Milan Zamazal <mzamazal@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > >> On Thu, Jul 02, 2020 at 01:21:15PM +0200, Milan Zamazal wrote: >>> The second problem is that a VM fails to start with a backing NVDIMM in >>> devdax mode due to SELinux preventing access to the /dev/dax* device (it >>> doesn't happen with any other NVDIMM modes). Who should be responsible >>> for handling the SELinux label appropriately in that case? libvirt, the >>> system administrator, anybody else? Using <seclabel> in NVDIMM's source >>> doesn't seem to be accepted by the domain XML schema. >> >> The expectation is that out of the box SELinux will "just work". So >> anything that is broken is a bug in either libvirt or selinux policy. >> >> There is no expectation/requirement to use <seclabel> unless you want >> to setup non-default behaviour which isn't the case here. >> >> IOW this sounds like a genuine bug. > > OK, I'll try to find out what and where is the problem exactly. The problem apparently is that /dev/dax* is a character device rather than a block device (such as /dev/pmem*), which is not expected by SELinux policy rules. This is an NVDIMM in fsdax mode: # ls -lZ /dev/pmem0 brw-rw----. 1 root disk system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 259, 0 Jul 9 11:39 /dev/pmem0 This is the same NVDIMM reconfigured as devdax: # ls -lZ /dev/dax0.0 crw-------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 252, 5 Jul 9 11:43 /dev/dax0.0 (Unix permissions are different, but when I change them to `disk' group and 660, the same problem still occurs.) audit.log reports the following when starting a VM with an NVDIMM device in devdax mode: type=AVC msg=audit(1594144691.758:913): avc: denied { map } for pid=21659 comm="qemu-kvm" path="/dev/dax0.0" dev="tmpfs" ino=1521557 scontext=system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c216,c981 tcontext=system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c216,c981 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 type=AVC msg=audit(1594144691.758:914): avc: denied { map } for pid=21659 comm="qemu-kvm" path="/dev/dax0.0" dev="tmpfs" ino=1521557 scontext=system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c216,c981 tcontext=system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c216,c981 tclass=chr_file permissive=0 Indeed, svirt_t map access to svirt_image_t is allowed only for files and block devices: # sesearch -A -p map -s svirt_t -t svirt_image_t ... allow svirt_t svirt_image_t:blk_file map; allow svirt_t svirt_image_t:file map; What to do about it? Do I handle the NVDIMM in a wrong way or should sVirt policies be fixed? Thanks, Milan