This patch fixes the secret type checking done in the virDomainDiskDefParseXML function. Previously, it would not allow any volumes that utilized a secret. This patch is a simple bypass of the checking code for volumes. Signed-off-by: Adam Walters <adam@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- src/conf/domain_conf.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index 1d5cc14..be6742a 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -5494,7 +5494,11 @@ virDomainDiskDefParseXML(virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt, cur = cur->next; } - if (auth_secret_usage != -1 && auth_secret_usage != expected_secret_usage) { + /* Bypass this check for volumes. On libvirtd start, pool definitions are not + * yet parsed, and thus we can't expect to have a valid expected_secret_usage. + */ + if (auth_secret_usage != -1 && auth_secret_usage != expected_secret_usage && + def->type != VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_VOLUME) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("invalid secret type '%s'"), virSecretUsageTypeTypeToString(auth_secret_usage)); @@ -18442,7 +18446,8 @@ virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk, if (!disk->src || disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_NETWORK || (disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_VOLUME && disk->srcpool && - disk->srcpool->mode == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_SOURCE_POOL_MODE_DIRECT)) + (disk->srcpool->mode == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_SOURCE_POOL_MODE_DIRECT || + disk->srcpool->actualtype == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_NETWORK))) return 0; if (iter(disk, disk->src, 0, opaque) < 0) -- 1.8.5.3 -- libvir-list mailing list libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list