On 01/23/2014 08:45 PM, Adam Walters wrote:
> This patch fixes the secret type checking done in the
> virDomainDiskDefParseXML function. Previously, it would not allow any
> volumes that utilized a secret. This patch is a simple bypass of the
> checking code for volumes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Adam Walters <adam@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> src/conf/domain_conf.c | 6 ++++--
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
> index 28e24f9..773dc26 100644
> --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
> +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
> @@ -5418,7 +5418,8 @@ virDomainDiskDefParseXML(virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt,
> cur = cur->next;
> }
>
> - if (auth_secret_usage != -1 && auth_secret_usage != expected_secret_usage) {
> + if (auth_secret_usage != -1 && auth_secret_usage != expected_secret_usage &&
> + def->type != VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_VOLUME) {
> virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
> _("invalid secret type '%s'"),
> virSecretUsageTypeTypeToString(auth_secret_usage));
So an rbd volume can have a secret when the pool has auth set to none?
Otherwise it seems the volume's secret data might get overwritten by
qemuTranslateDiskSourcePoolAuth.
And this could also be added to qemuxml2argvtest.
> @@ -18214,7 +18215,8 @@ virDomainDiskDefForeachPath(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
> if (!disk->src || disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_NETWORK ||
> (disk->type == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_VOLUME &&
> disk->srcpool &&
> - disk->srcpool->mode == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_SOURCE_POOL_MODE_DIRECT))
> + (disk->srcpool->mode == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_SOURCE_POOL_MODE_DIRECT ||
> + disk->srcpool->mode == VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_TYPE_NETWORK)))
What is the purpose of this? You are comparing the source pool mode against a
disk type constant. It seems this can never be true in this case.
Jan
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