On Thu, 20 Dec 2018 00:31:43 +0100, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > > header->number is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading > to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:792 wavefront_send_patch() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->patch_status' [w] (local cap) > sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:819 wavefront_send_program() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->prog_status' [w] (local cap) > sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:1197 wavefront_send_alias() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->sample_status' [w] > sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:1248 wavefront_send_multisample() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->sample_status' [w] > sound/isa/wavefront/wavefront_synth.c:1548 wavefront_synth_control() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev->sample_status' [r] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing header->number before using it to index > dev->patch_status, dev->prog_status and dev->sample_status. > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Is there any platform with ISA slot that suffers from Spectre? thanks, Takashi _______________________________________________ Alsa-devel mailing list Alsa-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://mailman.alsa-project.org/mailman/listinfo/alsa-devel
