On 03/06/2012 01:34 AM, Eric Blake wrote:
Using 'unsigned long' for memory values is risky on 32-bit platforms,
as a PAE guest can have more than 4GiB memory. Our API is
(unfortunately) locked at 'unsigned long' and a scale of 1024, but
the rest of our system should consistently use 64-bit values,
especially since the previous patch centralized overflow checking.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (_virDomainDef): Always use 64-bit values
for memory. Change hugepage_backed to a bool.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainDefParseXML)
(virDomainDefCheckABIStability, virDomainDefFormatInternal): Fix
clients.
* src/vmx/vmx.c (virVMXFormatConfig): Likewise.
* src/xenxs/xen_sxpr.c (xenParseSxpr, xenFormatSxpr): Likewise.
* src/xenxs/xen_xm.c (xenXMConfigGetULongLong): New function.
(xenXMConfigGetULong, xenXMConfigSetInt): Avoid truncation.
(xenParseXM, xenFormatXM): Fix clients.
* src/phyp/phyp_driver.c (phypBuildLpar): Likewise.
* src/openvz/openvz_driver.c (openvzDomainSetMemoryInternal):
Likewise.
* src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c (vboxDomainDefineXML): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuBuildCommandLine): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStart): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h (qemuMonitorGetBalloonInfo): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor_text.h (qemuMonitorTextGetBalloonInfo):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor_text.c (qemuMonitorTextGetBalloonInfo):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h (qemuMonitorJSONGetBalloonInfo):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c (qemuMonitorJSONGetBalloonInfo):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainGetInfo)
(qemuDomainGetXMLDesc): Likewise.
* src/uml/uml_conf.c (umlBuildCommandLine): Likewise.
---
diff --git a/src/xenxs/xen_sxpr.c b/src/xenxs/xen_sxpr.c
index f8390ea..beafb95 100644
--- a/src/xenxs/xen_sxpr.c
+++ b/src/xenxs/xen_sxpr.c
@@ -1101,9 +1133,15 @@ cleanup:
static
-int xenXMConfigSetInt(virConfPtr conf, const char *setting, long l) {
+int xenXMConfigSetInt(virConfPtr conf, const char *setting, long long l) {
virConfValuePtr value = NULL;
+ if ((long) l != l) {
+ XENXS_ERROR(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
I suppose the VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR is intentional.
+ _("integer overflow in trying to store %lld to %s"),
+ l, setting);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (VIR_ALLOC(value)< 0) {
virReportOOMError();
return -1;
ACK,
Peter
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