == '.') {
- dst[-1] = '\0';
- }
+ if (is_v6literal) {
+ rv = fix_hostname_v6_literal(r, host);
}
+ else {
+ rv = fix_hostname_non_v6(r, host);
+ if (strict && rv == APR_SUCCESS)
+ rv = strict_hostname_check(r, host);
+ }
+ if (rv != APR_SUCCESS)
+ goto bad;
+
r->hostname = host;
- return;
+ return is_v6literal;
bad:
- r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00550)
"Client sent malformed Host header: %s",
- r->hostname);
- return;
+ src);
+bad_nolog:
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ return is_v6literal;
}
-
/* return 1 if host matches ServerName or ServerAliases */
static int matches_aliases(server_rec *s, const char *host)
{
@@ -982,15 +1103,76 @@ static void check_serverpath(request_rec *r)
}
}
+static APR_INLINE const char *construct_host_header(request_rec *r,
+ int is_v6literal)
+{
+ struct iovec iov[5];
+ apr_size_t nvec = 0;
+ /*
+ * We cannot use ap_get_server_name/port here, because we must
+ * ignore UseCanonicalName/Port.
+ */
+ if (is_v6literal) {
+ iov[nvec].iov_base = "[";
+ iov[nvec].iov_len = 1;
+ nvec++;
+ }
+ iov[nvec].iov_base = (void *)r->hostname;
+ iov[nvec].iov_len = strlen(r->hostname);
+ nvec++;
+ if (is_v6literal) {
+ iov[nvec].iov_base = "]";
+ iov[nvec].iov_len = 1;
+ nvec++;
+ }
+ if (r->parsed_uri.port_str) {
+ iov[nvec].iov_base = ":";
+ iov[nvec].iov_len = 1;
+ nvec++;
+ iov[nvec].iov_base = r->parsed_uri.port_str;
+ iov[nvec].iov_len = strlen(r->parsed_uri.port_str);
+ nvec++;
+ }
+ return apr_pstrcatv(r->pool, iov, nvec, NULL);
+}
AP_DECLARE(void) ap_update_vhost_from_headers(request_rec *r)
{
- /* must set this for HTTP/1.1 support */
- if (r->hostname || (r->hostname = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Host"))) {
- fix_hostname(r);
- if (r->status != HTTP_OK)
- return;
+ core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
+ const char *host_header = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Host");
+ int is_v6literal = 0;
+ int have_hostname_from_url = 0;
+
+ if (r->hostname) {
+ /*
+ * If there was a host part in the Request-URI, ignore the 'Host'
+ * header.
+ */
+ have_hostname_from_url = 1;
+ is_v6literal = fix_hostname(r, NULL, conf->http_conformance);
}
+ else if (host_header != NULL) {
+ is_v6literal = fix_hostname(r, host_header, conf->http_conformance);
+ }
+ if (r->status != HTTP_OK)
+ return;
+
+ if (conf->http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE) {
+ /*
+ * If we have both hostname from an absoluteURI and a Host header,
+ * we must ignore the Host header (RFC 2616 5.2).
+ * To enforce this, we reset the Host header to the value from the
+ * request line.
+ */
+ if (have_hostname_from_url && host_header != NULL) {
+ const char *repl = construct_host_header(r, is_v6literal);
+ apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Host", repl);
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02417)
+ "Replacing host header '%s' with host '%s' given "
+ "in the request uri", host_header, repl);
+ }
+ }
+
/* check if we tucked away a name_chain */
if (r->connection->vhost_lookup_data) {
if (r->hostname)
Index: modules/http/http_filters.c
===================================================================
--- modules/http/http_filters.c (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ modules/http/http_filters.c (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -126,14 +126,15 @@ static apr_status_t bail_out_on_error(http_ctx_t *
/**
* Parse a chunk line with optional extension, detect overflow.
- * There are two error cases:
- * 1) If the conversion would require too many bits, APR_EGENERAL is returned.
- * 2) If the conversion used the correct number of bits, but an overflow
+ * There are several error cases:
+ * 1) If the chunk link is misformatted, APR_EINVAL is returned.
+ * 2) If the conversion would require too many bits, APR_EGENERAL is returned.
+ * 3) If the conversion used the correct number of bits, but an overflow
* caused only the sign bit to flip, then APR_ENOSPC is returned.
- * In general, any negative number can be considered an overflow error.
+ * A negative chunk length always indicates an overflow error.
*/
static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *ctx, const char *buffer,
- apr_size_t len, int linelimit)
+ apr_size_t len, int linelimit, int strict)
{
apr_size_t i = 0;
@@ -146,6 +147,12 @@ static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *c
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END
|| ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END_LF) {
if (c == LF) {
+ if (strict && (ctx->state != BODY_CHUNK_END_LF)) {
+ /*
+ * CR missing before LF.
+ */
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
}
else if (c == CR && ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END) {
@@ -153,7 +160,7 @@ static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *c
}
else {
/*
- * LF expected.
+ * CRLF expected.
*/
return APR_EINVAL;
}
@@ -180,6 +187,12 @@ static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *c
}
if (c == LF) {
+ if (strict && (ctx->state != BODY_CHUNK_LF)) {
+ /*
+ * CR missing before LF.
+ */
+ return APR_EINVAL;
+ }
if (ctx->remaining) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_DATA;
}
@@ -201,7 +214,8 @@ static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *c
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_EXT) {
/*
- * Control chars (but tabs) are invalid.
+ * Control chars (excluding tabs) are invalid.
+ * TODO: more precisely limit input
*/
if (c != '\t' && apr_iscntrl(c)) {
return APR_EINVAL;
@@ -208,7 +222,9 @@ static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *c
}
}
else if (c == ' ' || c == '\t') {
- /* Be lenient up to 10 BWS (term from rfc7230 - 3.2.3).
+ /* Be lenient up to 10 implied *LWS, a legacy of RFC 2616,
+ * and noted as errata to RFC7230;
+ * https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=7230&eid=4667
*/
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_CR;
if (++ctx->chunk_bws > 10) {
@@ -324,7 +340,10 @@ apr_status_t ap_http_filter(ap_filter_t *f, apr_bu
ap_input_mode_t mode, apr_read_type_e block,
apr_off_t readbytes)
{
- core_server_config *conf;
+ core_server_config *conf =
+ (core_server_config *) ap_get_module_config(f->r->server->module_config,
+ &core_module);
+ int strict = (conf->http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE);
apr_bucket *e;
http_ctx_t *ctx = f->ctx;
apr_status_t rv;
@@ -332,9 +351,6 @@ apr_status_t ap_http_filter(ap_filter_t *f, apr_bu
apr_bucket_brigade *bb;
int again;
- conf = (core_server_config *)
- ap_get_module_config(f->r->server->module_config, &core_module);
-
/* just get out of the way of things we don't want. */
if (mode != AP_MODE_READBYTES && mode != AP_MODE_GETLINE) {
return ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
@@ -526,7 +542,7 @@ apr_status_t ap_http_filter(ap_filter_t *f, apr_bu
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
parsing = 1;
rv = parse_chunk_size(ctx, buffer, len,
- f->r->server->limit_req_fieldsize);
+ f->r->server->limit_req_fieldsize, strict);
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, rv, f->r, APLOGNO(01590)
@@ -668,6 +684,114 @@ apr_status_t ap_http_filter(ap_filter_t *f, apr_bu
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
+struct check_header_ctx {
+ request_rec *r;
+ int strict;
+};
+
+/* check a single header, to be used with apr_table_do() */
+static int check_header(struct check_header_ctx *ctx,
+ const char *name, const char **val)
+{
+ const char *pos, *end;
+ char *dst = NULL;
+
+ if (name[0] == '\0') {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, ctx->r, APLOGNO(02428)
+ "Empty response header name, aborting request");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->strict) {
+ end = ap_scan_http_token(name);
+ }
+ else {
+ end = ap_scan_vchar_obstext(name);
+ }
+ if (*end) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, ctx->r, APLOGNO(02429)
+ "Response header name '%s' contains invalid "
+ "characters, aborting request",
+ name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (pos = *val; *pos; pos = end) {
+ end = ap_scan_http_field_content(pos);
+ if (*end) {
+ if (end[0] != CR || end[1] != LF || (end[2] != ' ' &&
+ end[2] != '\t')) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, ctx->r, APLOGNO(02430)
+ "Response header '%s' value of '%s' contains "
+ "invalid characters, aborting request",
+ name, pos);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!dst) {
+ *val = dst = apr_palloc(ctx->r->pool, strlen(*val) + 1);
+ }
+ }
+ if (dst) {
+ memcpy(dst, pos, end - pos);
+ dst += end - pos;
+ if (*end) {
+ /* skip folding and replace with a single space */
+ end += 3 + strspn(end + 3, "\t ");
+ *dst++ = ' ';
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (dst) {
+ *dst = '\0';
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_headers_table(apr_table_t *t, struct check_header_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ const apr_array_header_t *headers = apr_table_elts(t);
+ apr_table_entry_t *header;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < headers->nelts; ++i) {
+ header = &APR_ARRAY_IDX(headers, i, apr_table_entry_t);
+ if (!header->key) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!check_header(ctx, header->key, (const char **)&header->val)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check headers for HTTP conformance
+ * @return 1 if ok, 0 if bad
+ */
+static APR_INLINE int check_headers(request_rec *r)
+{
+ struct check_header_ctx ctx;
+ core_server_config *conf =
+ ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
+
+ ctx.r = r;
+ ctx.strict = (conf->http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE);
+ return check_headers_table(r->headers_out, &ctx) &&
+ check_headers_table(r->err_headers_out, &ctx);
+}
+
+static int check_headers_recursion(request_rec *r)
+{
+ void *check = NULL;
+ apr_pool_userdata_get(&check, "check_headers_recursion", r->pool);
+ if (check) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ apr_pool_userdata_setn("true", "check_headers_recursion", NULL, r->pool);
+ return 0;
+}
+
typedef struct header_struct {
apr_pool_t *pool;
apr_bucket_brigade *bb;
@@ -674,8 +798,7 @@ typedef struct header_struct {
} header_struct;
/* Send a single HTTP header field to the client. Note that this function
- * is used in calls to table_do(), so their interfaces are co-dependent.
- * In other words, don't change this one without checking table_do in alloc.c.
+ * is used in calls to apr_table_do(), so don't change its interface.
* It returns true unless there was a write error of some kind.
*/
static int form_header_field(header_struct *h,
@@ -1160,6 +1283,7 @@ AP_DECLARE_NONSTD(int) ap_send_http_trace(request_
typedef struct header_filter_ctx {
int headers_sent;
+ int headers_error;
} header_filter_ctx;
AP_CORE_DECLARE_NONSTD(apr_status_t) ap_http_header_filter(ap_filter_t *f,
@@ -1175,19 +1299,23 @@ AP_CORE_DECLARE_NONSTD(apr_status_t) ap_http_heade
header_filter_ctx *ctx = f->ctx;
const char *ctype;
ap_bucket_error *eb = NULL;
+ apr_bucket *eos = NULL;
AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(!r->main);
- if (r->header_only) {
- if (!ctx) {
- ctx = f->ctx = apr_pcalloc(r->pool, sizeof(header_filter_ctx));
- }
- else if (ctx->headers_sent) {
+ if (!ctx) {
+ ctx = f->ctx = apr_pcalloc(r->pool, sizeof(header_filter_ctx));
+ }
+ if (ctx->headers_sent) {
+ /* Eat body if response must not have one. */
+ if (r->header_only || r->status == HTTP_NO_CONTENT) {
apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
- return OK;
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
}
}
-
+ else if (!ctx->headers_error && !check_headers(r)) {
+ ctx->headers_error = 1;
+ }
for (e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(b);
e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(b);
e = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(e))
@@ -1204,10 +1332,44 @@ AP_CORE_DECLARE_NONSTD(apr_status_t) ap_http_heade
ap_remove_output_filter(f);
return ap_pass_brigade(f->next, b);
}
+ if (ctx->headers_error && APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(e)) {
+ eos = e;
+ }
}
- if (eb) {
+ if (ctx->headers_error) {
+ if (!eos) {
+ /* Eat body until EOS */
+ apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ /* We may come back here from ap_die() below,
+ * so clear anything from this response.
+ */
+ ctx->headers_error = 0;
+ apr_table_clear(r->headers_out);
+ apr_table_clear(r->err_headers_out);
+
+ /* Don't recall ap_die() if we come back here (from its own internal
+ * redirect or error response), otherwise we can end up in infinite
+ * recursion; better fall through with 500, minimal headers and an
+ * empty body (EOS only).
+ */
+ if (!check_headers_recursion(r)) {
+ apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
+ ap_die(HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, r);
+ return AP_FILTER_ERROR;
+ }
+ APR_BUCKET_REMOVE(eos);
+ apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
+ APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, eos);
+ r->status = HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ r->content_type = r->content_encoding = NULL;
+ r->content_languages = NULL;
+ ap_set_content_length(r, 0);
+ }
+ else if (eb) {
int status;
-
status = eb->status;
apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
ap_die(status, r);
@@ -1264,6 +1426,10 @@ AP_CORE_DECLARE_NONSTD(apr_status_t) ap_http_heade
apr_table_unset(r->headers_out, "Content-Length");
}
+ if (r->status == HTTP_NO_CONTENT) {
+ apr_table_unset(r->headers_out, "Content-Length");
+ }
+
ctype = ap_make_content_type(r, r->content_type);
if (ctype) {
apr_table_setn(r->headers_out, "Content-Type", ctype);
@@ -1352,11 +1518,11 @@ AP_CORE_DECLARE_NONSTD(apr_status_t) ap_http_heade
terminate_header(b2);
ap_pass_brigade(f->next, b2);
+ ctx->headers_sent = 1;
- if (r->header_only) {
+ if (r->header_only || r->status == HTTP_NO_CONTENT) {
apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
- ctx->headers_sent = 1;
- return OK;
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
}
r->sent_bodyct = 1; /* Whatever follows is real body stuff... */
Index: CHANGES
===================================================================
--- CHANGES (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ CHANGES (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -1,7 +1,27 @@
-*- coding: utf-8 -*-
Changes with Apache 2.4.24
+ *) core: Drop Content-Length header and message-body from HTTP 204 responses.
+ PR 51350 [Luca Toscano]
+ *) Enforce http request grammer corresponding to RFC7230 for request lines
+ and request headers [William Rowe, Stefan Fritsch]
+
+ *) core: New directive HttpProtocolOptions to control httpd enforcement
+ of various RFC7230 requirements. [Stefan Fritsch, William Rowe]
+
+ *) core: Permit unencoded ';' characters to appear in proxy requests and
+ Location: response headers. Corresponds to modern browser behavior.
+ [William Rowe]
+
+ *) core: ap_rgetline_core now pulls from r->proto_input_filters.
+
+ *) core: Correctly parse an IPv6 literal host specification in an absolute
+ URL in the request line. [Stefan Fritsch]
+
+ *) core: New directive RegisterHttpMethod for registering non-standard
+ HTTP methods. [Stefan Fritsch]
+
*) mod_http2: unannounced and multiple interim responses (status code < 200)
are parsed and forwarded to client until a final response arrives.
[Stefan Eissing]
Index: include/httpd.h
===================================================================
--- include/httpd.h (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ include/httpd.h (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -1585,6 +1585,28 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_weak(apr_pool_t *p, c
*/
AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_strong(apr_pool_t *p, const char *line, const char *tok);
+/* Scan a string for field content chars, as defined by RFC7230 section 3.2
+ * including VCHAR/obs-text, as well as HT and SP
+ * @param ptr The string to scan
+ * @return A pointer to the first (non-HT) ASCII ctrl character.
+ * @note lws and trailing whitespace are scanned, the caller is responsible
+ * for trimming leading and trailing whitespace
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_scan_http_field_content(const char *ptr);
+
+/* Scan a string for token characters, as defined by RFC7230 section 3.2.6
+ * @param ptr The string to scan
+ * @return A pointer to the first non-token character.
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_scan_http_token(const char *ptr);
+
+/* Scan a string for visible ASCII (0x21-0x7E) or obstext (0x80+)
+ * and return a pointer to the first SP/CTL/NUL character encountered.
+ * @param ptr The string to scan
+ * @return A pointer to the first SP/CTL character.
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_scan_vchar_obstext(const char *ptr);
+
/**
* Retrieve an array of tokens in the format "1#token" defined in RFC2616. Only
* accepts ',' as a delimiter, does not accept quoted strings, and errors on
Index: include/http_core.h
===================================================================
--- include/http_core.h (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ include/http_core.h (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -723,10 +723,24 @@ typedef struct {
#define AP_MERGE_TRAILERS_DISABLE 2
int merge_trailers;
+ apr_array_header_t *protocols;
+ int protocols_honor_order;
+#define AP_HTTP09_UNSET 0
+#define AP_HTTP09_ENABLE 1
+#define AP_HTTP09_DISABLE 2
+ char http09_enable;
- apr_array_header_t *protocols;
- int protocols_honor_order;
+#define AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSET 0
+#define AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE 1
+#define AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_STRICT 2
+ char http_conformance;
+
+#define AP_HTTP_METHODS_UNSET 0
+#define AP_HTTP_METHODS_LENIENT 1
+#define AP_HTTP_METHODS_REGISTERED 2
+ char http_methods;
+
} core_server_config;
/* for AddOutputFiltersByType in core.c */
Index: include/http_protocol.h
===================================================================
--- include/http_protocol.h (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ include/http_protocol.h (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -582,17 +582,22 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_get_basic_auth_pw(request_rec *
*/
AP_CORE_DECLARE(void) ap_parse_uri(request_rec *r, const char *uri);
+#define AP_GETLINE_FOLD 1 /* Whether to merge continuation lines */
+#define AP_GETLINE_CRLF 2 /*Whether line ends must be in the form CR LF */
+
/**
* Get the next line of input for the request
* @param s The buffer into which to read the line
* @param n The size of the buffer
* @param r The request
- * @param fold Whether to merge continuation lines
+ * @param flags Bit flag of multiple parsing options
+ * AP_GETLINE_FOLD Whether to merge continuation lines
+ * AP_GETLINE_CRLF Whether line ends must be in the form CR LF
* @return The length of the line, if successful
* n, if the line is too big to fit in the buffer
* -1 for miscellaneous errors
*/
-AP_DECLARE(int) ap_getline(char *s, int n, request_rec *r, int fold);
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_getline(char *s, int n, request_rec *r, int flags);
/**
* Get the next line of input for the request
@@ -610,7 +615,9 @@ AP_CORE_DECLARE(void) ap_parse_uri(request_rec *r,
* @param n The size of the buffer
* @param read The length of the line.
* @param r The request
- * @param fold Whether to merge continuation lines
+ * @param flags Bit flag of multiple parsing options
+ * AP_GETLINE_FOLD Whether to merge continuation lines
+ * AP_GETLINE_CRLF Whether line ends must be in the form CR LF
* @param bb Working brigade to use when reading buckets
* @return APR_SUCCESS, if successful
* APR_ENOSPC, if the line is too big to fit in the buffer
@@ -619,7 +626,7 @@ AP_CORE_DECLARE(void) ap_parse_uri(request_rec *r,
#if APR_CHARSET_EBCDIC
AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline(char **s, apr_size_t n,
apr_size_t *read,
- request_rec *r, int fold,
+ request_rec *r, int flags,
apr_bucket_brigade *bb);
#else /* ASCII box */
#define ap_rgetline(s, n, read, r, fold, bb) \
@@ -629,7 +636,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline(char **s, apr
/** @see ap_rgetline */
AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s, apr_size_t n,
apr_size_t *read,
- request_rec *r, int fold,
+ request_rec *r, int flags,
apr_bucket_brigade *bb);
/**
Index: include/ap_mmn.h
===================================================================
--- include/ap_mmn.h (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ include/ap_mmn.h (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
@@ -487,6 +487,13 @@
* 20120211.65 (2.4.24-dev) Add ap_check_pipeline().
* 20120211.66 (2.4.24-dev) Rename ap_proxy_check_backend() to
* ap_proxy_check_connection().
+ * 20120211.67 (2.4.24-dev) Add http09_enable, http_conformance, and
+ * http_methods to core_server_config
+ * Add ap_scan_http_field_token(),
+ * ap_scan_http_field_content(),
+ * and ap_scan_vchar_obstext()
+ * Replaced fold boolean with with multiple bit flags
+ * to ap_[r]getline()
*/
#define MODULE_MAGIC_COOKIE 0x41503234UL /* "AP24" */
@@ -494,7 +501,7 @@
#ifndef MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MAJOR
#define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MAJOR 20120211
#endif
-#define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MINOR 66 /* 0...n */
+#define MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER_MINOR 67 /* 0...n */
/**
* Determine if the server's current MODULE_MAGIC_NUMBER is at least a
Index: .
===================================================================
--- . (.../2.4.x) (revision 1767912)
+++ . (.../2.4.x-merge-http-strict) (revision 1780175)
Property changes on: .
___________________________________________________________________
Modified: svn:mergeinfo
## -0,0 +0,1 ##
Merged /httpd/httpd/trunk:r1406719,1407599,1407643,1425366,1426827,1426877,1426879,1426988,1426992,1428145,1436457,1446421,1610383,1664576,1687642-1687643,1754536,1754538-1754541,1754544,1754547-1754548,1754555-1754556,1754568-1754570,1754577,1754579,1755123-1755126,1755233-1755236,1755263-1755264,1755343,1755744,1756540,1756555,1756649,1756729,1756821,1756823-1756824,1756847,1756849,1756862,1756934,1756937,1756946,1756959,1756978,1757062,1757065,1757589,1757593,1757711,1757920-1757921,1757924,1758226,1758263,1758265-1758266,1758304-1758305,1758313,1760444,1764961,1765112-1765115,1765451,1769965,1770786,1770817,1770867,1770869,1771690,1772418,1773159,1773162,1773293,1773346,1773761,1773779,1773812,1773861-1773862,1773865,1774286,1777460,1777672
--------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx For additional commands, e-mail: users-help@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
|