Milan Zamazal <mzamazal@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: > >> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 12:18:32PM +0200, Milan Zamazal wrote: >>> Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@xxxxxxxxxx> writes: >>> >> >>> > On Wed, Sep 04, 2019 at 03:38:25PM +0200, Milan Zamazal wrote: >>> >> Hi, I'm trying to add TLS migrations to oVirt, but I've hit a problem >>> >> with certificate checking. >>> > >>> >> >>> >> oVirt uses the destination host IP address, rather than the host name, >>> >> in the migration URI passed to virDomainMigrateToURI3. One reason for >>> >> doing that is that a separate migration network may be used for >>> >> migrations, while the host name resolves to the management network >>> >> interface. >>> >> >>> >> But it causes a problem with certificate checking. The destination IP >>> >> address is checked against the name, which is a host name, given in the >>> >> destination certificate. That means there is mismatch and the migration >>> >> fails. I don't think it'd be a very good idea to avoid the problem by >>> >> putting IP addresses into server certificates. >>> > >>> > In fact that is *exactly* what you should be doing. >>> > >>> > Traditionally certificates were created with the 'common name' field >>> > holding the fully qualified DNS based hostname for the server. >>> > >>> > This was long known to be a problem because it is very common for >>> > servers to have multiple DNS names, or for clients to use the >>> > unqualified hostname, or use the IP address(es). >>> >>> The problem with putting IP addresses into certificates is that the >>> certificate must be updated each time an IP address changes, is added or >>> is removed. Doing this in oVirt would be complicated and error-prone. >>> While host names are stable, host networks and the related IP addresses >>> may change. >>> >>> > Thus, the "Subject alt name" extension was created. This allows >>> > certificates to be created containing multiple hostnames and >>> > multiple IP addresses. The certificate will be validated correctly >>> > if any one of those data items matches. When 'subject alt name' is >>> > present in a certificate, the 'common name' field should be completely >>> > ignored by compliant TLS clients, so you are free to put whatever >>> > you want in the common name - hostname or IP address or blah... >>> >>> We can switch to using Subject Alt Name and we have a patch for that now >>> based on your advice, but it doesn't solve the problem with tracking IP >>> address changes and updating the corresponding certificates whenever a >>> change occurs. >>> >>> > If you look at our docs, we updated them to illustrate how to >>> > issue certs containing hostnames + IP addresses: >>> > >>> > https://libvirt.org/remote.html#Remote_TLS_server_certificates >>> > >>> >> >>> >> Is there any way to make TLS migrations working under these >>> >> circumstances? For instance, SPICE remote-viewer allows the client to >>> >> specify the certificate subject to expect on the host when connecting to >>> >> it using an IP address. Can (or could) libvirt do something similar? >>> >>> Would it be possible? We have host names in the certificates under our >>> control and we know which host name to expect in the certificate >>> regardless the IP address used for the given connection. Checking the >>> certificate against a given host name would solve the problem easily and >>> robustly for us. >> >> There's two options that could make it work >> >> - Define a new migration parameter which lets apps pass in the hostname >> to use for TLS cert validation to libvirt, which would have to then >> pass it into QEMU > > I think this is the best option. We know the destination host name, > while we need to use an IP address to connect to it in order to use a > particular network. If we can agree on this, should I file a corresponding RFE on libvirt? Thanks, Milan >> - The source host libvirtd has a connection to the dest host libvirtd. >> It can thus ask dest host what its primary hostname is, and then >> automatically tell QEMu to use that for TLS cert validation. This >> could cause problems though for people already using TLS certs >> with IP addresses in. > > This doesn't look very good from the security point of view, since then > the source doesn't check it really connects to the host it expects, just > that the destination host has a valid certificate signed by the right CA > (I suppose). It may be good enough or even useful for some scenarios, > but not for others. _______________________________________________ libvirt-users mailing list libvirt-users@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvirt-users
