On 07/04/2014 05:29 AM, Peter Krempa wrote: > Refactor the existing code to allow re-using it for the per-image label > restore too. > --- > src/security/security_dac.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- > 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) > > > - secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_DAC_NAME); > + /* Don't restore labels on readoly/shared disks, because other VMs may > + * still be accessing these Alternatively we could iterate over all running Pre-existing typo, but s/these/these./ > + * domains and try to figure out if it is in use, but this would not work > + * for clustered filesystems, since we can't see running VMs using the file > + * on other nodes Safest bet is thus to skip the restore step. s/nodes/nodes./ > - /* If we have a shared FS & doing migrated, we must not > - * change ownership, because that kills access on the > - * destination host which is sub-optimal for the guest > - * VM's I/O attempts :-) > + /* If we have a shared FS & doing migrated, we must not change ownership, s/doing migrated/are doing migration/ > + * because that kills access on the destination host which is sub-optimal > + * for the guest VM's I/O attempts :-) Technically, changing SELinux labels kills guests (that takes effect immediately); but per POSIX, calling chmod() should not (as chmod only affects future open() calls, but not already-open fds). But then you throw in non-POSIX NFS, and there we have a case where chmod() can kill access to open fds (naughty NFS). So this comment is true, but only because of botched file systems :) ACK with comment cleanups. -- Eric Blake eblake redhat com +1-919-301-3266 Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
Attachment:
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
-- libvir-list mailing list libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list