On 2013年01月31日 03:36, John Ferlan wrote:
The 'dname' string was only filled in within the loop when available;
however, the TRACE macros used it unconditionally and caused Coverity
to compain about BAD_SIZEOF. Using a dnameptr keeps Coverity at bay and
makes sure dname was properly filled before attempting the TRACE message.
---
src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c
index 0f0ddff..29d1508 100644
--- a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c
+++ b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* virnettlscontext.c: TLS encryption/x509 handling
*
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2013 Red Hat, Inc.
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ static int virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt,
unsigned int nCerts, i;
char dname[256];
size_t dnamesize = sizeof(dname);
+ char *dnameptr = NULL;
memset(dname, 0, dnamesize);
@@ -1025,6 +1026,7 @@ static int virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt,
"[session]", gnutls_strerror(ret));
goto authfail;
}
+ dnameptr = dname;
VIR_DEBUG("Peer DN is %s", dname);
if (virNetTLSContextCheckCertDN(cert, "[session]", sess->hostname, dname,
@@ -1062,14 +1064,14 @@ static int virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt,
PROBE(RPC_TLS_CONTEXT_SESSION_ALLOW,
"ctxt=%p sess=%p dname=%s",
- ctxt, sess, dname);
+ ctxt, sess, dnameptr ? dnameptr : "(unknown)");
return 0;
authdeny:
PROBE(RPC_TLS_CONTEXT_SESSION_DENY,
"ctxt=%p sess=%p dname=%s",
- ctxt, sess, dname);
+ ctxt, sess, dnameptr ? dnameptr : "(unknown)");
return -1;
I guess dname[0] is guaranteed to be not nul as long as
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn succeeded.
If so, the patch can be simplified as:
dname[0] ? dname : "(unknown)"
Osier
--
libvir-list mailing list
libvir-list@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list