On Tue, 18 Dec 2018 18:18:34 +0100, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > > info->channel is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4100 snd_hdsp_channel_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'hdsp->channel_map' [r] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing info->channel before using it to index hdsp->channel_map > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > Also, notice that I refactored the code a bit in order to get rid of the > following checkpatch warning: > > ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition > FILE: sound/pci/rme9652/hdsp.c:4103: > if ((mapped_channel = hdsp->channel_map[info->channel]) < 0) > > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Applied, thanks. Takashi _______________________________________________ Alsa-devel mailing list Alsa-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://mailman.alsa-project.org/mailman/listinfo/alsa-devel
