Verdict expected soon on toxic air aboard jets By Byron Acohido, USA TODAY SEATTLE =97 Three Alaska Airlines managers conducted an extraordinary=20 experiment on an MD-80 jet in 1996. Frustrated by complaints about noxious= =20 mists on MD-80 flights, the managers tried to recreate the problem on a jet= =20 parked inside a hangar. John Fowler, then chief of maintenance, ordered a=20 mechanic to squirt 8 ounces of hydraulic fluid into a scooplike "air inlet"= =20 on the jet's underbelly, where it was sucked in by a small engine pumping=20 fresh air into the passenger cabin. In a few minutes, the managers noticed a waviness in the air inside the=20 cabin that looked like automobile exhaust or a heat wave. "I recall a=20 metallic taste in my mouth, some burning around the eyes and sensitivity in= =20 my nose," Fowler would say later. Fowler told his story recently during a trial that's been unfolding for 10= =20 weeks in state superior court here. Twenty-six current and former Alaska=20 Airlines flight attendants say they have suffered severe neurological=20 damage from being repeatedly exposed to toxic chemicals on MD-80 flights=20 during the 1980s and 1990s. The case is expected to go to the jury this=20 month, and the verdict could ripple well beyond Seattle, Alaska Airlines'=20 hometown. A victory for the flight attendants could damage the public's=20 confidence in the more than 1,700 MD-80s and DC-9s, the MD-80's predecessor= =20 model, used by airlines worldwide. It could also force airlines and=20 aircraft makers to confront contaminated air problems that regularly turn=20 up on other models. And it might stir further action to reduce the health=20 risks for millions who fly, especially flight crews, young children and=20 people sensitive to certain chemicals. "This is a big environmental issue with serious consequences," says Jean=20 Christophe Balouet, an environmental consultant based in Paris who has=20 worked for flight crew unions in several countries. Airlines and aircraft=20 makers, he says, have been "reluctant to admit contamination takes place=20 because they'd have to compensate the people who have been exposed." Last year, the Alaska flight attendants won a $725,000 out-of-court=20 settlement from Alaska Airlines, and now they're going after two of the=20 nation's biggest companies: Boeing and Honeywell. The plaintiffs contend=20 both companies have known for decades that the MD-80 and DC-9 have design=20 flaws that make it easy for leaking chemical fluids to get sucked into the= =20 auxiliary power unit, or APU, and mix with cabin air. The APU is a small=20 turbine engine used to generate electricity and circulate cabin air before= =20 takeoff. Boeing inherited responsibility for the MD-80 and DC-9 models when= =20 it bought McDonnell Douglas in 1997. Honeywell owns AlliedSignal, which=20 made the APU. Both companies dispute the flight attendants' claims. They say fumes that=20 enter the passenger cabin don't contain enough chemicals to cause harm. The= =20 lawsuit is believed to be the first to assert that an aircraft maker is=20 responsible for the quality of the air breathed by passengers and airline=20 crews. Jets built in the 1980s and since use 50% recirculated cabin air,=20 instead of 100% outside air, as earlier models do. Yet a wider group of=20 people now routinely travel by air. In no other public venue can you find=20 infants, the elderly and the infirm crammed into a public space =97 with no= =20 exits =97 and air supply systems in close proximity to pressurized lines of= =20 toxic chemicals. Over the past decade, flight attendants, pilots and=20 public-health advocates worldwide have clamored for air quality testing and= =20 standards. In a report to Congress in December, the National Academy of=20 Sciences called for establishment of a surveillance program to monitor=20 cabin air quality and document health effects. "If people had half a clue=20 about the possibility that this environment they're entering for whatever=20 period of time could jeopardize them, they'd be up in arms," says former=20 flight attendant Debra Bradford, the lead plaintiff. Problems on other models The Alaska flight attendants point to evidence the problem goes well beyond= =20 their airline's jets. A July 1996 Alaska Airlines maintenance document,=20 introduced during the trial, identifies 15 other airlines reporting=20 instances of "fluids entering APU air intake" on DC-9s and MD-80s and=20 resulting in "associated passenger/crew complaints including illnesses."=20 Among the most well-known airlines cited were Alitalia, American, Swissair,= =20 TWA and US Airways. To gauge how often air quality problems are reported on= =20 DC-9s and MD-80s, USA TODAY checked the Federal Aviation Administration's=20 Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) database. The FAA requires airlines to=20 file the one-page documents each time a mechanical problem arises. They are= =20 an imperfect indicator because some airlines are more rigorous about filing= =20 them than others. Even so, safety experts consider SDRs a useful tool for=20 spotting industrywide problems. From 1974 through mid-2001, eight U.S.=20 carriers =97 American, Northwest, TWA, Delta, Continental, US Airways,=20 Midwest Express and Alaska =97 reported 1,051 incidents of fumes, smoke,=20 haze, mist or odors entering the cabin air supply system of DC-9s and=20 MD-80s, USA TODAY found after reviewing SDRs supplied by Air Data Research= =20 of Helotes, Texas. In a majority of the reports, the aircraft turned back to the gate or made= =20 an unscheduled landing. Typically, the air supply system was inspected,=20 parts replaced and the jet returned to service. The DC-9/MD-80 isn't the=20 only model with cabin air problems. Through the 1990s, "air quality=20 incidents" have been reported on Airbus 320s, Boeing DC-10s, 737s, 757s and= =20 the British Aerospace BAe 146, other airline maintenance records and union= =20 surveys of airline crews show. In October, the British Air Line Pilots=20 Association surveyed 93 crews who reported more than 1,600 events of fumes= =20 reaching the flight deck on Boeing 757s. The events ranged from pilots "noticing some smells" and a few "serious=20 incidents where crews had to put on oxygen masks," says Bruce D'Ancey,=20 assistant technical secretary for the union. Honeywell and Boeing maintain= =20 that leaks, in general, occur so infrequently and pollutants mixing with=20 cabin air are so minuscule that health risks are minimal. "The level of=20 (chemicals) that would enter the cabin environment in event of a leak is=20 1/1,000th to 1/10,000th of what would be required to even begin to be=20 potentially harmful to human health," says Honeywell attorney Bradley= Keller. Though declining to comment specifically on the trial, Boeing provided a=20 statement listing 11 studies purporting to show cabin air "pollutant=20 levels" to be "low and, in general, not different from ground-based=20 environments such as your home or office." Medical experts say the right kind of research =97 studies that analyze=20 contaminated air, not just cabin air with no reported problems =97 has yet= to=20 be done. "Industry keeps saying there's no evidence that people have been=20 hurt, but there's no evidence people have not been hurt either," says=20 Christiaan van Netten, a professor at the University of British Columbia's= =20 Department of Health Care and Epidemiology. "Basically, we don't know=20 because we have yet to catch one of these incidents with the proper=20 instruments." Advice ignored A good place to begin such detective work would be on any DC-9 or MD-80,=20 says plaintiffs' attorney Randy Gordon. He and another attorney, Sam Elder,= =20 have spent four years gathering evidence of what they say are two design=20 flaws involving the APU. They begin with the placement of the APU's air inlet, the rectangular=20 opening through which the unit draws in fresh air, in a "6 o'clock"=20 position at the rear belly of the fuselage. Gordon and Elder contend that=20 as McDonnell Douglas incorporated improvements to the 1960s-era DC-9, it=20 should have heeded advice in a 1974 installation handbook suggesting the=20 air inlet ought to be moved. That's because hydraulic fluid lines running=20 throughout the aircraft invariably leak fluid into the belly, which is=20 designed with small "weep" holes so such fluid can drain out. Gravity and=20 motion can draw fluid toward the rear belly, where the air inlet sucks it=20 in like a vacuum. The APU then compresses the fluid and mixes it with air=20 delivered into the plane's ventilation system. "The least favorable location is an inlet located well aft of the bottom=20 surface of the fuselage," the installation handbook warns. "Fluids likely=20 to be ingested with this type of inlet include those that may be spilled=20 within the aircraft fuselage." SAE, a group that sets industrial standards= =20 for lubricants, reinforced that warning in a 1981 advisory: "APU inlets=20 should not be located on the bottom of the fuselage where there is maximum= =20 exposure to ... fluid leakage." But it wasn't until after Boeing acquired=20 McDonnell Douglas in 1997 that something was done. In 1999, more than a=20 year after the Bradford lawsuit was filed, Boeing certified the latest=20 version of the MD-80 and renamed it the Boeing 717, with one telling=20 change: The APU air inlet was raised to one side, in the 2 o'clock=20 position, of the fuselage, where it is unlikely to suck up leaking fluids.= =20 Boeing officials testified that the air inlet was moved solely to meet=20 stricter FAA ground noise rules. But Gordon and Elder contend Boeing moved= =20 the inlet to reduce future liabilities. "Everyone knew the 6 o'clock location was prone to ingestion problems, so=20 when the FAA said move it for noise, they had an excuse to do the right=20 thing for the wrong reason," Gordon says. The FAA in recent years has=20 required airlines using DC-9s and MD-80s to install metal strips and drain= =20 tubes near the air inlet to help direct leaked fluids away from it. An FAA= =20 order in September 2000 makes reference to "reports of smoke and odor ...=20 due to hydraulic fluid leaking in the APU inlet, and subsequently into the= =20 air conditioning system." The order requires airlines to strengthen=20 hydraulic lines prone to cracking, "which could result in smoke and odors=20 in the passenger cabin or cockpit." When smoke or odor is reported on an=20 American Airlines MD-80, the carrier removes the plane from service to=20 conduct a "burn-out" procedure designed to remove all remnants of the=20 leaked fluid from the air supply pumps and ducts. American has retrofitted= =20 its fleet of 360 MD-80s with higher-powered APUs and installed all=20 available diverters and upgradeable ducting and fluid lines, says American= =20 spokesman John Hotard. "We've built in a set of policies and procedures over the years to try to=20 prevent fluid ingestion into the APU and odors in the cabin," Hotard says. Gordon and Elder say the second design problem came to light in the 1980s=20 when airlines began reporting an unexpectedly high number of premature APU= =20 removals because of chronic leaks of an internal oil seal, court records=20 show. In 1995, AlliedSignal assigned an engineer, Arthur Eckstat, to try to= =20 resolve the problem. Now retired, Eckstat testified that he discovered=20 AlliedSignal had failed to adequately test the compatibility of a commonly= =20 used lubrication oil with a certain type of seal. The oil turned out to be= =20 more corrosive to that particular seal than anybody thought. In August=20 1996, AlliedSignal began to call for airlines to switch to a compatible=20 seal the next time they removed the APU for an overhaul. Karl Pfitzer,=20 Honeywell's director of product safety and integrity, says most airlines,=20 including Alaska, made the switch by 1998. "We think it has been fully=20 resolved," Pfitzer says. But by then, APU seal leaks had plagued airlines for more than a decade,=20 Gordon says. Incompatible seals and a poorly located air inlet, he says,=20 combined to make the 1990s a decade when Alaska Airlines received about=20 1,600 reports of what the airline began calling "unexplained illnesses"=20 from crew members and passengers. "Mysteries are cheaper than fixes," he= says. Mystery illnesses On a June 1996 MD-80 flight from Sacramento to Seattle, Terri Nixon, then=20 an Alaska flight attendant for 10 years, became dizzy and confused. She=20 subsequently developed blurred vision, migraines, extreme fatigue, balance= =20 problems and memory loss. Nixon lost her ability to multitask and, after the airline rejected her=20 workers' compensation claim, was forced to go on welfare. She now works as= =20 a cocktail waitress and has trouble remembering things. "I write all my=20 orders down. You learn to cope." Karen Burns had been a flight attendant for eight years when she boarded a= =20 flight from Cabo San Lucas, Mexico, to Phoenix in July 1996. On the flight,= =20 she and two co-workers became seriously ill. Maintenance records show the=20 MD-80 had leaked 8 quarts of hydraulic fluid. For the next two years, Burns= =20 endured violent, involuntary jerking of her upper trunk and arms. Six years= =20 later, she still has occasional shakes and hasn't been back to work. "As I= =20 start getting tired, I don't hold myself right, and it becomes more=20 noticeable." Taking chances Bradford, a nine-year veteran at Alaska, says she got used to toughing out= =20 a variety of flulike symptoms she'd sometimes leave work with. In March=20 1998, she went from the airport to her hotel room feeling acutely=20 depressed. She says she began coughing up blood and developed respiratory=20 problems, memory lapses and chronic disorientation over the next three=20 years. "It's like Russian roulette for anybody who flies," Bradford says.=20 "You never know when your number is up." During the past 10 weeks, a dozen= =20 physicians and medical experts have testified for the plaintiffs that the=20 flight attendants' central nervous systems have been damaged by exposure to= =20 organophosphates, a class of chemicals used in hydraulic fluid and jet=20 engine lubrication oil. Organophosphates are used in pesticides and nerve=20 gas. Gordon has introduced evidence showing how the APU can superheat=20 leaked fluids into a toxic "chemical soup" and how low concentrations of=20 chemicals breathed on several different flights can, for some people, be=20 more harmful than one large exposure. Keller describes the plaintiffs as "healthy people who live very active=20 lifestyles." Toxicologist Carl Mackerer testified that a flight attendant=20 could work in a "visible mist environment" for "two hours a day, seven days= =20 a week, 52 weeks a year, for more than two years without sustaining ... a=20 delayed neurotoxic reaction." Plaintiffs' attorney Elder notes that even=20 though Alaska, Honeywell and Boeing do not admit wrongdoing, each has taken= =20 steps to reduce opportunities for chemicals to mix with cabin air. "They've= =20 probably solved the specific instance of seal incompatibility, but seals=20 still sometimes leak, and the air inlet is still down there on the belly of= =20 the plane," Elder says. "I think it happens less frequently than it used to= =20 =97 but it still happens." Whatever the jury in Seattle decides, some flight= =20 attendants feel they've already won. "For so long, they've tried to cover=20 it up and make us think it was all in our heads, " Nixon says. "It was so=20 gratifying to get on the stand and tell what happened to us." 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