NYTimes.com Article: Finger-Pointing Over Air Crash in Queens

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Finger-Pointing Over Air Crash in Queens

March 21, 2004
 By MATTHEW L. WALD





WASHINGTON, March 20 - In an unusual public spat, American
Airlines and Airbus are blaming each other for the crash of
Flight 587 in Queens in November 2001. The plane's vertical
tail fell off shortly after takeoff from Kennedy
International Airport on a flight to the Dominican
Republic.

The dispute between the airline and the plane's
manufacturer centers on whether the design of the control
system or pilot training led to the crash, which killed all
260 aboard the plane and five people on the ground.

In briefs submitted to the National Transportation Safety
Board earlier this month, the airline accused Airbus of
suppressing information about previous control problems
involving the plane model, an A-300, and similar planes.
Those incidents, said American, indicated a design problem
with the rudder that made it difficult to control at the
speed the plane was flying.

In its briefs, however, Airbus contends that American
improperly trained the pilot in the use of the rudder, and
had been warned before the crash that its pilot training
was wrong.

"They're certainly pointing fingers in each other's
direction, and it's a 'not my fault' kind of thing," said
one investigator in a high-level position at the agency,
who asked not to be named because the five members of the
board have not yet ruled in the case. The board had said it
would take action in the spring, but recently delayed a
decision until summer.

The briefs are public record, but are not yet posted on the
board's Web site. When they were submitted, American took
the unusual step of sending e-mail messages to reporters
with its version of events; Airbus did the same a few hours
later.

Investigators say the board will certainly cite both the
design issue and pilot training as contributing to the
crash, but it is not clear which they might say is more
important. "I would put it design first, training second,
but you could argue over that," said one longtime
investigator, who also asked not to be named because of the
board's pending decision. "The pilot did it," he said. But
he added: "He responded the way he was trained. He didn't
do anything wrong."

Since the accident, investigators from the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation
Administration and others have looked closely at previous
incidents in which Airbus A-300-600's, the precise model
involved, swung from side to side because of rudder
movements by the pilots.

"This accident never should have happened and could have
been prevented if Airbus had disclosed to American, the
F.A.A. or the safety board what it knew about the
propensity of the flight control system on the A-300-600 to
allow hazardous rudder control inputs that could cause
structural damage," American said in its brief.

American pointed out that an independent study,
commissioned by the safety board, found that the plane had
gone through a "pilot-induced oscillation," or a
back-and-forth motion that was created by actions of the
pilot, but not intended. The pilot, encountering turbulence
from a plane ahead, pushed a foot pedal to extend the
rudder all the way in one direction, then the other, then
switched again. As the tail of the plane moved sideways, it
came under more pressure than it was designed to withstand
and broke off.

But the author of the study, Ronald A. Hess of the
University of California, said that the design of the
rudder was conducive to such oscillations. One problem, he
found, was that on the A-300, the amount of force needed to
start moving the rudder was relatively high, and the total
range of motion allowed at that speed was only a little
over an inch, making it very difficult to apply any amount
of rudder less than its full extension. In addition, rudder
application does not move the plane instantly, and the
delay might encourage a pilot to keep applying the rudder
until the aircraft moved further than the pilot intended,
according to Mr. Hess's analysis. The natural reaction
would then be to apply the rudder in the opposite
direction.

Complicating the problem, aeronautical engineers write
specifications for each plane, stating that pilots should
not use the rudder above a certain speed, called
"maneuvering speed." Pilots are taught that below that
speed, they can use the rudder as needed; Flight 587 was
moving below that speed. But unknown to most pilots,
according to aviation authorities, the engineers intend a
single application of the rudder, not a repeated,
alternating application, which in the case of Flight 587
built up a swinging motion that broke the tail.

But Airbus said that the pilot of Flight 587
inappropriately worked the controls, and it added, in bold
type, "exactly as he was taught to do." Airbus contends
that American put the pilot through a special training
program for how to recover from in-flight "upsets" that
included rudder use. The program, Airbus said, put pilots
through a simulator that de-emphasized the effectiveness of
other controls and thus encouraged rudder use.

The force required to move the pedals, and the pedal travel
distances, met certification requirements, Airbus said, and
the one that crashed had no mechanical flaws before the
accident. In addition, it said, "no adverse comments were
received form the operators after more than 16 million
flight hours."

Technically the board's decision is not admissible in
court, but it will probably play a role in dividing up
damages from lawsuits resulting from the crash.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/21plane.html?ex=1080895265&ei=1&en=9eae44046a775341


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