[Yum] Security issues with include= implementation in yum.conf

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Some initial work on a patch [1] adding include= functionality to
yum.conf has been submitted to bugzilla [2] for review and possible
addition into the 2.1 branch. Some security questions came up in
discussion with seth and I was hoping to solicit feedback from the list
on whether anyone thought this to be a significant issue.

First, includes are recursive. e.g. yum.conf may include a file that
includes a file that includes a file ad infinitum. And, it is possible
to include either local files or remote (http/ftp) files. The problem
here is that it is (currently) possible for a remote file to include any
other file. When the remote file is managed by the user this isn't a big
deal but if repositories started providing files for users to include=
in their yum.conf's, this could lead to security concerns in that the
remote file can basically set arbitrary values in yum.conf (adding other
repositories behind the scenes, etc). Or, if a remote file is
compromised, it could point to some other repository URL without the
user knowing, which may allow a malicious someone to update almost
anything (in the absence of gpg).

Should the responsibility of ensuring included files are "safe" be yum's
or the user's? I would argue that the user should be responsible but
that something should be noted in the yum.conf man page about
discouraging using include on remote files that are not under the direct
control of the user.

-Ryan

[1]
http://devel.linux.duke.edu/bugzilla/attachment.cgi?id=24&action=view

[2] Bugzilla for include=
http://devel.linux.duke.edu/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=62





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